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Abstract
European transmission grids face a huge challenge over the next decades. Driven
by European energy policy goals aiming at sustainability, competitiveness and
security of supply, massive investments in the transmission grids are required to
enable these goals and fulfill its tasks at the heart of the European power system.
This challenge clearly plays at a larger level than the traditional national scale
requiring stronger regional or European collaboration in planning and financing of
investments.
This thesis firstly performs an assessment of the current framework and analyzes how
the European interest is integrated in the current investment planning, financing
and decision-making process. It is observed that the national level remains crucial
and the incorporation of European goals is limited. Hence, an area of tension exists
between both levels.
Next, a formal framework is developed for investigating this wedge. Three
collaboration concepts are defined. They differ in the assumed level of collaboration
between the national decision-makers and in the assumed incorporation of European
goals. The three concepts are modelled mathematically as quadratic programs,
mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints or equilibrium problems
with equilibrium constraints and tested on small examples using standard solution
methods. All models assume a static treatment of the time horizon, no uncertainties
and a reactive planning approach with respect to generation investments. A
perfectly competitive market with nodal pricing using a DC load flow approximation
for modelling the network flows is explicitly modeled in each concept. In the
objective function only economic welfare is maximized. Comparison of the concepts
allows drawing conclusions on how different forms of collaboration influence the
ultimate investment outcome.
i

Samenvatting
Het Europese hoogspanningsnet staat voor enorme uitdagingen de komende
decennia. Gedreven door Europese energiedoelstellingen inzake duurzaamheid,
interne markt en bevoorradingszekerheid, zijn gigantische investeringen in het
netwerk noodzakelijk om het elektriciteitssysteem, waarin het een centrale plaats
inneemt, toe te laten die doelen te verwezenlijken en de opgelegde taken te vervullen.
Deze uitdagingen overstijgen duidelijk het klassieke nationale niveau en vereisen
een sterkere regionale en Europese samenwerking inzake planning en financiering
van investeringen.
Vooreerst wordt in deze verhandeling het huidige kader gewikt en gewogen en wordt
geanalyseerd hoe vandaag het Europese belang in rekening wordt gebracht bij de
planning en financiering van investeringen en tijdens het beslissingsproces. Dit
leidt tot de vaststelling dat het nationale niveau een cruciale rol blijft spelen en
dat Europese doelstellingen slechts in beperkte mate doorwegen. Er is bijgevolg
een spanningsveld tussen deze twee niveaus.
Vervolgens wordt een formeel kader ontwikkeld dat toelaat deze wig te onderzoeken.
Drie concepten voor samenwerking worden gedefinieerd. Zij verschillen in de
veronderstelde mate van samenwerking tussen nationale beslissingsnemers en hoe de
Europese doelen in rekening worden gebracht. De drie concepten worden wiskundig
gemodelleerd als kwadratische programma’s, mathematische programma’s met
evenwichtsvoorwaarden of evenwichtsproblemen met evenwichtsvoorwaarden en
ge¨ıllustreerd aan de hand van kleine voorbeelden die worden opgelost gebruikmakend
van standaard oplossingsmethoden. Alle modellen veronderstellen een statische
behandeling van de tijdshorizon, geen onzekerheden en een reactieve benadering
ten op zichte van investeringen aan de productiezijde. Een markt met perfecte
concurrentie en een knooppuntgebaseerd prijsmechanisme wordt voorop gesteld
waarbij de vermogenstromen in het net gemodelleerd worden via een DC load
flow benadering. In de objectieffunctie wordt enkel de economische welvaart
gemaximaliseerd. Op basis van vergelijking van de concepten kunnen conclusies
getrokken worden aangaande hoe verschillende vormen van samenwerking de
uiteindelijke investeringen kunnen be¨ınvloeden.
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Voorwoord
Na ruim vijf jaar ligt dit boekje dan eindelijk op tafel. De volgende hoofdstukken
zijn het resultaat van het gevoerde onderzoek en geven in zekere mate ook het
afgelegde parcours weer. Er is echter een groot hiaat: het menselijke luik. Velen
hebben me de voorbije jaren steeds gesteund en geholpen. Hoog tijd dus om te
zorgen dat dit boekje een volwaardig verslag van de voorbije tijd kan zijn en om
wat menselijke gezelligheid en warmte toe te voegen aan de veeleer droge analyses
en resultaten.
Alles begon in de Leuvense binnenstad met hoorcolleges over energie die mijn
interesse wekten. De reden voor die interesse, zo ontdekte ik later, is de combinatie
van een honger naar iets meer techniek en een voorliefde voor netwerkeconomie.
Uiteindelijk belandde ik in een groepje van handelsingenieurs op Electa, een bastion
van ingenieurs. De spil in dit hele verhaal is Ronnie. Hij heeft me niet enkel de
kans gegeven om op Electa te werken. Gedurende vijf jaar heeft hij tal van kansen
gegeven: de kans om met interessante partners samen te werken, de kans om een
stukje van de wereld te zien (incl. de Vurige Stede), de kans om fouten te mogen
maken en natuurlijk ook de kans om met hem als promotor aan dit doctoraat te
kunnen werken. Ik heb op die manier veel kunnen leren en niet enkel over het
energievraagstuk, maar bijvoorbeeld ook dat vele problemen een menselijke kant
hebben (tot zover de illusie van het rationele individu) en dat ingenieurs best een
gezellig volkje zijn. Bedankt voor alle kansen! Ik wacht enkel nog op de kans om
ooit in een Duffels bioscoopcomplex een film op het witte doek te zien, maar ja. . .
Dit boekje was ook niet mogelijk geweest zonder de steun van de voltallige jury en
de juryvoorzitter. Bedankt voor de terechte opmerkingen en de vele suggesties die
de kwaliteit enkel ten goede zijn gekomen.
Ee´n jurylid wens ik bijzonder te vermelden. Vanaf dag e´e´n op Electa was Leo de
mentor die me door dit doctoraat heeft geleid. Ik wens elke doctoraatsstudent een
zelfde klankbord, kritische geest, motivator en Italiaanse fontein van ideee¨n toe.
Zijn aandeel in wat ik bereikt heb de voorbije jaren valt moeilijk te overschatten.
Om je dag in dag uit te kunnen motiveren, helpt het om het geluk aan je zijde te
hebben. Naast mij stond en staat steevast Joke. Bedankt om de voorbije jaren er
altijd te zijn, met een liefdevolle glimlach en moedgevend schouderklopje, maar
v
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ook met veel warmte, begrip, steun en interesse. Het geluk staat niet enkel aan
mijn zijde, ik ben omsingeld. Bedankt mama, papa en Linde om gedurende al die
jaren interesse te tonen en mij op alle mogelijke manieren te steunen.
Op het onderzoeksfront kwam warmte en gezelligheid vooral van lotgenoten, de
collega’s. Enkele tassen zijn weliswaar gesneuveld, maar de goede sfeer bracht ons
vaak aan de koffiemachine. Miko is er - geheel onterecht - wel bij gevaren en ook
de producent van de soldatenkoek heeft geen recessie gekend de voorbije jaren. De
groep koffiedrinkers en de locatie zijn doorheen de tijd weliswaar veranderd, maar
aan de gezelligheid (en de frequentie) is nooit geraakt.
Enkele collega’s hebben zeker hun stempel gedrukt op mijn Electa-tijd. In de eerste
plaats zijn er mijn bureaugenoten. Door enkele stoelendansen heb ik het plezier
gehad met velen een bureau te delen, maar Leen en Cedric zijn vaste waarden
en vaste discussiepartners over alles wat wel en niet met energie of beroemd en
bizar te maken heeft. Het was aangenaam toeven op ons bureau. Verder wil ik ook
David bedanken als partner in crime. Zijn inbreng in mijn doctoraat is groot, onder
andere dankzij de modelling Fridays en de bijhorende partyschotels en ijsjes in de
Lodge. Maar ook de organisatie van de quiz zo nu en dan, het bezoek aan RTE en
de droppings samen met Valentijn waren toppers. Ook alle andere collega’s zijn
stuk voor stuk fijne mensen om plezier mee te beleven tijdens een voetbalmatch,
in Londen aan zee en in Limburg, op vrijgezellenweekend, op een activiteit van
Guy Ener, op YEEES, op conferentie, op cafe´... Ook van de samenwerking in de
powergroep of in het labo heb ik enorm genoten. Het was een fijne tijd op Electa.
Tot slot nog een woord van dank voor de motor die Electa doet blijven draaien en
steeds te vinden is voor een babbel: de mensen van het secretariaat en het labo.
Zonder Katleen en Gerda zat ik nu nog ergens vast in een of andere procedure.
Samen met Veerle, Diane en Nathalie hebben ze ervoor gezorgd dat ik nooit iets
tekort kwam, zelfs niet wanneer het grafische kunsten betrof. Roland, Martin
en Johan hebben er dan weer voor gezorgd dat ik zorgeloos de labosessies ben
doorgekomen, maar stonden ook steevast garant voor een vrolijke noot.
Een welgemeende dankuwel!
Patrik
Mechelen
22 december 2011
List of symbols and abbreviations
Symbols
max Maximum
init Initial
∗ Optimal
p Period index
n, b Node index
t Generation technology index
l Line, corridor index
z Zone index
ΩP Set of periods
ΩN Set of nodes
ΩT Set of generation technologies
ΩL Set of lines
ΩZ Set of zones
TXY Transmission link between nodes X and Y
Tp Duration of period p [h]
An,p Intercept demand function in node n for period p [e]
Bn,p Slope demand function in node n for period p [e/MW2]
dn,p Demand in node n in period p [MW]
Cn,t,p Intercept generation cost function
in node n for technology t in period p [e]
Dn,t,p Slope generation cost function
in node n for technology t in period p [e/MW2]
gn,t,p Generation in node n for technology t in period p [MW]
CLl Annual line cost for line l [e/(MW.km.year)]
LNl Length of line l [km]
xl Invested capacity in line l [MW]
θn Voltage angle in node n
INC Network incidence matrix with rows indicating lines
and columns indicating nodes
Hl Susceptance of line l [S]
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viii
fl,p Flow on line l in period p [MW]
Fmaxl Flow limit for line l [MW]
Gmaxn,t,p Maximal generation output
in node n with technology t in period p [MW]
Λn,p Long run nodal price in node n in period p [e/MWh]
λn,p Short run nodal price in node n in period p [e/MWh]
NCl Number of circuits in corridor l
yl Dummy variable indicating wether line l is built or not
CCl Annual cost of building line l [e/year]
WFz Welfare in zone z [e/year]
Abbreviations
AC Alternating Current
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
BEMIP Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan
CR Congestion Revenues
CS Consumer Surplus
DC Direct Current
DCOPF Direct Current Optimal Power Flow
Dena Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH
EC European Commission
EEA European Economic Area
EERP European Economic Recovery Plan
EIP Energy Infrastructure Package
ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
EPEC Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints
ERGEG European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas
ETSO European Transmission System Operators
EU European Union
GA Genetic Algorithm
GNEP Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
ISO Independent system Operator
ITC Inter-TSO Compensation mechanism
KKT Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
LMP Locational Marginal Price
LP Linear Program
MIP Mixed-Integer Program
MIQP Mixed-Integer Quadratic Program
MPEC Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints
ix
NEC Net Export Curve
NLP Non-Linear Program
OPF Optimal Power Flow
Pareto CA Pareto-planner with Cost Allocation
Pareto w/o CA Pareto-planner without Cost Allocation
PIP Priority Interconnection Plan
PS Producer Suplus
QP Quadratic Program
RTD Research and Technology Development
TEN-E Trans-European Energy Networks
TSO Transmission System Operator
TYNDP Ten-Year Network Development Plan
UCTE Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity
General remarks
 The capitals used to indicate points in a figure in chapters 3 and 5 are not
listed above. It should be clear from the text that it are not the symbols
above which are referred to in these cases. Referral only occurs within a
single section and not throughout the text.
 Greek symbols always indicate dual variables. They are not specifically listed
in the symbol list, except for θ, λ and Λ which are used to indicate voltage
angles and short and long run nodal prices.
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1
Introduction
This introductory chapter intends to familiarize the reader with the topic
investigated, explain how the research materialized over the previous years and
how the text is structured. A brief description of the context and the motivation
of the performed research is given in section 1.1. The road towards this thesis is
described in section 1.2. Section 1.3 provides a guide to the reader by unfolding
the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Context and motivation
This thesis deals with electricity transmission investment planning and financing
in Europe. On the one hand Europe (and in particular continental Europe) is
characterized by a single interconnected transmission network connecting generation
facilities and demand centres. It serves as a backbone for the entire power system
and combines multiple tasks ranging from keeping the lights on over accomodating
a sustainable and low-carbon energy mix to facilitating international trade. On
the other hand it should not be overlooked that this interconnected network is
a patchwork of different national systems. Those systems are built and financed
nationally. Many assets still date from an era when a European vision was limited
1
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to mutual help in case of difficulties in generation. Although there have always
been clear benefits to interconnect different national grids (e.g. higher reliability,
better economic mix), the call for a better integrated European network has never
been heard louder than today.
Indeed, the transmission network faces a huge investment challenge for the next
decades. Not only are there several assets that approach the end of their lifetime
and need to be replaced1, but also how the network is planned, what it is planned
for and how it will be financed and used is undergoing drastic changes. Whereas
in the previous years the national level used to play the central (if not the only)
role, the regional and European levels are more and more coming into the picture.
Recent developments in European legislation and a renewed intrest in overlay grid
concepts and ’European electricity highways’ are visible manifestations of this
trend.
This transition from a nationally oriented approach to network investment planning
and financing to an approach inspired by European-wide goals and challenges is
not straightforward. The historical frameworks and decision processes are not fully
adapted to this new context and need to be redesigned. This redesign and the
question how different national decision-makers can collaborate in a European
context, is the main motivation for this thesis. This thesis and its results can
feed the debate with solid arguments. In particular in the field of transmission
investments, a momentum is reached with the Third Package going live and a
new infrastructure package on the drawing board. This research can provide
policy-makers with appropriate guidance for future choices.
1.2 Road towards this thesis
Transmission investments have been a hot topic over the last years. The number of
research projects in this area is significant, both from an academic and industrial
point view. Several projects have given shape to this thesis. Especially the research
question itself, but also the ideas for how to approach the question originate from
such projects.
A first project dealing with cross-border investments took place in collaboration
with a merchant transmission investor. Besides the pecularities arising from the
merchant nature of a project (e.g. specific European legislation, competition
assessments and the issue of determining the ’optimal’ investment capacity), it
allowed a close look at the potential of congestion revenues in the European context.
Obviously, financing, risk and profit are very important for a third party merchant
1Ageing assets and replacement investments are not dealt with in this thesis as this is considered
’business as usual’ and not linked to the specific European context of interconnected national
grids.
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investor. Additionally, this collaboration was also an early introduction to today’s
topic concerning overlay and offshore grids.
A second project in collaboration with a European transmission system operator
(TSO) focused in particular on the inter-TSO compensation (ITC) mechanism and
how it could (or could not) contribute to investments. Here the issue of incentives
for regulated transmission system operators came into play. Apart from a detailed
analysis of the ITC mechanism this project also served as a first eye-opener on the
misalignment of investment incentives.
This issue was further deepened in a third project with the same TSO where the
broader cross-border framework was analyzed and in particular the impact of the
Third Legislative Package was investigated. The results of this project are at the
root of chapter 2 and the research questions formulated at the end of that chapter.
In addition, several other research projects done by the research group Electa at
K.U.Leuven on the increasing European impact served as source for inspiration. In
particular research on market coupling, the coordination of power flow controlling
devices and the design and integration of balancing markets in a European context
helped in setting the scene [1–3].
1.3 Thesis overview
The thesis is structured around one central theme: collaboration of different
transmission planners in a single interconnected network.
In chapter 2 it is analysed why this topic is relevant and how the current European
framework performs. Building further on the short motivation of section 1.1, it sets
the scene, describes flaws in the current framework and distilles concrete research
questions. Whereas chapter 2 adopted a policy viewpoint for determining research
questions, chapter 3 is used to set up a formal framework allowing an in-depth
analysis of the research questions in the following chapters. The framework enables
the identification of three concrete collaboration concepts.
Before entering into the concrete modelling of the different collaboration concepts
defined in chapter 3, a literature overview on transmission planning models is
provided in chapter 4. Not only does this chapter identify several general design
options for transmission planning models, it also investigates the state-of-the-art on
how a situation with multiple transmission planners is dealt with in the academic
literature. Finally, the literature review allows determining an appropriate set of
general assumptions for all models presented in the following three chapters.
Backed up by the literature review and assumptions made in chapter 4, the three
collaboration concepts defined in chapter 3 are described, modelled and illustrated
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in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The internal structure of these chapters is identical. The
sequence of these chapters is chosen in such way that the mathematical complexity
increases and is presented in a logical way in order to facilitate a more easy access for
readers who are not familiar with concepts from operations research. Additionally,
a decreasing degree of collaboration can be noted when moving from chapter 5 to
chapter 7.
Comparison of the three different models allows answering the research questions.
The answers are formulated throughout the different chapters whenever they
occur as a result of the performed analysis. They are recapitulated in chapter 8
emphasizing the link with the policy analysis in chapter 2. In addition,
recommendations for further research are made.
2
European transmission
investment framework:
ready for the challenge?
This chapter positions this thesis in the European energy infrastructure debate.
Starting from the ongoing policy debate and a reality check, the research questions
are distilled.
In section 2.1 it is argued that there is a clear electricity transmission investment
challenge. Moreover, it is illustrated that this challenge is a direct consequence
of European energy policy. Additionally, it is suggested that the challenge goes
beyond the typical national level of decision-making. After these observations, it is
analysed in section 2.2 whether the current European framework for cross-border
investments is able to cope with this challenge or not. For planning, regulatory
oversight and financing, it is checked whether or not the European nature of the
challenge is adequately incorporated. Based on the findings of the first two sections
conclusions are drawn in section 2.3 and from these conclusions relevant research
questions are distilled. These questions are tackled in this thesis.
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2.1 European transmission investment challenge
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly, in section 2.1.1 the aim is to indicate
the origin and scale of the transmission investment challenge Europe is facing. It
is argued that European policy is clearly at the root of the challenge and that it
goes beyond national borders and historical network boundaries. Secondly, the
challenge is given a face by providing a brief look into the results of two recent
studies. It is important to gauge the size of the challenge before further analyzing
it and tackling underlying problems. This is pursued in section 2.1.2.
2.1.1 Policy-driven investment needs
Since 2007 the European Union (EU)1 by the voice of the European Council, the
European Commission and the European Parliament has repeatedly expressed
clear goals with respect to energy policy. A triangular vision is endorsed.
Sustainability, security of supply and a competitive and affordable energy supply
are put forward [4]. This general threefold goal heavily relies on adequate
energy infrastructure, including electricity transmission networks [5]. Transmission
networks are considered the backbone of the energy infrastructure and prerequisite
for meeting the goals. Although the three goals are intertwined, for each of them
it is highlighted how it poses a challenge for the transmission network.
 A sustainable energy future is strived for by reducing or even eliminating the
emission of greenhouse gasses. The electricity sector is considered key for
delivering on this goal. Europe set a 20% target for renewable energy by 2020.
This implies that a share of more than 30% of electrical energy should be
produced from renewable energy sources [6].2 Wind energy is already a major
contributor and its share in the energy mix is thought to further increase.
Locations with favourable conditions for developing wind energy are often
remotely located and not equally spread over Europe. Offshore and coastal
areas around the North Seas and the Baltic Sea are best suited to host wind
farms. However, these areas should be connected to the transmission grid
in order to bring the energy to the demand centres. An extra challenge is
1Although the European Union does not cover all countries in Europe and is limited to its
27 Member States, in this thesis no further distinction is made. The geographic scope is not
always the same when different legislative texts, frameworks and associations are considered.
For instance, the EU covers a different area than the European Economic Area (EEA) or than
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). The differences
and implications coming from this patchwork are not studied in this thesis and the presented
analysis remains valid without distinguishing between them.
2The debate concerning the role of nuclear energy in a low-carbon future is not touched upon
in this thesis but is obviously an important element in the discussion of a sustainable energy
future.
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put on the transmission network due to the variable output profile of wind
energy and other renewable energy sources as e.g. photovoltaics. When no
wind is available, other generation facilities should ensure the balance with
demand for electrical energy. Substantial investments in new connections and
reinforcements are required. For instance, a study focussing on the German
context identified the need for a tremendous amount of new transmission
investments required to accomodate further wind power development [7].
The challenge for the transmission network when wind energy is massively
integrated is studied at European scale by [8]. In particular, a strong focus
was put on the interconnections between the different countries. A similar
result emphasising the need for transmission investments is reported.
 Aiming for a secure energy supply is a goal playing at different fronts. Firstly,
there is the long-term energy mix and the dependence on primary energy
supplies. Diversification in the energy mix with the aim of lowering the
dependence of natural gas from outside Europe is a good example. The
development of renewable energy based on locally available resources is
another route followed in this process for diversification. The electricity
transmission grid again plays a central role. On the one hand there obviously
is the challenge of connecting the newly developed renewable energy plants,
but on the other hand at larger scale an adequate electricity transmission
grid can increase the possibilities for solidarity between different countries.
The burden for diversification can be shared by tapping into the best suited
locations. Secondly, as already hinted upon in the previous paragraph, the
transmission grid is the backbone for ensuring a short-term secure and reliable
electricity supply. Balancing demand and supply at European scale requires
sufficient interconnection capacity between the different national grids [3].
 The third goal pursues the establishment of a single European energy market
with the purpose of ensuring a competitive and affordable energy supply.
Electricity sector reforms taking off in the nineties introduced significant
changes with this goal in mind. The results of the Sector Inquiry published
by the European Commission in 2007 identified several obstacles impeding
a genuine European electricity market to become a reality [9]. A lack of
investments in the transmission network was one of the elements. Persistent
congestion on several interconnections resulting in diverging prices between
various national markets should be alleviated by transmission investments.
In general, by investing in the network and increasing available transmission
capacity for commercial transactions, a level playing field is created and new
entrants can more easily access the market. More fundamentally, a better
interconnected network allows benefitting to the full extent of the cheapest
electricity generation resources and avoids the use of expensive power plants
in congested areas.
8 EUROPEAN TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK: READY FOR THE CHALLENGE?
Not only are the goals formulated at the European level, their nature suggests that
a European or at least coordinated approach is required for attaining them in a
cost-effective manner (e.g. [10]). Several of the challenges identified above such as
accomodating massive wind power development, balancing demand and generation,
long-term solidarity and interconnecting markets go beyond the national level.
Although this level used to be (and still is) the main level for decision-making and
the subsidiarity principle should not be questioned, it at least appears beneficial
to take the challenge to a level with a larger geographic scope and to install a
framework for this collobaration with solid instutions and correct incentives for
all parties involved. This issue is further explored in this thesis with respect to
planning and financing of transmission investments.
2.1.2 Gauging the challenge
In the previous section it is discussed that all three European energy policy goals
require a strong grid and therefore new investments in it. The aim of this section
is to sketch an image of the size of the challenge. Results of two recent studies are
referred to for providing an indication of the technical and financial challenge.
It is already highlighted that Germany requires significant transmission investments
in order to fulfill its needs with respect to wind power for the year 2020. A study
conducted by Dena3 found that in Germany alone about 1700 km of additional
routes in the transmission grid are required when state-of-the-art technologies4
are applied and about 3600 km without these technologies [7]. The latter amount
is more than the total number of kilometers installed in Belgium in 2010 at 150,
220 and 380 kV (cables and overhead lines).5 Preparing the German network
would require 1.617 billion e per year until 2020 for the case with state-of-the-art
technologies and 0.946 billion e per year until 2020 without these technologies.6
For Europe as a whole the challenge is obviously larger. In 2010 ENTSO-E
published a first pilot Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP). In this plan
the European-wide transmission investments needs are assessed. A total length of
35300 km of new connections are identified. Additionally the upgrade of 6900 km
of existing connections is considered necessary. Financially this boils down to an
investment challenge during the next five years of 23 to 28 billion e. Note that
the TYNDP only looks ten years ahead. Hence, on the longer term the investment
challenge is even greater. For instance, offshore networks like a North Seas grid
are not yet taken into account.
3The Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH (Dena) is the German Energy Agency. It is the second
time in five years that Dena investigated the transmission impact of German wind power.
4In particular high temperature conductors are assumed [7].
5According to [11] 891, 297 and 2435 km are installed at respectively 380, 220 and 150 kV.
6The financial numbers are annuities assuming typical asset lifetimes for Germany [7].
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From these two examples it should be clear that the investment challenge is huge,
not only in terms of lines to be built but also when the price tag is taken into
account.
2.2 Analysis of the current European framework
In this section the European framework dealing with transmission investments is
analysed. The focus lies on all cross-border aspects. Purely national issues (e.g.
national tariff design) are not discussed. The current framework is by large the
result of the Third Legislative Package (further called ’Third Package’). With
respect to electricity, three documents are of particular importance: Regulation
(EC) No 713/2009, Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, and Directive 2009/72/EC
[12–14]. They are taken as a starting point for the analysis. Other elements of
the European framework like the Transeuropean Energy Networks (TEN-E), the
inter-TSO compenstion (ITC) mechanism and the European Economic Recovery
Plan (EERP) are also part of the analysis.
Additionally, the legislative proposals recently launched by the European
Commission on trans-European energy infrastructure are investigated. After a
blueprint for an integrated European energy network published in November 2010
[5], an infrastructure package including proposals for a new European Regulation on
trans-European energy infrastructure [15] and a more general Regulation on network
infrastructure (incl. broadband, transport. . . ) [16] is published on 19 October 2011
(further called ’Energy Infrastructure Package (EIP)’). Note, however, that these
proposals are not yet final and currently only reflect the European Commission’s
viewpoint.7 The Member States and the European Parliament can have different
opinions and the ultimate outcome is uncertain. As a consequence, these proposals
should be carefully dealt with.
The analysis is split in three parts: planning, regulatory oversight and financing.
2.2.1 Planning
The Third Package takes important steps towards a better integration of European
policy goals into future grid development. Firstly, two new European-wide
institutions are given a crucial role. Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 creates the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)
bringing together all TSOs that until now have been cooperating on a voluntary
basis only within for instance UCTE, ETSO and Nordel. Also, European Regulation
7The current timeline foresees entry into force on 1 January 2013.
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(EC) No 713/2009 establishes the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
(ACER) and bundles all energy regulators.
Whereas there used to be no European-wide transmission development plan,
Art. 8(3) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 gives ENTSO-E the task to publish
each two year a non-binding Community-wide 10-year network development plan
(TYNDP) including a European generation adequacy outlook up to 15 years ahead.
According to the Regulation the TYNDP has to build on the yearly published
10-year national investment plans, i.e. a bottom-up approach is envisaged. Art. 22
of Directive 2009/72/EC provides further details on these national plans. It has to
take into account regional investment plans. Although not said with that many
words in the Third Package itself, ENTSO-E considers the regional level and their
development plans as the working horses for the Community-wide plan.
Furthermore, the TYNDP has to incorporate supranational aspects, so-called
Community aspects via a top-down approach. Explicit referral is made to the
guidelines for the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E). The latter guidelines
including the TEN-E project lists and the Priority Interconnection Plan (PIP) can
be considered as the most concrete realization of the supranational viewpoint (see
also section 2.2.3). Cross-border investments or the lack thereof should also be
given sufficient attention in the TYNDP. It is clear that the bottom-up approach
based on the national development plans is flavoured by national aspirations and
the top-down approach based on the Community needs is supranationally oriented.
The TYNDP combines both and is complemented with public consultations. An
important question is whether both planning approaches can converge or not and
whether they both have sufficient impact on the resulting plan and, ultimately, on
the investments really done or not. Note that the TYNDP by itself is non-binding.
Proper regulatory oversight at different levels is key. This is further discussed in
the next section.
In March 2010 a Pilot TYNDP is published by ENTSO-E. This version only takes
into account the bottom-up approach, i.e. it is based on national development
plans and does not fully incorporate a European viewpoint yet. This pilot intends
to open the debate and start the loop of public consultations and consecutive
publications of bi-annual TYNDPs also including the top-down approach.
In the EIP planning is explicitly dealt with. In particular a planning process based
on regional clusters is proposed with the aim of identifying Projects of European
Interest. The project lists resulting from the different regional clusters are then
pooled into a unified European list. This list serves as an input to the TYNDP
drafted by ENTSO-E. As for the TYNDPs this process is repeatedly undertaken
and closely follows the loop of the TYNDPs. Via these projects of European
Interest the European viewpoint should be more actively pursued and incorporated
in the TYNDP [5].
Another long-term element is introduced in the blueprint of the EIP: European
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Electricity Highways. Their purpose is threefold: (a) accomodating increasing
levels of renewable generation throughout Europe, (b) connecting these new hubs
with major storage facilities based on hydropower and large demand centres and (c)
coping with more flexible and decentralised demand and supply [5]. Although the
first projects of this kind should be commissioned by 2020, its scope clearly goes
beyond 2020 and the ten-year ahead viewpoint of the TYNDP. The proposed EIP
Regulation sets up a framework to identify bi-annually projects of common interest
(cfr. infra) within regional groups. After an opinion of ACER, the Commission
decides on adoption of the list projects. These projects should become an integral
part of the regional investment plans and national ten-year network development
plans.
Finally, it is interesting to note that throughout Europe different forms of voluntary
cooperation are being established aiming at a regional approach of cross-border
investments. There is an increased awareness of regional challenges.
In Scandinavia there is a longer tradition of cooperation in this field with grid master
plans [17]. The process is long and remains nationally inspired. More recently a
Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) was agreed upon among the
different countries in the region. The development of electricity interconnectors
is part of the plan. Another recent example can be found in the North Seas
region. Nine countries around the North Seas signed in December 2009 a political
declaration concerning the development of an offshore grid in the North and Irish
Seas. These cooperations are an important step into the good direction, but based
on voluntary cooperation it cannot be expected from the participants to leave
their own national interests when they do not match with the best solution from a
European perspective.
2.2.2 Regulatory oversight
Regulatory oversight with respect to the TYNDP is mainly a task of ACER. In
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 it is stipulated that ACER has to give its opinion
on both the TYNDP (Art. 9(2)) and national development plans (Art. 8(11)).
The latter opinion should assess to which extent there are inconsistencies between
the national plans and the TYNDP. ACER can recommend amendments to the
national plans which then have to find their way to the national regulators. At the
same time the national regulators have to examine the national development plans
and check their consistency with the TYNDP. Although it appears there is a lot
of oversight on the development plans, it remains to be seen whether the struggle
between the bottom-up and top-down approaches converges to a result that is
acceptable for both national and European parties. Indeed, national regulators
still play a central role, even in the incorporation of higher-level viewpoints. Do
they have sufficient incentives to do so?
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Moreover, will ACER truly act as a European regulator and will it be as powerful
as required to fulfill Community needs? According to Art. 2 of Regulation (EC)
No 713/2009, ACER consists of four entities: an Administrative Board, a Board of
Regulators, a Director and a Board of Appeal. The Board of Regulators and the
Director are responsible for the opinions, recommendations and decisions of ACER.
These entities should make the difference in adopting the European viewpoint. The
Board of Regulators copies the structure of ERGEG , i.e. one representative of the
national regulator per Member State and one non-voting member of the European
Commission. Art. 13(5) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 requires that this board
should act fully independently and should not be influenced by (among others)
the Member States. It remains to be seen how well this structure works. The
members of this board are still clearly linked to the national regulators and the
question is whether they will defend their national interest or draw the European
card. This opens the door towards a more multilateral nature where everyone
separately has to benefit in order to progress. However, the Board of Regulators
acts by a 2/3 majority (Art. 13(3)). Abandoning unanimous decision-making is an
important step towards a supranational ACER. Backed up by sufficient incentives
for national regulatory authorithies to think across borders, this framework might
work. In the next section on the financing framework, these incentives are analyzed
from a financing point of view.
Although the EIP does not propose concrete measures to incent national regulatory
authorithies to think more in line with European needs, the EIP at least proposes
a toolbox facilitating cross-border approval procedures such as the one-stop-shop
principle and limitations on the duration of the approval procedure. The one-stop-
shop principle entails a better integrated and coordinated scheme for obtaining
all necessary approval decisions. Nevertheless, member states still keep their full
decision-making and approval competences [5, 15]. Note that when a project of
common interest is undertaken a cost-benefit analysis is used to allocate investment
cost. National regulatory authorithies have to reach an agreement on the allocation
key. If they disagree, ACER is given the decision-power for cost allocation.
2.2.3 Financing
In European energy policy, funding of energy networks has always been based on
self-financing by private partners, i.e. mainly the different TSOs in their respective
regions. This proved to be a successful way of working in a time without substantial
and fluctuating international power flows. The new challenges cause an increase in
geographic scale and force the cross-border investment framework to move from a
bilateral context to a regional or even European context. The financing framework
has not kept pace with this evolution.
Supportive financing mechanisms for cross-border investments have been set up
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since the nineties, but until now they more served as a market fix. In fact, they
have never been able to change the true nature of European network funding:
nationally oriented self-financing via national transmission tariffs charged upon
national grid users. Cost allocation across borders or direct funding from the
European level has been limited. Two frameworks exist with a special focus on the
cross-border context: the (almost abondonned) TEN-E program and the Inter-TSO
Compensation (ITC) mechanism. Although no clear framework is present today
congestion revenues also have the potential to play a role on the cross-border scene.
Additionally, a European Economic Recovery Program (EERP), being part of the
program to overcome the recent economic crisis, provides a one-time opportunity
for financing a limited number of projects.
A brief discussion of these four elements is given, high-lighting why they are not
fully adapted to the new cross-border context and why they rather facilitate a
nationally oriented multilateral cooperation instead of a supranationally inspired
grid development. The recent proposals of the EIP are linked to these four elements,
although it sometimes clearly goes beyond the existing framework.
TEN-E program
The TEN-E program was launched in 1995 to promote transmission investments
enabling a European internal energy market, strengthening security of supply and
improving economic and social cohesion throughout Europe [18, 19]. Together with
the Priority Interconnection Plan (PIP) of 2007 [20], mainly consisting of a subset
of the TEN-E project list, it has been the most concrete framework inspired by
Europe for transmission investments for a long time.8
The merits of TEN-E with respect to financing have been limited. Although
published at the European level, the TEN-E framework did not include funding for
entire projects. Financial support was mainly limited to financing feasibility studies.
Although several barriers were encountered for the different projects, the lack of
European funding or an adequate cost sharing mechanism might have contributed
to the slow progress.
In November 2008 a Green Paper [22] reconsidering the role of TEN-E was published
by the EC which resulted in the Energy Infrastructure Package in 2010 [5]. Whereas
network policy used to ’plug gaps’ and foster ’missing links’, a renewed energy
infrastructure policy should be fully aligned with the new challenges and proactively
promote network investments supporting security of supply, sustainability and
competitiveness. The TEN-E framework’s visibility and impact should be altered
to be more compatible with the overall energy policy and to increase its efficiency.
8Reference [21] provides a historical overview of how the European interconnected network
is created. European-wide plans are not new, but it is the first time that they are explicitly
embedded in any form of legislation.
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Note that the TEN-E and PIP project lists do not entail any binding commitment
on the EU Member States.
The Green Paper’s bottom-line for financing energy network investments remains
self-financing by TSOs. The proposed improvements for financing investments are
two-fold. Firstly, an increased TEN-E budget is put forward. It should especially
facilitate non-commercial investments, e.g. driven by security of supply. Secondly,
TEN-E should be better aligned with other forms of EU funding, like the Structural
and Cohesion Funds and RTD Framework Programmes. Further coordination
between TEN-E and the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development should be explored. The World Bank Accelerated
Programmatic Loan is also considered as a potential partner.
It is clearly stated that self-financing remains the main driver for energy network
investments. Most attention in the Green Paper goes to the surrounding framework.
No proposals are made to enhance the self-financing frameworks themselves,
although it remains the core revenue stream. There is, however, one reference to
the problem of financing cross-border investments by different Member States. In
the context of TEN-E projects it is stated in the Green Paper that [22]: ’Member
States who benefit may also be expected to contribute.’ This indeed addresses the
root of the problem, but how it should be organized remains an open question.
The EIP goes further than the 2008 Green Paper. Not only the TEN-E framework
is replaced by a more powerful framework, but also an ex ante cost-benefit analysis
and cost allocation is introduced (see next section on ITC). The TEN-E era is
de facto finished and a proposal is made to alter the framework. No lists with
concrete projects are proposed, rather a set of criteria is determined against which
all projects within four predefined priority corridors9 can be tested. This can result
in projects being labelled as Project of Common Interest. Such a framework is
believed to be more flexible than the rigid TEN-E project lists. With respect to
financing, the EIP goes significantly further than the TEN-E framework. Not
only feasibility studies are eligible for grants, but also works themselves can be
eligible if the necessary conditions are met. Moreover, not only grants are available,
also other financial instruments are defined. In particular, project bonds and
possibly even equity funding are possible. Both instruments should help investors
to have better access to capital and capital markets in general. Finally, the EIP
introduces the possibility to provide extra incentives (extra return on investment,
treatment of anticipatory costs. . . ) for projects of common interest if required
by the risks incurred. However, these extra incentives can only be given by the
national regulatory authorithy. Summarized, the EIP provides an elaborate toolbox
both for permitting and approval and for financing, but the national level remains
crucial.
9The corridors are: Northern Seas Offshore Grid, North-South electricity interconnections in
South-Western Europe, North-South electricity interconnections in Central Eastern Europe and
South Eastern Europe and the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan in electricity.
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Inter-TSO Compensation (ITC) mechanism
The ITC mechanism stems from the beginning of European market integration
and went online for the first time in 2002. It has been created so that countries
receive compensation if their assets are used by TSOs that do not contribute to
their financing. Participation by national TSOs in the mechanism used to be
voluntary. It replaced tolling mechanisms at the different borders (often referred to
as pancaking10) and thereby enabled international trade. The mechanism allows
introducing an international element in the different non-harmonized national
tariffs [25].
According to ETSO11 there are three mechanisms dealing with costs originating from
the cross-border context [25]. Firstly, there is an ITC mechanism for compensating
costs caused by network losses. Secondly, new investments and costs linked to
firmness are to be covered by congestion revenues. Finally, there is an extra ITC
fund providing any necessary additional compensation.12 Network losses are not
considered in this thesis. Congestion revenues are discussed in the next section. In
the remaining part of this section this additional ITC fund is treated.
This ITC mechanism has been the subject of a lot of debate and the algorithms
used for determining who pays and who receives money changed several times
over the last decade. Several of them were fundamentally flawed [26, 27]. They
draw on a yearly ex post calculation based on energy-based measures. However,
ex ante securing financing is crucial for investment decisions involving large sunk
costs. Cost distributions should be agreed upon upfront. Transmission investment
decisions are more often capacity-based (MW) rather than energy-based (MWh).
Moreover, the size of the fund also varied over time rendering it a less reliable
source of funding. Recently it was reduced to 100 Me, whereas it used to be about
350 Me [25]. This may change once a new mechanism is installed [28].
Although the intention of the ITC is laudable as it introduces a cost-sharing
mechanism across borders and as it was successful in removing the pancaking
of tariffs at different borders, it has been found inadequate for fostering new
investments and providing good incentives to TSOs.
10The pancaking refers to the problem of double marginalization [23]. Applied to the context
of international electricity trade, this refers to the practice where in each zone or country along a
contract path the monopolist network operator charges the transaction for the use of the network
and extracts a monopoly rent from it. The price paid for the transaction then depends on the
number of political borders crossed. An accumulative ’pancaked’ tariff is paid, rather than a
tariff that would occur under a single-zone paradigm (see [24], p. 246). The European reforms
removed this pancaking. The ITC-mechanism brought this transfer to the TSO level. Grid users
now only have to deal with the congestion management mechanisms, such as explicit and implicit
capacity auctions.
11ETSO, the association bundling several European Transmission System Operators, ceased to
exist. Its activities are now taken over by ENTSO-E.
12It should be noted that the ITC mechanism for infrastructure was not conceived as a
mechanism aiming at supporting new investments, its focus is on existing infrastructure.
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The Third Package called for a long-term mechanism in which all TSOs participate
and instructed the formulation of guidelines for such mechanism. The guidelines
were published in September 2010 [28]. The current mechanism dwells on the
calculation of transit flows. Nevertherless, ACER is instructed to propose a new
mechanism by the end of 2012 based on long-run average incremental costs and
standard-costing methodologies [28].
The EIP acknowledges the difficult situation created by the current framework
for financing large cross-border projects. In particular when benefits and costs of
investments are unequally distributed over different countries, projects are not likely
to be financed by nationally regulated private TSOs. A new ex ante cost allocation
mechanism is proposed and is thought to resolve the cost-benefit distribution
issue. Not only those countries hosting the infrastructure, but all involved and/or
affected countries are part of the mechanism in order to better address externalities.
Cost are said to be allocated proportionate to benefits. The current proposals,
however, seems to only focus on investment cost allocation only.13 Compensations
for negatively affected parties are not mentioned.
Congestion revenues
In Europe congestion revenues are mainly collected via auctioning transmission
capacity at borders between different countries (and sometimes between different
zones within a country). Within a country, uniform pricing is applied.14 As a
consequence, congestion revenues are a direct result of international trade and
the link with cross-border transmission infrastructure is easily made. Using these
revenues as funding for cross-border investments seems an attractive solution.15
Before the Third Package, it was stipulated in Art. 6(6) of Regulation (EC)
No 1228/2003 that congestion revenues could be used for three purposes: (a)
guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity, (b) network
investments maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities and (c) as income
to be taken into account when approving transmission tariffs. It was not defined
which option should be prioritised. The last option, reducing national transmission
tariffs, has been frequently enforced by regulators [9].
13See, for instance, the presentations given by representatives of the European Commission
in the Working group for offshore and onshore grid development (North Sea, Baltic Sea) (the
so-called Adamowitsch working group)
14Except for Norway, Denmark and Italy where different price zones exist. In Poland a nodal
pricing scheme is announced.
15Only congestion revenues on regulated transmission links are considered. A minority of (mainly
DC) cross-border connections are developped under the so-called merchant scheme (e.g. Estlink,
BritNed). This implies they are exempted from several requirements stipulated in the European
regulations, including those dealing with the use of congestion revenues. Merchant investors are
rewarded with the congestion revenues collected on their link to finance the investment.
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In Art. 16(6) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 the formulation is changed. Option
(a) envisaging firmness of interconnection capacity has been retained; the wording of
option (b) is altered in order to better emphasize new interconnection investments.
The new wording ensures that congestion revenues have to be used to either
ensure or increase interconnection capacity. Only if congestion revenues cannot
be efficiently used for options (a) and (b), they can be used to lower tariffs (the
former option (c)). Therefore, implicitly a priority list for the use of congestion
revenues is now enforced. This is clearly an improvement.
Although more capital should now be available for investments in cross-border
transmission capacity, the regional or European viewpoint is not captured here.
Congestion revenues are still kept by the national TSOs and they decide, after
approval by the national regulator, on how to use them. The Third Package gives
also no hints on the distribution of the congestion revenues over different countries
or how they can be used to foster interconnections that go beyond the bilateral
cooperation between adjacent countries and serve the new investment challenges.
Also in the EIP this issue remains untouched.
European Economic Recovery Plan
On the March 2009 Spring Summit of the European Council a proposal for the
European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) has been adopted [29]. Investments
in energy infrastructure are financially supported. Several millions of euros are
assigned to specific projects for interconnectors for gas (1440 Me) and electricity
(910 Me), offshore wind projects (565 Me) and carbon capture and storage
(1050 Me). This commitment will be spread over two years, i.e. 2009 and 2010.
The list of selected interconnection projects is inspired by the PIP.16
With respect to electricity interconnectors the proposed amount is significant. For
instance, for the envisaged link in Germany between Halle/Saale and Schweinfurt
100 Me is budgeted. This is more than 50% of the required budget according to
estimated costs in the 2007 Priority Interconnection Plan [20, 29].
Although the extra money for interconnectors is welcome and can contribute
substantially, this injection is a one-time opportunity for a limited set of projects.
It does not change TSOs’ investment incentives and it remains to be seen whether
all supported projects will be operational in due time and not blocked at national
levels due to different interests.
Although the EIP does not create a permanent source for European funding, it
aims at increasing access to public funding (e.g. from the European Investment
Bank ) for projects of common interest. Also, these projects should be able to
16In total, at least about 700 km of subsea HVDC connections and 640 km of AC connections
are supported.
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benefit from different, flexible financial mechanisms tailored for mitigating the
specific risks encountered (e.g loan guarantees, project bonds, grants).
2.3 Conclusion: policy-oriented research questions
In this chapter it is argued that for the next decades to come there is a clear
investment challenge for electricity transmission networks. Several thousands of
kilometers of new lines have to be built and billions of euros are required to make it
happen. Moreover, not only is the investment challenge inspired by European policy
goals, the geographic scope is larger than the traditional level of decision-making.
The consequences of the connection of massive amounts of renewable energy sources
to the existing power system for the transmission network cannot be captured by a
single country. As networks are interconnected and a reliable service is required both
in the short and the long run, countries cannot be isolated from each other when
solidarity, diversity of supply and balancing of load and generation are considered.
Increasing cross-border trade opportunities and lowering persistent congestion in
order to achieve a single internal electricity market requires investments in internal
and cross-border transmission links. It should be clear that the national level alone
is unlikely to take up this task in a cost-effective way. An adapted framework
fostering collaboration and providing correct incentives is required.
Given this call for an adequate framework and incentives, this chapter provided
an analysis of the current framework. The Third Package clearly introduced a
European flavour in transmission investments. The creation of ENTSO-E and
ACER are important milestones. The TYNDPs have the potential to become
powerful tools for meeting the challenge. However, it should also be clear that
the Third Package does not go far enough to ensure that European goals will be
met. An area of tension between the national and the European level remains.
The national level of decision-making remains very strong and lacks incentives to
truly incorporate the European goals in its decision-making. Planning, regulatory
oversight and financing are not fully adapted to the investment challenge.
The upcoming EIP again takes significant steps forward with the introduction of a
cost-benefit allocation mechanism and a new financial toolbox, but is unlikely to fix
all remaining loopholes. Although the investment process for projects of common
interest becomes better streamlined and more financing tools become available, the
root of the area of tension is not addressed. The national level does not receive
sufficient incentives to fully align their interests with European policy goals.
Given the investment challenge and the identified flaws in the current framework,
a fundamental question can be raised:
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What outcome can be expected when the national level of decision-
making remains strong without incentives to really take into account
the European goals?
Given the above question, the call for incentives and the proposals done by the
European Commission in the EIP to foster an investment cost allocation scheme in
order to resolve the cost-benefit distribution problem, a second question can be
identified:
Is investment cost allocation a sufficient tool to align European and
national goals?
Both questions are relevant for the ongoing developments and answering them can
feed the debate on the design of a good framework with solid arguments. In the
remaining chapters, this thesis addresses both. The structure of the thesis is built
around the first question, considered the main contribution of this thesis. The
approach includes the setup of a formal framework, the definition and comparison
of three collaboration concepts and testing them on how they behave on small
examples. The second question is dealt with throughout the different chapters.
It is important to realise that both research questions do not address the specific
design of any financing mechanism. It only looks at the outcome, i.e. which
investments have to be done and whether or not a cost allocation mechanism is an
appropriate tool. Different designs of such tool are not investigated, nor is dicussed
how different outcomes should be translated into end-user transmission tariffs.

3
Concepts for transmission
investment collaboration
Departing from the area of tension described, this chapter outlines different
ways for collaboration in transmission investments. In essence, three planning
collaboration concepts are developed: supranational, Pareto-optimal and non-
cooperative planning.
The aim is to provide a single framework based on welfare economics enabling a
comparison of the different concepts. It sheds a light on the underlying principles
and interrelations. By doing so this chapter serves as a guide to the reader and an
intuitive introduction to the models presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 without going
into mathematical details. It refines the research question and translates it from a
general policy-oriented formulation towards a more concrete problem that can be
addressed by the use of specific models.
Firstly, section 3.1 develops the framework, introduces planning concepts and
outlines further issues after intuitively discussing a two-node example. Next, section
3.2 makes the link with game theory. This is followed by a further refinement of
this thesis’ research question in section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes this chapter.
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3.1 Framework based on welfare economics
From the previous chapter it is concluded that the current regulatory context
can drive a wedge between what is striven for by a common European energy
infrastructure policy and by the individual member states. The objectives are not
always aligned. An insightful framework to analyze this problem relies on welfare
economics. Firstly, the necessary basics of welfare economics are briefly mentioned.
Secondly, a more formal framework is presented and three planning concepts are
developed. Thirdly, the concepts are applied on an intuitive two-node example.
Starting from this example several other relevant issues are highlighted.
3.1.1 Basic welfare economics
In welfare economics the economy is studied from a general equilibrium point of
view. It analyzes economic efficiency and how the economy can be organized. This
is strongly related to public-choice theory, i.e. the domain in economics studying
how governments take decisions [30]. As clarified throughout the following sections,
especially the organization and decision-making of transmission planning is a key
element in analysing the area of tension in transmission planning impacting the
further outline of this thesis.
In Fig. 3.1 a basic representation with two zones A and B is given. The vertical
and horizontal axes reflect respectively zone A’s and B’s utility, in this case called
welfare. The curve going from Amax to Bmax is called the Utility Possibility Frontier
or Pareto-front.1 An outcome is said to be Pareto-efficient or Pareto-optimal if
there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off and at
least one player strictly better off. Stated otherwise, a Pareto-optimal outcome
cannot be improved upon without hurting at least one player. Given the available
inputs, all outcomes on the frontier are Pareto-efficient outcomes.2 All points to
the southwest from this curve are sub-optimal. Outcomes located northeast from
this curve are not reachable with the given set of inputs.
Assume now an initial situation U with initial welfare Ainit and Binit for zones A
and B. As U is located to the southwest from the Pareto-front, there clearly is
some inefficiency in the economy. For instance, this can be due to market failures
like externalities or imperfect competition. In the context of this thesis the lack of
transmission planning collaboration can be the cause of such inefficiency.
The area of sub-optimal outcomes can be split in four smaller areas:
1This goes back to the first theorem of welfare economics stating that in a perfectly competitive
general equilibrium, the system is Pareto-efficient[30].
2According to the second theorem of welfare economics it possible to switch between different
efficient outcomes by changing the initial welfare distribution and allowing competition to work.
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Fig. 3.1: Pareto-optimality and initial welfare distribution (adapted from [30])
 Area I groups all outcomes with a strict lower welfare for both zones.
 Area II includes all outcomes with a higher or equal welfare for both zones.
These outcomes are Pareto-improving.
 Area III gathers all outcomes with a strict lower welfare for zone B, but a
higher or equal welfare for zone A.
 Area VI groups all outcomes with a strict lower welfare for zone A, but a
higher or equal welfare for zone B.
Note, however, that even within area II significant differences exist in how welfare
is distributed. The fact that a particular outcome like V , W , X or Y is Pareto-
optimal, does not imply that welfare is evenly distributed among the different
zones. V and W are two extremes. Point V denotes the Pareto-optimal outcome
with the highest welfare for zone B without decreasing zone A’s welfare. Point W
is the equivalent for zone A. In X and Y both zones benefit compared to U , but
not with the same intensity.
3.1.2 General framework for collaboration concepts
Based on the above notions of welfare economics, a framework formalizing the
different objectives regarding transmission investments is presented. The focus lies
on how transmission planning and decision-making is organized.
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Assume that zones A and B are connected and their welfare depends on investments
in the interconnecting network. In U , the initial situation, there is a clear inefficiency
caused by a lack of coordination and investments in this network. By investing it
is possible to alter the welfare in both zones. The effect of investing is illustrated
in Fig. 3.2 for two cases. Due to investments total welfare can change according
to the parallel movement of the straight line from tinit to t∗. It is assumed that
total welfare increases in the direction of the arrow. Welfare does not necessarily
change in an equal way for both zones. For instance, an investment can cause a
huge welfare increase for one zone, whereas the other zone benefits only moderately.
This is reflected in the angle of the straight line. An angle of 45 degrees implies
that both zones benefit equally (case (a) of Fig. 3.2).
In case (a) of Fig. 3.2 the solution with the highest welfare is found in X, i.e. at
the intersection of the tangent t∗ and the efficiency frontier. Moving from U to X
implies a welfare increase for both zones. In terms of Fig. 3.1 point X lies in area
II.
The situation is different for case (b). Here both zones benefit with a different
intensity from the transmission investment. Zone A profits more from the capacity
increase. This can be caused by different characteristics of both zones with respect
to generation portfolio, demand elasticity, etc. Contrary to case (a), the total
Welfare B
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W
V
Amax
Bmax
Ainit
Binit
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Welfare B
Welfare A
U
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V
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Fig. 3.2: Impact of investments on the Pareto-optimal solution: two cases (adapted
from [30])
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welfare maximising solution, i.e. point Y , is now located in area III implying a
negative welfare impact on zone B. Although zone B looses in this situation, from
an overall welfare point of view this is counterbalanced by the welfare gains of
zone A. As a consequence, an overall welfare maximizing transmission planner
would invest until point Y is reached and then organize a lump-sum payment from
zone A to B to compensate for zone B’s welfare loss.
Returning to the analysis of chapter 2 solutions X and Y can be classified as the
desired outcomes of European policy makers for cases (a) and (b) in Fig. 3.2.
However, as discussed in chapter 2, today there is no adequate compensation
mechanism in place in Europe. Welfare transfers are not possible. Together with
the fact that investment decisions are mostly decided at the zonal level, it is unlikely
that zone B accepts moving to point Y in case (b). Without compensations only
Pareto-improving solutions, i.e. solutions in area II of Fig. 3.1, are realistic. For
case (b), the solution with the highest welfare within reach is point W . Based on
the above analysis two planning collaboration concepts are defined.
Collaboration concept 1. Supranational planner: The supranational planner
maximizes overall welfare, i.e. the sum of welfare created in all zones minus
transmission investment costs, by deciding on transmission investments in the
entire interconnected grid as if it is one single zone.
Collaboration concept 2. Pareto-planner: The Pareto-planner maximizes
overall welfare, i.e. the sum of welfare created in all zones minus transmission in-
vestment costs, by deciding on transmission investments in the entire interconnected
grid as if it is one single zone, but constrained by the initial welfare distribution.
No zone can loose welfare.
An alternative interpretation of a compensation mechanism is making the
supranational results binding for the involved zones, i.e. they have to implement
the results even if this negatively affects them. This would of course require a
strong regulatory framework. This alternative is not further considered in this
thesis.
The above two concepts both start from the objective to maximize overall welfare.
This is in line with policy goals defined at the European level. Whereas for
the supranational planner the distributional effects and welfare transfers are not
important (i.e. a compensation mechanism is assumed), the Pareto-planner looks
for the welfare-maximizing solution which is still Pareto-improving, i.e. situated in
area II of Fig. 3.1. The supranational planner can also consider solutions within
areas III and IV. Due to this larger solution space the supranational planner always
outperforms the Pareto-planner or, at best, they come to the same solution. Stated
otherwise, both planners are solving the same problem but the Pareto-planner is
bounded by more constraints and is therefore never able to attain a higher overall
welfare than the supranational planner.
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A third planning collaboration concept takes a different starting point. It does
not assume a single planner maximizing overall welfare. Different zonal planners
maximizing zonal welfare are together playing a game. Of course, those different
planners influence each others decisions as they all act on the same interconnected
network.
Collaboration concept 3. Non-cooperative planning game: Game between zonal
planners maximizing zonal welfare minus investment costs by deciding upon
transmission investments in their zone. A solution or equilibrium is found when
no planner can increase its zonal welfare given the decisions of the other players.
Although it can always be plotted on the same graph, in general the outcome of this
game is not easily intuitively determined in terms of Fig. 3.1.3 The result can be
anywhere on or southwest from the Pareto-front. Furthermore, it can even coincide
with the supranational and/or the Pareto-planner’s solution. It is even possible
that the game has no solution. The outcome depends on the reactions of the
different planners on the actions of the other planners. A solution or equilibrium is
characterized by the fact that in the given situation no planner can increase its
zonal welfare given the actions taken by the other players.
3.1.3 Application on a two-node example
In this section the above framework and concepts are illustrated on a two-node
example. Without going into any technical details or specific modelling assumptions
the different solutions are intuitively deduced. Starting from this example several
other relevant issues are identified in the next section.
Consider the two-node example of Fig. 3.3. Each node represents a zone. Both
zones are linked with a single transmission link TAB consisting of two parts TAF
and TBF. Each zone hosts one part of the link. F denotes the frontier between zones
A and B. In the initial situation there is already some trade, but the transmission
capacity is fully used, i.e. the link is congested. Changes in welfare are directly
related to increased trade over this link. Depending on the characteristics of each
zone, welfare can change in various ways with increased interconnection capacity.
In Fig. 3.4 three possible trajectories are illustrated.4 The solutions for the different
3For specific cases it is possible to derive a solution based on a graphical intuitive analysis
(see section 3.1.3).
4Note that by limiting the options to move away from U to a single variable, i.e. increasing
transmission capacity on a single link, the area of possible improvements is limited to a single
line. The graphical representation is slightly abused as now not all points southeast from or on
the Pareto-frontier are reachable. The Pareto-frontier is only shown to illustrate the link with the
more general framework and some further comments made at a later stage in this section.
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Fig. 3.3: Two-node example: network structure
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Fig. 3.4: Two-node example: impact of transmission investment on welfare
planning concepts are directly related to this trajectory. S1, S2 and S3 are the
outcomes of the supranational planner for each possibility. The first trajectory
remains in the Pareto-improving area. S1 is therefore also the outcome of the
Pareto-planner. As both zones gain with every capacity increase, this is also the
outcome for the non-cooperative planning game.
On the entire second trajectory a negative impact for zone A is observed. Whereas
the supranational optimum is S2, the Pareto-planner’s solution (P2) is to remain in
U and not to invest in a capacity increase. As both zones can influence the capacity
on the entire link TAB
5, the non-cooperative game also ends in U. Whatever the
action is of zone B, zone A always blocks the capacity increase from its side.
5The minimum capacity of TAF and TFB determines the capacity of TAB. In theory they
can only differ in the non-cooperative planning game when both zones would decide on another
capacity to be installed.
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Fig. 3.5: Multiple investment options creating a solution area
The third trajectory is more complicated. The first part of the trajectory going
from U to P3 is Pareto-improving. This changes at P3, where zone B’s welfare
equals its initial level. The second part from P3 to S3 is only beneficial for zone A.
Therefore, P3 is the solution for the Pareto-planner. On the supposition that
both zones can influence the capacity to the same extent, the outcome of the
non-cooperative planning game is N3. Here zone B’s welfare reaches its maximum
value along the trajectory.
3.1.4 Further considerations
The two-node example presented in the previous section illustrates well the planning
collaboration concepts. However, the very simple setup hides several underlying
difficulties which need to be addressed when more realistic examples are dealt with.
 The transmission segments TAF and TFB in Fig. 3.3 are complimentary in a
sense that a limited capacity on one segment also limits the capacity on the
other even if the latter segment is designed for a higher capacity. In meshed
transmission networks this is not always the case. Transmission links can
also work supplementary to other links. This can obviously change the games
played. Moreover, when there is more than just a single link to invest in, the
trajectories of Fig. 3.4 can expand towards areas as for instance depicted in
Fig. 3.5.
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 It can also happen that for the Pareto- and supranational planners the same
level of overall welfare can be reached by different sets of investments. As
mentioned in section 3.1.1, those solutions can significantly differ in the zonal
welfare distribution. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.5 by section Sa to Sz which
is a subset of the Pareto-frontier. Also the non-cooperative planning game
can have several solutions. The question arises which solution is preferred
and whether some solutions are more likely to materialise than others?
 In case of a larger network it is better to address investments in the
entire network at once, rather than applying the concepts on each link
separately. The effects can often not be isolated. Due to complementarity
and supplementarity, a new investment is likely to change the effects produced
by previous projects. This also increases the solution space of a Pareto-planner
as negative and positive effects can cancel out when investments are considered
together. Now more investments are allowed than only those benefiting to all
parties when looked at individually.
 A final so far unaddressed issue is to define in more detail who finances the
investments. For the non-cooperative planning concept the situation is clear.
The lack of any form of collaboration directly implies that investments have
to be borne by the zones deciding upon and hosting the infrastructure. Also
for the supranational planning concept this issue is implicitly covered by the
assumptions. When solving the planning problem itself, the investment costs
are part of the welfare maximizing objective function and it looks like they
are financed at the supranational level, e.g. via direct European funding.
However, the supranational planner decides on investments assuming that
there is a compensation mechanism in place correcting the welfare distribution.
Such a mechanism can also cover the investment costs.6
For the Pareto-planner, however, the underlying financing mechanism can
cause subtle differences in the solutions found. Two possible mechanisms can
intuitively illustrate this. Firstly, assume a strict interpretation of the Pareto-
planning concept and suppose that there is no possible way to allocate costs
nor benefits among different zones. In such a context each zone has to finance
all investments hosted on its territory. This implies that the Pareto-planner’s
zonal welfare constraints have to include those costs. Secondly, assume a more
relaxed Pareto-planner. Although there is no compensation mechanism for
redistributing welfare as in the case of the supranational planner, a mechanism
limited to investment cost allocation only can diminish the potential gap
between the Pareto- and supranational planner. In such a relaxed context
the zonal welfare constraints include welfare without infrastructure costs.
6The European Inter-TSO Compensation Mechanism (ITC) is set up for this purpose. It has
as a goal to allocate infrastructure costs among different European TSOs. However, it is limited
to cost allocation only and does not consider an overall welfare redistribution.
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The latter are taken into account in the overall welfare maximizing objective
function and are ex post allocated to the different zones.
The above issues are further discussed in the chapters 5, 6 and 7 dealing with the
specific planning concepts in more detail.
3.2 Links with game theory
Although this thesis is not rooted in game theoretical research it is interesting to
note that the three defined concepts have close ties with game theory. For the
third planning concept this is obvious as it is directly defined as a game, but both
other concepts can also be considered as a game.
In game theory, two large groups of games can be identified: cooperative and non-
cooperative games. Whereas in non-cooperative games all players act individually
in line with their own interest, in cooperative games coalitions can be formed.
Coalitions take joint actions and the consequences for the group rather than the
individual members are at stake. The cooperative games can be further split into
two groups according to the possibility of transferring utility (or welfare) or not.
The ability to transfer utility among members of a coalition, e.g. by means of
monetary side payments, can change the outcome of the game. Cooperative games
go back to the theories developed in [31]. The fundamentals of non-cooperative
games are laid by Nash [32]. A basic understanding and overview of the theory
can however be found in most textbooks on game theory [33].
For linking the three planning concepts to game theory, a last notion is required:
the grand coalition. In general, coalitions do not necessarily include all players. For
instance, in a game with three players, a coalition can exist of two players playing
against the third. The coalition gathering all players is called the grand coalition.
As mentioned earlier, the third concept is classified as a non-cooperative game
among zonal transmission planners trying to maximize zonal welfare while taking
into account the other planners’ actions. The supranational and Pareto-planners
are closely related to cooperative games. They both look for the best possible
solution for the grand coalition. They maximize overall welfare, i.e. the sum of
zonal welfare of each zone. The major difference lies in the transferability of welfare
among the members of the (grand) coalition. Whereas the supranational planner
assumes that it is possible to transfer or redistribute welfare among all zones, the
Pareto-planner considers welfare as non-transferable or limited to investment costs
only.
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3.3 Research question and further outline
The research question as defined in chapter 2 is policy-driven. Given today’s
investment planning and financing framework it is observed that it is not
straightforward that policy objectives set at a higher level and requiring significant
support for well interconnected transmission networks are met in a context where
investment planning and decision-making is undertaken at a lower level. The
potential mismatch of interests between both levels causing different preferences in
transmission investments is to be investigated.
In section 3.1.2 three collaboration concepts are defined. These concepts allow to
further refine this thesis’ research question. The impact on preferred transmission
investments is analyzed via the three concepts. The concepts differ in the assumed
level of collaboration among the different zonal planners. These differences are
suitable for linking them to the policy-driven research question.
The supranational planner corresponds to the European level where policy goals
are set impacting all zones. The non-cooperative planning game represents another
extreme, i.e. the situation where all zonal planners act out of their own interest
without caring about European policy. The Pareto-planner is situated in between
both extremes. It presents a way to reconcile European objectives with zonal
interests.
Explicit mathematical modelling of each collaboration concept and comparison of
their outcomes for concrete examples allows providing profound techno-economic
background and proof when addressing the problems addressed in chapter 2.
Keeping this goal in mind, the three defined collaboration concepts give shape to
the structure of the remainder of this thesis.
Chapter 5 deals with the supranational planner. The Pareto-planner is considered
in chapter 6 and the non-cooperative planning game in chapter 7. As depicted
in Fig. 3.6, these three chapters not only differ in the degree of the assumed
level of collaboration, but also in the degree of the mathematical complexity
of formulating the different collaboration concepts as explicit models. Whereas
the degree of assumed collaboration has already been addressed in this chapter,
mathematical complexity is discussed throughout the following chapters. The
further elaboration of these models is preceded by chapter 4 where the general
characteristics of transmission planning models are discussed and choices are made
for the subsequent models.
Although the next chapters could also be organized the other way around, i.e.
with increasing degrees of collaboration and decreasing degrees of mathematical
complexity, there are additional reasons for the choice made:
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Fig. 3.6: Relation between further thesis outline and collaboration concepts
 The supranational planner most closely follows existing academic literature
on transmission planning. Starting from these existing models the Pareto-
planner can be considered as a logic expansion of known models. Although
there is a close link with both other concepts, the non-cooperative planning
game has less ties with existing transmission planning literature and is more
than an expansion of existing models.
 The mathematical complexity increases in the proposed structure. Each next
chapter can build further on the foundations laid in the previous chapters,
thereby avoiding unnecessary repetition and guaranteeing a gradual approach.
This should help the reader in grasping a better understanding of the problem.
3.4 Conclusions
The seams issues described in chapter 2 and the resulting research question can
be captured in a more formal economic framework based on welfare economics.
There is also a close link with game theory. Intuitively, the framework already
allows indicating the relevance of an adequate compensation mechanism when the
policy goals set at the European level are to be met with consent of the zonal level.
Furthermore, it suggests that depending on the level of collaboration, a different
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outcome can be reached and there is no guarantee that in all cases European
objectives are always met.
In order to assess this wedge, three collaboration concepts are defined. A first
concept, the supranational planner, assumes that an adequate compensation
mechanism is in place (or that zones can be forced to invest against their own
benefit) and maximizes European welfare irrespective of the distributional effects.
Pareto-improvements are the prerequisite in convincing the zonal level without
an adequate compensation mechanism covering for possible zonal welfare losses.
Otherwise no zone is willing to accommodate projects lowering their own welfare
even if they are increasing overall welfare. The second collaboration concept,
the Pareto-planner, starts from this assumption. It looks for an investment plan
maximizing overall welfare on the supposition that no compensations are made.
The distributional effects are accounted for by adding the initial welfare level as a
lower bound to the problem, i.e. it has to be Pareto-improving. Additionally, it
is argued that a relaxed interpretation of the zonal welfare constraints can help
closing the gap with the supranational planner.
A last concept is more difficult to capture in the general framework as it depends on
specific characteristics of the different zones involved. Assuming no collaboration
at all between different zonal planners and no commitment to act in line with the
European policy goals, zonal welfare maximizing planners play a non-cooperative
planning game, i.e. the third collaboration concept.
The three collaboration concepts serve as a story line for the remainder of this thesis.
Their relationships in terms of degree of assumed collaboration and mathematical
complexity, but also their ties to the academic literature on transmission planning
play a decisive role for the further structure. However, before addressing the three
planning collaboration concepts themselves, the general design of transmission
planning models is discussed.

4
Design of transmission
planning models
After having defined and further refined this thesis’ research question in chapters
2 and 3, this and the following chapters deal with transmission planning models.
Whereas chapters 5, 6 and 7 consider specific models linked to the earlier defined
planning concepts, this chapters describes the main contours of those models.
The main building blocks of the models used are determined and supported by a
thorough literature review on transmission planning models.
Firstly, section 4.1 discusses the literature on transmission planning models. The
discussion is structured by the use of common design building blocks. Each model
consists of a combination of different features brought together to serve a particular
research question. A building block can relate to the scope of a model or to a basic
assumption. Here, only major constituting elements are discussed. Often also more
specific assumptions are made as discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7 when the specific
models are described. Secondly, the model design choices are presented and argued
in section 4.2.
Note that the presented overview of building blocks focuses on models only, not
on how they are solved. Solution methods are considered to be chosen after the
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model is properly designed. Taking into account that this thesis does not focus on
solution methods but rather on the models themselves and the comparison of their
outcomes, they are merely considered as a tool and therefore discussed separately
for each planning concept in the following chapters.
4.1 Transmission planning model building blocks
In the literature several fruitful attempts for classifying transmission planning
models have been undertaken. A large number of publications is classified in
[34] according to three main building blocks: solution methods, treatment of the
planning horizon and consideration of the electricity sector. Whereas in [34] the
intention is to really classify publications on transmission planning with electricity
sector considerations as just another building block, this particular block is used
in [35] to structure its overview. Starting from planning in vertically integrated
utilities, changes and new requirements for transmission planning in a market
context are defined. Nevertheless, the treatment of the planning horizon and
solution methods are used as building blocks at a lower level to differentiate
between different publications.
An alternative building block is extensively discussed in [36] where the distinction
is made between deterministic and non-deterministic transmission planning
approaches. The importance of this building block is linked to the changed
market context which introduced increased uncertainty for transmission planners,
but also changed the transmission planning objectives. In both [34] and [35] these
aspects are mentioned but not put forward as true building blocks. They are rather
considered as consequences of a changed market context. It is however argued by
[36] that not all uncertainties are related to the market and some are inherent to
the transmission planning problem, e.g. the random nature of load or unplanned
outages.
Furthermore, the changed interrelationship between transmission and generation
investments as a consequence of market context changes not only increases
uncertainty but also gives rise to a more fundamental question in planning. Who
takes the lead: transmission or generation planners? The choice between proactive
or reactive transmission planning is not always explicitly recognized as a separate
building block, but can significantly influence a transmission planning model design
[37, 38].
As the market is (at least partly) responsible for determining the dispatch of load
and generation and consequently for the flow patterns, it is a major driver for
transmission investments. There are different approaches possible for taking this
into account in a transmission planning model. Either the market can be separated
from the planning model and serve as an exogeneous input or it can explicitly be
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part of the model. Market modelling itself is therefore an important building block
for transmission planning models.
A last building block is driven by the research question of this thesis and addresses
the way neighbouring grids and the international context are taken into account.
In the literature this is not identified as a critical issue and has been overlooked so
far.
Based on the analysis of the overview papers and the above argumentation, several
building blocks cosntitute a model’s design. It is clear that the generally formulated
building block of electricity sector considerations or changed market context can
be covered by several more specific blocks as its impact on transmission planning
model design is diverse.
The following building blocks are shortlisted for further exploration in this section:
 Treatment of the planning horizon
 Uncertainty incorporation
 Transmission planning objectives
 Market incorporation
 Link with generation investment planning
 Multi-area awareness
4.1.1 Treatment of the planning horizon
Transmission investment planning deals with investments to be done in future. It
is important how this time period is addressed. In general, there are two options:
a static or dynamic planning approach [34, 35].
A static approach plans for a single moment in time, e.g. a specific year. A static
transmission planning determines how the network has to look like at a future
moment in time. According to [35] it answers questions like what and where, but
not when. It does not make any consideration on the timing of the investments or
the sequence in which investments have to be done. The path followed from now
until the considered moment in time is not specified.
In contrast, a dynamic approach explicitly answers the when question. Instead of
statically determining the network for a future moment in time, it defines which
investments have to be undertaken in the period starting now until a specified later
moment. It provides an investment strategy and can lead to better results. In
[38] the superiority of the dynamic approach is illustrated in a context with lumpy
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investments and returns to scale. Obviously, the quality of the result depends on
how detailed the modeled time period is and at how many moments during that
period actions can be undertaken.
Dynamic models outperform static ones in the quality of output, but they are
significantly larger, more complex and more difficult to solve. Therefore, mostly
static models are used in literature. However, a third approach identified in
[34] reconciles the more easy to solve static and qualitatively better dynamic
models to a certain extent: pseudodynamic models. This kind of models solves a
sequence of static models for different subsequent moments in time in an attempt
to approximate the dynamic approach.
Recent examples of static transmission planning models can be found in [39–43].
Dynamic planning models are less common. In [44] a dynamic investment planning
model involving both generation and transmission investments is presented. Another
example is found in [45] where the advantages of being able to act on different
moments in time in the dynamic approach are exploited by allowing flexible grid
operation and thereby alter investment needs. In [46] both a static and a dynamic
model are solved. A more extensive list of examples for both approaches is provided
in [34, 35].
4.1.2 Uncertainty incorporation
In general, there are two groups to be distinguished in this category: deterministic
and non-deterministic models. The former differs from the latter by not taking into
account the probability of occurrence or degree of importance of an event [36]. An
interesting example to illustrate the difference is the way reliability is dealt with.
For instance, N-1 rules are deterministic as each possible outage is given the same
probability of occurrence and the system has to withstand each such event [47].
According to [36] there are several kinds of uncertainties transmission planning has
to deal with. They all put different requirements on planning models. Infrastructure
availability, actual load, wind power output, generation expansions and closures,
future market rules,... all create uncertainties.
General approaches to deal with uncertainties are based on scenario techniques
and decision analysis [36]. In the former different scenarios are identified, each
with a specified weight reflecting its importance or probability of occurrence. An
investment plan is then determined according to a decision rule like expected cost,
minimax regret or Pareto-optimal. Decision analysis is based on an event tree and
looks for a flexible plan able to adapt quickly to emanating events. This kind of
approaches is for instance used in [41, 44, 48–50] to take into account different
states of the system or different market outcomes (e.g. peak and off-peak demand,
wind power output, unexpected outages). For specific types of uncertainties, e.g.
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actual load or wind power output, models using statistical approaches (e.g. chance
constraints, time series models, etc.) can be used [47, 51–53].
4.1.3 Transmission planning objectives
Transmission planning is a complex problem and the network has to serve
multiple goals simultaneously. This is reflected in the different kinds of objective
functions put forward in the literature. Historically, transmission investment cost
minimization and reliability-driven planning received a lot of attention, but since
the emergence of electricity sector restructuring more and more attention goes to
market-oriented and even sustainable objectives.
Several models only address transmission investment costs in the objective function
sometimes supplemented with costs due to losses. Such models minimize these
costs subject to constraints for ensuring a feasible power flow given power injections
and withdrawals or maintaining a specified reliability level [54].
Reliability can also serve as an objective rather than as a constraint. A typical
example is the trade-off between investment costs and reliability gains [55–57]. In
[58] the choice between different investment options is based on the minimization of
estimated costs related to a lack of reliability. The vulnerability of the transmission
network to terrorist attacks is minimized in [59, 60].
Market-oriented objectives are modelled in various ways. Whereas some
publications explicitly focus on minimizing congestion costs emphasizing the market
facilitation function of the transmission network [61–63], other publications define
different kinds of welfare functions to be maximized. Sometimes welfare is calculated
based on a market outcome and consists of functions of consumer and producer
surplus [41, 64, 65]. In other cases an approach minimizing a total cost function
including investments costs, losses, congestion costs and costs related to not supplied
energy is adopted [66]. In [63] this is done in a multi-objective framework.
In [67] an illustration of a model including a sustainable objective function is
provided. A common welfare maximizing transmission planning model including
economic dispatch and transmission investment costs is extended with the costs
related to CO2 emissions. An alternative approach considering sustainable criteria
is found in [68], where land use is minimized.
Furthermore, combining several (incompatible) goals in a multi-objective framework
is being extensively investigated [63, 68–71]. Often an assessment of objectives is
required as they not always point in the same direction. Also the European energy
policy objectives aiming at security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability
are sometimes incompatible and require trade-offs [72].
Note that not optimizing for a particular goal via the objective function, does
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not mean it is not at all accounted for in a model. For instance, market-oriented
objective functions can still be constrained by reliability considerations. A popular
approach is to add N-1 constraints to the problem [44, 50, 54, 69].
4.1.4 Market incorporation
Especially in a changed context with generation and load levels determined via
the market and the transmission planner acting as facilitator of that market, it
is important to analyze how the market is incorporated in transmission planning
models. In the end, the market determines which generators inject power in the
network and how much is withdrawn at different demand locations. Put differently,
the market is responsible for the flow patterns observed in the network and it is
the transmission planner’s task to invest efficiently in order to accommodate these
patterns.
Several models explicitly incorporate the market as a separate problem within the
transmission planning model and thereby make the transmission investment decision
dependent on the market outcome and vice versa.1 This is especially true for models
focusing on economic issues. Most of the time a DC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is
used maximizing welfare subject to network constraints [41, 44, 45, 48, 64, 67, 73].
A DCOPF can be used to represent a perfectly competitive market ran by an ISO
when it is assumed that all participants bid their true costs. Alternatively, it can
be considered as a pool-based market clearing bids from all participants. The dual
variables in a DCOPF2 can be interpreted as locational marginal prices (LMP) or
nodal prices [74]. However, also other market representations are possible. For
instance, in [75] an oligopolistic market is used as underlying market determining
load and generation levels.
Instead of setting the generation and load levels within the transmission planning
model, some models start from ex ante determined levels. Note, however, that these
values can still originate from a market outcome. However, the reciprocity between
transmission investments and market outcome is lost. Examples can be found in
[70, 76, 77]. Especially in models focusing on reliability issues this simplification is
used [54, 55, 58].
Note that most models use a DC (optimal) power flow representation for modeling
the power flows in the network.3 Especially for economic analyses DC power flow
is considered as sufficient and it is not required to rely on the more accurate but
also more complex AC power flow representation [49, 78].
1See also chapter 5 for a more elaborate discussion on this matter.
2In particular, the dual variables linked to the nodal balance equations can be interpreted as
nodal prices. They indicate the marginal cost of supplying an extra unit of energy in a particular
node.
3The specific DC power flow assumptions are given in section 5.2.1.
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Additionally, it is important to realise that in all market models implying the
(implicit) auctioning of transmission capacity, such as all models relying on a
DCOPF, the investor is not able to set prices for access to or use of its investment.
The transmission planner only decides on the transmission capacity and the market
determines the level of congestion revenues. No explicit tolling mechanisms are
possible. This assumption is in line with European (and beyond) reality where
tolls for transit flows have been abolished since market reforms took off (see also
chapter 2).4
4.1.5 Link with generation investment planning
Market reforms changed the way transmission and generation are organized and
their interrelation. The impact on investment planning is significant. Whereas it
were mostly vertically integrated utilities covering both generation and transmission
within one company, generation and transmission are now unbundled. They are
now managed - and in many cases also owned - by different entities. Whereas
generation and transmission used to be part of a single planning process, they are
now planned separately with limited (if any) information exchange. Nevertheless,
the one can never be planned without knowledge or assumptions about the other.
The question then rises who comes first?
From the perspective of transmission planning they are two options. Either
transmission planning is proactive and by investing it provides signals towards
generation investments or a reactive approach is adopted where transmission is
planned given actual and anticipated generation expansions. This fundamental
difference and its welfare implications are studied in [37, 38, 81].
Although theoretically the proactive planner leads to ideal investments and a higher
welfare level, it is argued in [38] that the reactive planner is probably the most
realistic assumption.5 Transmission planners are said not to be willing to take
the risk to end up with stranded investments. It is not the economic consequence
that prevents them from acting in an optimal proactive way, it is rather the
embarrassment of taking wrong investment decisions that drives planners to a
reactive approach.6
4In the more general non-cooperative pricing and investment literature, this would be considered
as an unconventional assumption. Often a two-stage game is developed where in the first stage the
investment capacities are determined and the second stage the prices for using the infrastructure
[79, 80].
5In [38] the reactive planning policy is called the practical planning policy.
6It should, however, be noted that reality is often more complex and for different generation
technologies a different approach could be applied. For instance, the lead time to develop a new
high voltage line is nowadays longer than for the construction of gas-fired power plant. The
opposite holds when nuclear power plants are considered. This distinction is not further taken
into account.
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Although many publications start from the assumption of a reactive transmission
planner, i.e. with a given (future) generation park, strategic investment decisions at
the generation side impacting transmission investments are also modelled. Recent
examples of the former group include [41, 46, 48, 61, 66], the latter approach is
applied by [73, 82]. Despite a changed market context, several publications develop
planning models under the old paradigm of an integrated or coordinated planning
of generation and transmission investments with the purpose of being used as
references for regulatory authorities or for markets without restructuring [44, 83].
Another coordinated but market-based approach for investments is found in [84, 85].
They model an ISO governing a coordinated capacity planning process involving
both generation expansions and merchant transmission investment proposals.
4.1.6 Multi-area awareness
Keeping in mind the research question addressed it is relevant to investigate how
transmission planning models deal with an international or multi-area context, i.e.
a context with neighbouring networks, cross-border energy exchanges and other
planners.
Although it is generally acknowledged as something to take into account [86, 87], it
is interesting to note that only very few papers presenting a modeling approach take
this context into consideration. Almost all papers design transmission planning
models as if the transmission planner covers the entire network. The network is
considered as a single zone. This can be interpreted in two ways: (i) either there
are no neighbouring networks or their existence is neglected or (ii) the transmission
planner decides for the entire network, including the neighbouring zones. The
latter interpretation corresponds to the supranational planning concept defined in
section 3.1.2. For instance, in [88] multi-area generation and transmission planning
is addressed but the adopted viewpoint fits into the supranational planning concept.
Similarly, a single zone viewpoint for interregional planning in Europe is applied in
[89].
Although generally overlooked in the transmission planning literature, there are a
number of publications touching on a situation with multiple transmission investors.
They link the problem to game theory. In [90] the followed investment rationale is
based on merchant investors maximizing own profit rather than welfare. Although
no quantitative analysis is provided, it is clearly indicated that merchant investors
are participating in a non-cooperative planning game and their interactions should
not be neglected. As further discussed in chapter 7, the non-cooperative planning
game concept has a close connection with this problem.
Whereas a non-cooperative game is assumed in [90], a multi-agent approach
embedded in cooperative game theory is followed in [91–94]. The focus is on
finding a fair cost allocation convincing involved parties or regions to cooperate.
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In [91] no attention is given to the planning problem itself and the analysis starts
from a given set of possible coalitions and their potential gains.7 Similarly, in
[92, 93] potential transmission investors, namely loads, generators and third party
investors, try to find a coalition in order to maximize their benefit via bilateral
negotiations. Although multiple agents interacting in a game are modeled, no areas
are defined. As a consequence, the analysis is not fully applicable on the European
situation where transmission infrastructure is always hosted by a particular country
which itself is a player in the game. In contrast, in [94] countries are specifically
addressed. Although the planning part is underdeveloped in [91–94], their discussion
is obviously linked to the topic discussed in this thesis as it addresses the potential
of compensation mechanisms.8
Not only compensation mechanisms are dealt with in literature, but also related
multi-area issues are discussed. Several papers address investment cost allocation
in a multi-area context. In particular the European situation is discussed [26, 27].
Other topics include operational issues like multi-area optimal power flow calculation
[95] and phase-shifting transformer coordination [96], power exchanges covering
multiple zones [97], cross-border balancing [3] and organization of transmission
operators and regulatory authorities across boundaries [98].
4.2 Design choices
For the three planning collaboration concepts defined in chapter 3 to be comparable,
they should all be modelled according to same design choices. Based on the above
analysis, this section presents the choices made for the specific models discussed in
the following chapters. The set of model design properties should be such that it
is possible to address the research question. The differences in planning concepts
should become clear. Nevertheless, it is preferred not to make the models too
complex in order to keep results more tractable and intuitively understandable.
The following choices are made for each building block:
 Treatment of the planning horizon: A static planning approach provides a
picture of how the grid should look like at a specific moment in time. A static
transmission planning model already allows differentiating between the three
planning concepts. They differ mostly in objective functions and constraints
and timing is not a primary concern in the concepts. As a consequence, a
dynamic planning setup leading to larger and more complex models is not
required.
7Moreover, it is unclear from the paper whether only transmission or also generation investments
are part of the cooperation.
8Note that the compensation mechanisms addressed in the mentioned publications discuss an
allocation of benefits and are not limited to cost allocation only.
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Note, however, that it is argued in [90] that a dynamic approach can
reveal additional interaction between different national planners in the non-
cooperative planning game. It is illustrated how merchant investors can suffer
from pre-emption and a war-of-attrition game. This is not further explored.
 Uncertainty incorporation: A deterministic approach is opted for. This keeps
the models less complex and still allows to address the research question.
Additionally, the deterministic approach can define several scenarios that
can be taken into account and properly weighted. For instance, transmission
planning can be done taking into account multiple load levels representing
peak and off-peak periods.
 Transmission planning objectives: Although in a European context there are
several objectives in play, the analysis in this thesis is limited to changes in
economic welfare.9 This is clearly linked to the objective of competitiveness or
affordability of energy supply. Although it is theoretically possible to extend
the models towards other objectives, sustainability and security of supply
are not addressed. These objectives are also not covered by the constraints.
This implies, for instance, that no N-1 requirements are enforced. Although
it is technically possible to implement such extra constraints, it would render
models more complex and results less tractable. Moreover, as long as other
elements can be expressed in monetary terms (e.g. the cost related to the
visual impact of new lines or crossing a nature reserve) they can be easily
incorporated within an economic welfare oriented objective function.
 Market incorporation: An explicit market formulation as a part of the
transmission planning models is chosen. Although this makes the models
more complex, this is required to enable the analysis of the effects of
transmission investments on prices and dispatched generation and load. The
interplay between market and transmission network is considered as crucial.
Additionally, the choice for an economic planning objective, i.e. maximizing
economic welfare, also calls for an explicit market modeling.
Furthermore, a DCOPF assuming marginal cost bidding and maximizing
overall economic welfare is chosen as network and market model as it can be
used to represent a perfectly competitive market. It is assumed that all loads
and generators place bids according to their true costs. Locational marginal
pricing is used to determine energy prices and to take into account the effect
of congestion on prices.
 Link with generation investment planning: As argued in section 4.1.5 the
reactive planner is likely to be the most realistic assumption. Moreover, a
reactive planning model is less complex. Consequently, the models in this
thesis start from an ex ante known and fixed generation park.
9In chapter 5 economic welfare is further defined.
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 Multi-area awareness: Given this thesis’ research question, multi-area
awareness is crucial. The different planning concepts vary in the way how the
different areas or zones are dealt with. Whereas in the supranational concept a
single zone viewpoint is adopted, the Pareto-planner and the non-cooperative
planning game differentiate between various zones. For the Pareto-planner
this is limited to putting constraints on the zonal welfare distribution only.
The non-cooperative planning game goes a step further and also considers
transmission investments as a zonal decision variable.
With respect to the market incorporation it is assumed for all planning
collaboration concepts that an integrated market is present. This implies
that all generators and loads participate in a single market covering all zones
and that one set of prices and quantities clears the market for all players.
This viewpoint matches with the European goal of a single internal electricity
market.
The above outlined set of design choices give shape to the models presented in the
next chapters and ensure that they are consistent and comparable. Sometimes
extra assumptions are required for a specific model as discussed for each model
separately.
4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter transmission planning models are anatomized according to different
building blocks defining a model design. Based on the transmission planning
literature and the research question addressed in this thesis a total of six building
blocks are identified: treatment of the planning horizon, uncertainty incorporation,
transmission planning objectives, market incorporation, link with generation
investment planning and multi-area awareness.
It is observed in the literature that planning models differ significantly in their
design choices. Driven by a particular research question complexity is added in
one building block in order to have a more subtle representation of the planning
problem. Other building blocks are dealt with in a lighter way in order to keep
models simpler and results more tractable.
For all building blocks a range of design choices is possible and examples covering
this spectrum can be found throughout the literature. Only for the building
block concerning multi-area awareness, there is an observed lack of publications
addressing this issue in concrete planning models. This thesis is an attempt to
contribute in this research field.
Based on the analysis of the different design building blocks for transmission
planning models, a choice of design options is made for the models presented
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in the next chapters. A static, deterministic transmission planning model with
the aim of maximizing economic welfare is opted for. A perfectly competitive
market determining locational marginal prices and the generation and load dispatch
covering all zones is assumed to interact with the planning problem and is explicitly
modelled as a part of the planning problem. Furthermore, a reactive planning
philosophy with respect to generation expansions is adhered. The treatment of
multiple areas or countries is dealt with in different ways for the different planning
concepts and is a part of the addressed research question.
5
Supranational planner
In this chapter the first planning collaboration concept is further elaborated. Firstly,
the intuition and structure of the supranational planning concept is discussed in
section 5.1. Based on this structure a mathematical formulation is proposed in
section 5.2. It is further refined in order to come to a setup which still has the
required complexity for dealing with the supranational planning concept, but is as
simple as possible in order to be easily implementable. The necessary assumptions
are highlighted. Next, the solution methods are briefly described in section 5.3.
The last section of this chapter (section 5.4) introduces four examples which allow
illustrating various aspects of the collaboration concepts and providing an insight
in the model’s sensitivities. The same examples are also used in the next chapters.
5.1 Model intuition and structure
As defined in section 3.1.2 the supranational planner maximizes overall welfare by
deciding on transmission investments in the entire interconnected grid as if it is
one single zone. Hence, the supranational planner can decide on any investment
anywhere in grid even when it causes effects elsewhere in the network, e.g. in another
zone than the zone hosting the infrastructure. Or stated in terms of the building
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block of multi-area awareness as discussed in section 4.1.6, the supranational
planner acts as if he is not aware of the fact that the addressed network covers
multiple zones.
In his objective function the supranational planner makes a trade-off between
welfare and transmission investment costs. He invests until the marginal benefit
of an extra unit of transmission infrastructure, i.e. a marginal increase in overall
welfare, equals the marginal cost of investing more in infrastructure. This trade-off
is not trivial and implies that in the optimum there can still be congestion. Hence,
any objective function aiming at reducing congestion entirely and obtaining a
so-called copper plate is fundamentally flawed [38].
By investing in transmission infrastructure, the planner can influence the level of
welfare attained. The crucial link between both is the market. By providing the
market with a better transmission grid more trade opportunities can be realised
and more welfare created. However, the market itself is out of direct control of
the transmission planner. It is a separate problem that acts as a set of constraints
for the transmission planner. As indicated in Fig. 5.1 this reciprocal relationship
between the transmission planner and the market can be captured by a bilevel
structure. From a structural point of view, the market problem constrains the
transmission planner in a similar way as direct constraints of the planning problem
itself. In Fig. 5.1 the latter is indicated by the so-called investment constraints.
Such a bilevel problem structure is well known in economics as well as operations
research theory. In the former such structure is found in Stackelberg games. In
this type of game there are two players: a leader and a follower. The leader has
the advantage of first deciding on his output. When taking his decision the leader
already anticipates the response of the follower on his decision. He determines the
best-response curve of the follower which he takes into account when maximizing
his own objective function. The follower then decides given the decision of the
Transmission planner [LEADER]
Max { Welfare – Investment cost }
     s.t. Investment constraints
Market outcome [FOLLOWER]
Fig. 5.1: Bilevel structure of the supranational planning concept
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leader. In the context of the supranational planning concept, the transmission
planner is obviously the leader whose decisions are then used as an input for the
market problem. Hence, the planner decides on optimal investments taking into
account the market’s best response to his investment decisions.
A mathematical classification of a bilevel problem is found in operations research
theory. An optimisation problem with another problem in the constraints is called
a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). The equilibrium
constraints refer to the underlying problem. The best response of the underlying
problem given the decision of the upper level problem can be written as a set of
equilibrium constraints.1 MPECs are further discussed in chapter 6.
5.2 Mathematical formulation
After highlighting several assumptions, this section provides a mathematical
formulation of the supranational planner based on the bilevel structure. Next, it is
argued that, under the given assumptions, this structure can be simplified towards
a single-level structure. This proves to have significant advantages with respect to
finding solutions for the supranational problem. Finally, several assumptions are
relaxed and the model is again reformulated with the aim of accommodating lumpy
investment decisions using discrete variables instead of a continuous representation.
5.2.1 Assumptions
Before providing a mathematical formulation of the supranational planner, necessary
assumptions are outlined and clarified. Major assumptions are already covered by
the selection of design options in chapter 4. They include:
 Static treatment of the time horizon.
 Deterministic planning with the possibility of using scenarios covering different
situations.
 Economic welfare is to be maximized. Security of supply, sustainability or
other objectives are not accounted for in the objective function nor in the
constraints.
 The market is explicitly represented in the planning models via a DCOPF.
 A reactive planning approach starting from a fixed and known generation
park is modelled.
1For an optimisation problem the equilibrium conditions are the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions.
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 The supranational planner acts as a single zone planner treating all countries
together as one zone.
Although not changing the basic nature of the model, several other assumptions
are required concerning the following issues:
 Possible investments,
 Network representation,
 Shape of demand, generation and transmission cost functions,
 Overall welfare definition.
Possible investments
modelling transmission infrastructure investments requires a strict definition of
what exactly the investment options or decision variables of the planner are. Firstly,
in this thesis it is assumed that the planner can invest in extra transmission capacity
on each existing or ex-ante defined transmission corridor. This implies that the
transmission investor is bounded by an ex-ante network topology.2 Hence, the
planning models never suggest connections between nodes that are not linked before
the model is run. If new links should be explored by the model, they have to be
already added to the network incidence matrix on beforehand. Stated otherwise,
the possible investments are capacity upgrades of existing transmission corridors or
at least ex-ante determined corridors. It is not further specified which technology
is used for this upgrade, e.g. increasing the voltage level or adding an extra circuit.
Investments are expessed in MW, i.e. in terms of extra transmission capacity.
Secondly, it is assumed that a capacity upgrade of any corridor is possible. This
assumption is used in, for instance, [48, 49, 62]. The set of possible investments is
not ex-ante limited to a shortlist of possible projects. When planning problems
become larger in scope or when there are other constraints which are not modelled
limiting investment options (e.g. environmental or urban planning constraints), it
might be appropriate to start from a limited set. This contributes to a reduced
model size and calculation times. A predefined limited set of investment options is
used in, for instance, [60, 76, 99].
Thirdly, investments can be modelled in a continuous or discrete way. Whereas a
continuous representation allows a capacity increase of any size, a discrete treatment
assumes that capacity increases are lumpy and only steps of e.g. 100 or 500 MW
are possible. The step size depends on the available technologies. A discrete
2Network topology is defined as the network defined by nodes and connections between them.
It can be represented by a network incidence matrix.
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representation is more realistic. Unfortunately, by introducing discrete variables
the model complexity increases significantly. Whereas the model is first developed
using continuous variables, in section 5.2.4 a discrete representation of investment
options is provided. Throughout this thesis both approaches are used depending
on the concept or example considered. However, unless clearly stated otherwise,
continuous variables are assumed.
Network representation
As already briefly mentioned in section 4.1.4 a DCOPF is used to model the
market and consequently also the power flows in the network. A DC load flow
is a linear approximation of the AC power flow equations based on the following
assumptions [78]:
 Voltage angle differences are small,
 Line resistance is negligible,
 Flat voltage profile over the entire network.
It is generally accepted that the DC approximation can be used for economic
applications [49]. As discussed earlier it has been widely applied in transmission
planning literature.3 In [78] it is argued that under certain conditions a DC
representation is sufficiently accurate. In [100] this is validated for the UCTE
network. In this thesis it is assumed that these conditions are met. As a consequence
of using a DC representation losses and reactive power issues cannot be analysed
in this thesis.4
Investments in the network are likely to have an impact on the technical
characteristics determining the load flow. However, for the sake of simplicity
it is assumed that reactances - the only characteristic taken into account in a DC
load flow - do not change when increasing the transmission capacity. By doing
so, the linear nature of the load flow equations does not change after introducing
investment variables. In this thesis this assumption is only used for the continuous
representation of investments.5 It corresponds to assuming fixed Power Transfer
Distribution Matrices as modelled in [49] and applied in [50]. In section 5.2.4
this simplification is removed and discrete capacity increases affecting the total
reactance of a corridor are modelled.
3See section 4.1.4.
4Note, however, that methods have been developed to extend the DC method with (an
approximation) of losses, e.g., in [101].
5Note, however, that it is possible to use a continuous representation and at the same time
alter the electrical characteristics. One option is to make the reactance of a line a function of the
decided investment level. The formulation becomes non-linear is such a case. An example can be
found in [102].
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Shape of demand, generation and transmission cost functions
Demand is considered elastic and linearly decreasing with the price. Generation
costs are assumed to be linearly increasing with the output. In some examples
constant generation costs are assumed. Non-convexities like minimum run levels
and start-up costs are not taken into account. Only variable generation costs linked
to fuel costs are taken into account. Other cost increasing factors like ramping
requirements are also ignored. By assuming generation cost functions, abstraction
is made from a specific underlying generation mix. The generation cost function
can be understood as a merit order with increasing marginal costs.
Transmission costs are assumed to be linearly increasing with the transmission
capacity. No economies of scale are assumed.6
Overall welfare definition
As discussed in section 4.2, a purely economic objective function maximizing welfare
is opted for. Several measures for economic welfare exist. In [41] social welfare,
merchandising surplus, consumer and producer surplus (CS and PS) are proposed
as metrics for measuring the economic effects of transmission investments. In
this thesis overall welfare is defined as the sum of net consumer and net producer
surplus and congestion revenues (CR). They are all valued equally. This implies
that CS is considered as important as PS or CR. As a consequence, it is possible
that welfare transfers occur from consumers to producers and vice versa. The
planners are assumed to be indifferent to this matter. This is a rather strong
assumption. It is not unreasonable to think that from a zonal perspective PS is
not valued equally with CS and CR because generation facilities are often owned
and operated by international companies. Generation profits (i.e. PS) is hence
not necessarily linked to a particular zones. This issue is particularly relevant in
the remaining two concepts, where zonal welfare is explicitly calculated (see also
Appendix B).
Net consumer surplus is defined as the quantity consumed in a node multiplied
by the difference between the willingness to pay of the load and the price paid
in that node. This boils down to the area below the demand function minus the
area corresponding to the payments made. Net producer surplus is the profit
6For electricity transmission infrastructure economies of scale exist. Assuming economies of
scale has as a consequence that in the optimal outcome it is for investors no longer possible to rely
on congestion rents only to finance the investment cost. Extra side-payments are then required.
In the electricity transmission sector this is covered by transmission tariffs charged upon grid
users. These tariffs are often a function of the energy withdrawn from or injected on the network.
Not only economies of scale, but also other elements (e.g. reliability constraints) make such tariffs
a necessity to cover the enitre network cost. This issue is addressed by [103] for transmission
infrastructure.
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at generation side calculated as the revenues received minus the costs made.
Congestion revenues are calculated as the price difference between the nodes at
both side of a link multiplied by the flow over that link.
The supranational planner maximizes overall welfare and therefore sums net
CS, net PS and CR over the entire network. An aggregated calculation is
more straightforward. Overall welfare is then defined as the aggregated gross
consumption surplus, i.e. the area below the aggregated demand function7, minus
total generation costs. CR are inherently included in this way of calculating overall
welfare. Formulating overall welfare in this way only uses variables concerning
generation and load levels and thereby avoids a formulation requiring the prices in
each node.8
5.2.2 Bilevel supranational planning model
Under the assumptions outlined above, the supranational planning concept can be
mathematically formulated as follows:
Maximize
∑
p
∑
n
Tp
(
An,p dn,p − 1
2
Bn,p d
2
n,p
)
(5.1a)
−
∑
p
∑
n
∑
t
Tp
(
Cn,t,p gn,t,p +
1
2
Dn,t,p g
2
n,t,p
)
(5.1b)
−
∑
l
(CLl LNl xl) (5.1c)
subject to:
∀l xl ≥ 0 [αl] (5.2)
7The aggregated demand function is the horizontal sum of the demand functions in each node.
8As further discussed when the supranational planner and the Pareto-planner are
mathematically formulated, nodal prices are obtained from the dual variables of the planning
optimisation. Demand and generation levels are primal variables. A less complex model is
obtained when everything can be formulated in either primal or dual variables, rather than when
both sets are used together.
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where ∀p : dn,p, θn,p, θns,p, gn,t,p ∈ arg : Maximize∑
n
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An,p dn,p − 1
2
Bn,p d
2
n,p
)
(5.3a)
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∑
t∈ΩT
(
Cn,t,p gn,t,p +
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Dn,t,p g
2
n,t,p
)
(5.3b)
subject to:
∀n, p
∑
t
gn,t,p − dn,p −
∑
l
(
INCl,nHl
∑
b
(INCl,bθb,p)
)
= 0 [λn,p]
(5.4a)
∀l, p −Fmaxl − xl ≤ Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p)
[
µal,p
]
(5.4b)
∀l, p Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p) ≤ Fmaxl + xl
[
µbl,p
]
(5.4c)
θns,p = 0 [ξp] (5.4d)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≤ Gmaxn,t,p [νn,t,p] (5.4e)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≥ 0 [ρn,t,p] (5.4f)
∀n, p dn,p ≥ 0 [κn,p] (5.4g)
The bilevel structure is clearly visible. The leader’s objective function is given
by (5.1). It is constrained by (5.2) and by the follower’s problem. The objective
function of the following market problem, i.e. the DCOPF, is found in (5.3).
The equations in (5.4) are the market-related constraints. Note that the above
problem has a convex quadratic objective function (both in the leader and follower’s
problem) and linear constraints. The remaining part of this section discusses the
different levels of the above problem formulation in more detail.
Transmission planner’s objective function and constraints (Leader)
The transmission planner’s objective function in (5.1) consists of three terms. The
first term (5.1a) represents the gross CS or the area below the aggregated demand
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 55
function. In (5.1b) the total generation costs are calculated. Both terms are
weighted by Tp representing the number of hours in period p. The sum of Tp for all
p has to equal 8760 hours in order to be comparable with the annual transmission
investment cost.9 Note that these two terms are fully determined by dn,p, demand
in each node in each period, and gn,t,p, generation in each node for each technology
in each period. These two sets of variables are determined in the underlying market
problem. Hence, welfare is clearly determined by the market outcome.
The transmission investments costs in (5.1c) are proportional with the length LNl
of the line, a unit cost CLl per MW.km.year and the added capacity xl. This
assumes that there are no economies of scale in transmission investments.
The transmission planner is directly constrained by limitations on the feasible
transmission investments. As discussed in section 5.2.1 it is assumed that only
capacity increases on existing transmission corridors are possible. This is expressed
by constraint (5.2).
Underlying market (Follower)
The transmission planner is also bound by the underlying market outcome, here
modelled via a DCOPF. As for each period a different market outcome is possible,
for each period p a DCOPF has to be added as a follower to the transmission
planner’s problem. These different DCOPFs are independent from each other.
As a DCOPF is an optimisation problem itself, it has an objective function and
constraints. The objective function for a single period is given by (5.3). As again
economic welfare is maximized over the entire network at once, gross CS minus
total generation costs is maximized. The constraints in (5.4) represent network,
generation and demand limitations and can be interpreted as follows:
 Kirchhoff constraints are enforced using (5.4a)-(5.4d). Nodal energy balances
are maintained via the equality constraints in (5.4a). Constraints (5.4b) and
(5.4c) ensure that flows are within their limits. Note that the transmission
investment variable xl is determining these limits and added to the already
existing transmission capacity. The voltage angle in the slack bus is fixed by
constraint (5.4d).
 Generation is bounded by its generation capacity and has to be positive
according to constraints (5.4e) and (5.4f).10
9The annual transmission investment cost should be understood as the yearly amount to be
paid when all costs of the asset during its lifetime and the investment cost are taken together
and then recalculated to a yearly cost using an annuity [104]. Note that in the planning model
described in this section existing infrastructure constitutes a sunk cost. Hence, it does not appear
in the objective function. Only new investments are influencing the objective function value.
10Pumped storage is not taken into account.
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 Demand has to be positive due to constraint (5.4g).
The Greek variables after each constraint denote the dual variables. Of particular
interest is λn,p, which is the nodal price in node n in period p. It indicates the cost
of supplying an extra unit of demand in the node and period considered.
5.2.3 Single-level supranational planning model
The bilevel supranational planning model from the previous section can be
reformulated as a single-level problem. This is advantageous as it can enable
the use of less complex solution methods. In this case, the crucial element for the
simplification to be possible is the model chosen for the underlying market. As
here a DCOPF is opted for, it turns out that the follower’s objective function in
(5.3) is already covered by the leader’s objective function in (5.1).11 As argued in
[48] and implicitly assumed in [49] the constraints of the follower can simply be
added as normal constraints to the leader’s problem at the same level as constraint
(5.2) on the feasible investment options. This avoids the necessity of looking for the
(more complex) equilibrium conditions of the follower’s problem and using those as
constraints to the leader’s problem. As a consequence, the bilevel formulation of
section 5.2.2 can be simplified to a conventional QP formulation:
Maximize
∑
p
∑
n
Tp
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An,p dn,p − 1
2
Bn,p d
2
n,p
)
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−
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2
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(5.5b)
−
∑
l
(CLl LNl xl) (5.5c)
subject to:
11In [48] this is formulated as follows: ”... the objective function of the upper-level problem
and the objective functions of all lower-level problems ’point to the same direction’, i.e., all these
objective functions align pursuing their respective targets.”
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∀n, p
∑
t
gn,t,p − dn,p −
∑
l
(
INCl,nHl
∑
b
(INCl,bθb,p)
)
= 0 [Λn,p]
(5.6a)
∀l, p −Fmaxl − xl ≤ Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p)
[
µal,p
]
(5.6b)
∀l, p Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p) ≤ Fmaxl + xl
[
µbl,p
]
(5.6c)
θns,p = 0 [ξp] (5.6d)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≤ Gmaxn,t,p [νn,t,p] (5.6e)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≥ 0 [ρn,t,p] (5.6f)
∀n, p dn,p ≥ 0 [κn,p] (5.6g)
∀l xl ≥ 0 [αl] (5.6h)
The interpretation of the different constraints remains unchanged. Note, however,
that the meaning of the dual variables has slightly changed compared to the bilevel
formulation. For instance, in constraint (5.4a) λn,p was linked to the objective
function of the DCOPF. Now, Λn,p is linked to the transmission planner’s objective
which not only includes gross CS and generation costs, but also transmission
investment costs.12 This nodal price still indicates the cost of supplying an extra
unit of demand in node n in period p, but now also transmission investments are
possibly determining this cost and not only increased generation. Therefore, Λn,p
can be seen as a long-term nodal price as for instance studied in [66], whereas λn,p
is the commonly known (short-term) nodal price.
5.2.4 Planning model with discrete investments
As outlined in the assumptions in section 5.2.1 and seen from the bilevel and
single-level formulations of the supranational planner, transmission investments
are modelled as continuous variables representing a capacity increase on existing
connections. The size of the increase can take any value higher than zero.13
12Also the interpretation of the other dual variables has slightly changed. Unlike for λn,p no
new symbol is assigned to them because they are not further used in the text.
13Of course, an upper bound can be imposed on the capacity increase.
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Furthermore, it is assumed that the electrical characteristics of the network do not
change due to the increased transmission capacity. In this section these assumptions
are relaxed and discrete transmission investment variables are introduced. This
allows representing lumpy transmission investments, i.e. in fixed steps of several
hundreds of megawatts, the addition of extra circuits in an existing corridor and
the development of new corridors. However, the resulting model becomes more
complex.
In the transmission planning literature discrete transmission investment representa-
tions are well-known. In general, two approaches are observed. The first introduces
integer variables indicating the number of circuits. The second uses binary variables
to decide on whether to accept an ex-ante defined candidate project or not.
Integer approach
Capacity increases can be modelled by the possibility of adding circuits parallel to
existing circuits or on a newly defined corridor [43, 46, 63]. When extra circuits are
added in parallel to a particular corridor l, the flow in a circuit l can be calculated
as:
fl,p =
(
NCinitl +NCl
)
Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p) (5.7)
where NCinitl and NCl are integers respectively indicating the number of initial
and extra circuits on transmission corridor l and Hl is the susceptance of a single
circuit.14 Whereas NCinitl is a parameter known ex-ante, NCl is the decision
variable for the transmission planner. Note that when NCinitl = 0 deciding on
NCl ≥ 0 is equivalent to developing a new transmission corridor between two
nodes which are not linked in the initial situation.15 The formulation has become
non-linear due to the bi-linear terms created by the multiplication of NCl and
θn,p. This makes the problem more complex and may require more sophisticated
solution methods.
14Note that the index l now rather indicates corridors which can contain multiple circuits than
a particular line. In the remainder of this thesis l represents single connections or circuits, i.e.
when there are more circuits in a corridor they are represented by as many instances of l as there
are circuits.
15As discussed earlier it is important to notice that this possibility has to be provided to the
model ex-ante as the model itself does not propose new corridors.
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Binary approach
Another approach allows the model to choose between candidate investments which
are ex ante defined [44, 48, 66]. Although the difference is subtle, there is a clear
difference in how they are implemented. Whereas in the previous approach there
is a single integer variable indicating the number of parallel circuits in a particular
corridor, in this approach a binary variable is assigned to each candidate circuit.
In fact, each new circuit is regarded as a new connection and is represented by a
separate row in the network incidence matrix. Note that a candidate circuit can be
parallel to an existing one or the first one in a new corridor. The flow on a circuit
l is defined as:
flowl,p = yl Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p) (5.8)
where yl is a binary variable indicating whether circuit l is built or not and INCl,n is
the row of the network incidence matrix corresponding to the candidate investment.
Also in this case the formulation is no longer linear due to the multiplication of yl
and θn,p.
Linearisation of the binary approach
In this thesis the binary approach is used in transmission planning models as
it can be easily reformulated as a set of linear equations without compromising
the discrete nature of investment decisions. Also in the literature this approach
has been followed. A number of publications applying such linearisation deals
with switching in transmission grids and tries to optimise reliability or generation
dispatch by also considering changes in the network topology.
Especially the work presented in [105–107] is interesting. Switching on or off
transmission lines is there applied within a DCOPF and the objective function
is therefore similar to the one of the supranational transmission planner. The
only difference lies in the transmission investment costs. Whereas in the switching
application no costs are assigned to switching lines on or off, in transmission
planning an investment cost is assigned to the switching variable. Investing in
a candidate line is equivalent to switching that line on at a certain cost. Of
course, when multiple periods are considered an investment remains, whereas in
the switching application the line can be turned off again when the generation and
load dispatch changes. This switching approach for discrete investment decisions is
applied in [41, 48]. A mixture of both approaches is found in [45] where transmission
investment planning is investigated with an underlying DCOPF allowing switching
to improve dispatch costs and possibly avoid transmission investments.
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Mathematically, the single-level supranational transmission investment problem
can be formulated as:
Maximize
∑
p
∑
n
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(INCl,nFlowl,p) = 0 (5.10a)
∀l, p −Fmaxl yl ≤ Flowl,p (5.10b)
∀l, p Flowl,p ≤ ylFmaxl (5.10c)
∀l, p Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p)− Flowl,p +M (1− yl) ≥ 0 (5.10d)
∀l, p Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p)− Flowl,p −M (1− yl) ≤ 0 (5.10e)
θns,p = 0 (5.10f)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≤ Gmaxn,t,p (5.10g)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≥ 0 (5.10h)
∀n, p dn,p ≥ 0 (5.10i)
∀l ∈ ΩL yl ∈ {0, 1} (5.10j)
∀l ∈ ΩLinit yl = 1 (5.10k)
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The above formulation closely follows [48]. The intuition behind the linearisation
is explained in [48, 107]. In constraints (5.10d) and (5.10e) M is a sufficiently
large number. When yl = 1 and the line is built, the term containing M becomes
zero. Both constraints together then ensure that the flow through line l is correctly
calculated. When yl = 0 and the line is not built, the term containing M is
dominating the other terms in (5.10d) and (5.10e) and thereby ensures that the
constraints are met. The flow itself is brought to zero by constraints (5.10b) and
(5.10c) as the maximum flow through the line becomes zero.
The part of the objective function concerning transmission investment costs has
slightly changed to accommodate discrete investment decisions. The costs are now
calculated using CCl, a single annual total cost figure for the entire line l, and not
a cost per MW installed. The cost for existing lines is assumed to be zero and does
not influence the objective function value.
Constraints (5.10j) and (5.10k) respectively define yl as a binary variable and
ensure that already existing lines are active.
The supranational transmission planning problem in (5.9)-(5.10) has a quadratic
objective function and linear constraints. It consists of both continuous and discrete
variables. Therefore, it can be classified as a Mixed Integer Quadratic Program
(MIQP).
5.3 Solution methods
The continuous single-level supranational planning model is a convex QP and the
discrete model can be written as a convex MIQP. For both model types proven
optimal solutions can be determined. Both problems are well known and can be
solved easily using commercially available solvers. For this thesis the models have
been implemented in GAMS using the CPLEX solver.16
When the problems become larger, the calculation time for the MIQP can become
unacceptably high and other solution methods have to be used. As discussed in
chapter 6 heuristics like genetic algorithms can provide near-optimal solutions in
such cases.
16The General Algebraic modelling System (GAMS) is a high-level modelling system for
mathematical programming and optimisation. CPLEX is a high-performance LP/MIP solver
from IBM. (http://www.gams.com)
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5.4 Examples and sensitivity analysis
After having introduced a mathematical optimisation model for the supranational
planning concept in the previous sections, the remainder of this chapter introduces
several examples. They are used to illustrate the basic principles of the model and
to get grips on the true meaning of the supranational planning concepts. A simple
example is also used to illustrate important sensitivities inherent to the model.
The same examples are also used in the next chapters when the other planning
concepts are modelled and compared.17
The examples and numerical data are chosen in function of the research question at
hand. The selection is made with the purpose of illustrating potential differences
between the different planning concepts. There is no guarantee that these differences
occur in each situation.
The discrepancy between the different collaboration concepts only occurs when
the involved zones have different characteristics. When the zones are entirely
symmetric with respect to demand and generation cost functions, there is obviously
no reason to trade and no rationale to develop the transmission link.18
Firstly, a simple two-zone example with each zone consisting of one node is
introduced. It is used to outline the basic principles and to test the model with
respect to a number of sensitivities. Next, two three-zone examples with each zone
consisting of one node are given. They differ in network topology. Whereas the
first three-zone example has a radial topology, the second has a meshed triangular
network. In the three-zone examples especially the effects of a transit zone are
interesting. Finally, a more complicated 14-node network with three zones is used
to illustrate the effect when a single zone consists of multiple nodes. Additionally,
the results obtained in the examples are linked to real European transmission
systems.
For each example a description of the network and connected network users is
given as well as the data used to obtain the presented results. All results are found
using CPLEX in GAMS.
5.4.1 Two-zone example
A simple two-zone example is presented to explain how the supranational planning
concept works. Also a detailed graphical analysis of the welfare effects is provided.
17This is true for all examples, except for the 14-node, three-zone example. The latter won’t be
used for the non-cooperative planning game.
18Except for reliability purposes, which are not analysed in this thesis.
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Zone A Zone BF
TAF TBF
TAB
Figure 5.2: Two-zone example: network structure
Data
Assume two zones A and B each consisting of a single node and interconnected
via a single transmission link TAB. In figure 5.2, the auxiliary node F indicates
the frontier between A and B. The transmission link can be split into two parts
TAF and TBF respectively linking A and B to F.
19 Both segments are identical
and have an arbitrarily chosen length of 100 km. Transmission investments come
at an annual cost of 50 e/(MW.km.year). This cost corresponds approximately
to a typical investment cost of a double circuit 380 kV line as calculated in [104].
The order of magnitude is the same as found in other studies like [108] and values
retrieved from Transmission System Operators (TSO).20
In each zone there is available generation capacity and price-elastic demand.21 It
is assumed that generation capacity is abundantly available meaning that in each
zone sufficient generation capacity is installed allowing it to be autarkic. Hence,
maximum generation output levels do not constrain this example. The demand and
generation cost functions are given in figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b). Only one period is
assumed meaning that generation and demand levels are equal in each hour during
a year.22
19This split of TAB in TAF and TBF is not particularly relevant for this chapter, but this
example is referred to when the other collaboration concepts are discussed and illustrated in the
next chapters.
20Private communication with a European TSO and UK values in [109].
21It is possible to do the analysis with price-inelastic demand. Although this would simplify the
problem, it makes the examples less useful with respect to the other planning concepts presented
in the next chapters.
22In terms of the mathematical formulations in section 5.2, there is only one element p in the
set of periods.
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Figure 5.3: Two-zone example: (a) demand functions and (b) generation cost
functions
Results and welfare analysis
In Table 5.1 the results for the two-zone example are given. The results (excluding
transmission investment costs) are shown on an hourly basis. The situation without
a transmission link is compared to the supranational planning solution.
Obviously, in the situation without transmission link, demand and generation are
matched at the zonal level. As there is no link, there are also neither congestion
revenues, nor investment cost. Due to the higher generation costs in zone B,
demand is lower and the price is higher. CS in zone B is lower than in zone A. The
opposite is true for PS.
In the supranational planning solution a transmission link with a capacity of
945.2 MW is installed. This link causes the prices in both zones to almost converge.
Whereas the price in zone A increases, zone B faces a lower price. Zone A is now
exporting to zone B. Both zones enjoy a higher welfare (measured by CS+PS+CR).
However, the breakdown into CS, PS and CR has altered. In zone A the higher
price results in a lower value for CS, but a higher value for PS (and vice versa for
zone B). The amount of CR collected on TAB is split on a 50-50 basis between
zones A and B.
The welfare effects can be further clarified using Fig. 5.4. For each zone demand
and supply (i.e. generation cost) functions are given. In the middle of the figure
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No link Supranational optimum
Zone A Zone B Zone A Zone B
Generation [MW] 3250 2666.7 3958.9 2036.5
Demand [MW] 3250 2666.7 3013.7 2981.7
Price [e/MWh] 32.5 53.3 39.6 40.7
CS [e] 158437.5 142222.2 136235.7 177814.9
PS [e] 52812.5 71111.1 78364.6 41474.5
CR [e] 0 0 539.5 539.5
CS+PS+CR [e] 211250 213333.3 215139.8 219828.9
Transmission capacity [MW] 0 945.2
Investment cost [e] 0 1079
Total welfare [e] 424583.3 433889.7
Table 5.1: Two zone example: overview of results on an hourly basis
No link Supranational optimum
Zone A Zone B Zone A Zone B
Net CS (IJL) (VWX) (IJL)-(FIJK) (VWX)+(RUVW)
Net PS (IJM) (NVW) (IJM)+(EIJK) (NVW)-(TUVW)
CR - - 0.5×CRev 0.5×CRev
∆Welfare - (IEF)+0.5×CRev (RTV)+0.5×CRev
Table 5.2: Two zone example: welfare effects
the Net Export Curves (NEC) are shown for each zone. It shows for each zone the
relationship of the market price and the net export (or import) volume.23
When the transmission capacity between both zones is zero, the market outcome is
given by the intersection of supply and demand in each zone separately, represented
by I and V for respectively zone A and B. Zone A is clearly the low-price region
and has a higher demand. The transmission investment done by the supranational
planner is shown in the middle pane of Fig. 5.4 and indicated by Cap. The new
prices are determined by the intersection of the vertical line Cap with both NECs.
Zone A becomes an exporter and zone B importer. Note that prices would converge
completely when a capacity of 1000 MW is available. The shaded area (further
referred to as CRev) in the middle pane is the amount of CR and equals the
remaining price difference times the amount of electricity exported from A to B.
The welfare effects are summarised in Table 5.2 by referring to areas in Fig. 5.4.
Both zones enjoy a positive welfare effect. Note, however, that within a zone there
can be a significant transfer between CS and PS.
23See [110, 111] for more information on Net Export Curves.
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Figure 5.4: Two-zone example: welfare effects
5.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Before discussing more complicated examples, a better understanding of the
supranational planning model’s behavior is provided by illustrating the model’s
sensitivity to changes in the input data. The simple and tractable two-zone example
is used for this analysis.
It is not the purpose of this section to perform an extensive sensitivity analysis, but
rather to illustrate sensitivities by using examples. The aim is to get better grips
on how the model functions. Firstly, the difference or degree of asymmetry between
both zones is explored. Secondly, the trade-off made in the objective function is
further investigated.
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Parameter Zone A Zone B
Intercept demand 130 130
Slope demand -0.03 -0.03
Intercept generation 0 0
Slope generation 0.015 [0.005;0.025]
Table 5.3: Degree of symmetry: data for two-zone example
Degree of asymmetry
As already mentioned, there is no economic reason to develop a transmission link
between two perfectly symmetric zones because there is no reason to trade between
them. Asymmetry can originate from a different cost structure of the generation
park or a different load profile. As indicated in Fig. 5.2, in the two-zone example
discussed in the previous section both asymmetries are present. The impact of
asymmetry is further illustrated by focusing on generation cost differences.
In Fig. 5.5 the impact of asymmetry on the optimal transmission capacity is
illustrated using a two-zone example. As indicated by Table 5.3 the demand
functions of zones A and B are identical. The generation cost function of zone A
is fixed. The slope of the generation cost function of zone B varies within the
interval [0.005;0.025]. Demand and generation levels in both zones and the optimal
transmission capacity are shown in Fig. 5.5 for different values of generation costs
in zone B. It can be seen from this graph that in the symmetric case, i.e. for the
slope in B equal to 0.015, the optimal transmission capacity is zero and demand
and generation levels are equal in both zones. Smaller values for the slope in B
imply cheaper generation costs. Consequently, demand is higher and there is a
strong incentive to trade, thereby justifying a higher transmission capacity. For
higher values of the slope in B, generation is more costly, thereby lowering demand
and the need for transmission capacity. Note that left from the symmetric case,
zone B is cheaper than zone A and vice versa at the right side of the symmetric
case. The flow on the transmission link has a different direction at both sides.
In the European context, several asymmetries can be observed, both at generation
and demand side:
 Generation mix: The portfolio of installed generation facilities largely varies
over different countries. It is the result of available (primary energy) resources,
political choice, geography,. . . For instance, whether or not nuclear energy
is installed significantly impacts a countries portfolio as it mostly are large
facilities with cheap variable costs. Several countries have historically been
dominated by nuclear power and hosted a large number of plants, e.g. France,
68 SUPRANATIONAL PLANNER
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
Slope generation cost zone B
[M
W
]
 
 
Demand A
Generation A
Demand B
Generation B
Capacity on TAB
Figure 5.5: Two-zone example: impact of generation cost difference on demand,
generation and investment levels
Germany, UK and Belgium. Today, nuclear phase-outs are observed in several
countries, but not in all countries. Even stronger, some countries are investing
in new nuclear facilities. These choices obviously impact the portfolio and
creates asymmetry.
Another source of asymmetry at the generation side can be found in renewable
energy sources. Many hydropower plants can be found in mountaineous
countries such as Switzerland and Austria. Also in the Nordic countries the
generation portfolio is dominated by hydropower, e.g. Norway. Southern
countries have a larger potential for solar energy and coastal countries can
profit from better wind conditions.
Those differences in generation portfolio are also reflected in the generation
cost functions and give a natural incentive to trade. Hydro and thermal
systems are considered as complementary. The same is true for hydro systems
and systems with a substantial amount of intermittent resources.
 Demand side: Also at the demand side differences between countries occur.
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A seemingly trivial issue is created by time zones. For instance, the U.K. and
the continent operate with a time difference, which results in the demand
peak to be shifted as well. This create opportunities to exchange peak power.
Another difference is observed at the consumption side. When consumers
rely more on electricity for heating than on other energy sources (e.g. natural
gas), this has an effect on the demand curve. Similarly, different industries
have a different demand profile. For some sectors electricity is vital, for others
demand is more elastic. As the industry mix is not the same in all countries,
this again creates trade opportunities due to asymmetry.
Objective function trade-off
The objective function of the supranational planner consists of two important parts:
welfare and transmission investment costs. It is the task of the supranational
planner to properly balance both parts. Of course, this trade-off is driven by cost
figures. To make an optimal trade-off, the relative difference between welfare and
transmission investment costs should be carefully addressed. Therefore, in this
section it is analysed how the decision of the supranational planner alters when
this relative difference changes. For this purpose transmission investment costs are
varied, ceteris paribus.
Transmission investment costs can vary because of a longer distance of the
connection, but also due to a more expensive technology used. For instance,
it is often stated that underground cables cost a multiple of overhead lines. This
obviously changes the trade-off made by the planner and the optimal outcome.
The two-zone example from section 5.4.1 is used to illustrate this effect. A fixed
distance of 200 km is assumed. Varying the investment cost has the same impact
as changing the distance. Transmission investment costs are varied from 0 to
1000 e/(MW.km.year). The latter is of course an extreme value, but it allows
assessing when the investment costs becomes prohibitively high to justify any
investment. A similar cost sensitivity analysis has been undertaken in [50] where it
is investigated how a planner makes a trade-off between connecting wind farms
and transmission investments.
In Fig. 5.6 it can be seen that the size of the transmission investment in TAB
decreases with its cost and falls back to zero when the costs exceed a value of
about 920 e/(MW.km.year). Again, this is a very high value and is more than 18
times higher than the estimated cost of 50 e/(MW.km.year) for a double circuit
380 kV overhead line, which can be regarded as the most economical solution.24
24Of course, a 380 kV overhead line is not always the preferred solution from a technical or
societal point of view. Here, it is just used as a reference. In general, the true cost of a particular
technology can be higher than the pure investment cost, even when assessed from a life-cycle
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Figure 5.6: Two-zone example: impact of transmission investment costs on demand,
generation and investment levels
More interestingly, it can be seen that when costs are only 5 times higher, which
can correspond to relying on underground technology instead of AC overhead
technology, the amount of transmission capacity decided by the supranational
planner drops to approximately 736 MW or about 75% of the case with a cost of
50 e/(MW.km.year).
Another reason for using higher transmission investment costs is take into account
external costs related to for instance visual impact, degraded value of property
along the corridor, potential health hazards, nature reserve crossing... For several
reasons public opposition is often fierce causing many delays for infrastructure
projects [112]. Assigning a higher cost to transmission investments can also be a
way to cover such ’acceptability’ concerns. As this renders the trade-off between
welfare and transmission investment cost less favourable for the latter, only those
point of view. Several problems as public acceptance, electromagnetic fields, urban planning
requirements, etc. influence the true cost in one or another direction. See, for instance, [112] for
a more elaborate discussion.
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investments still being worthwhile even after external costs are then retained by
the model.
From Fig. 5.6 it was already clear that for a higher investment cost a lower optimal
investment capacity is found resulting in a different load and generation dispatch.
The upper graph in Fig. 5.7 illustrates the impact on overall welfare. Overall
welfare is scaled in such way that the overall welfare level of the situation where
investments are free of charge equals 1. Compared to the reference case with a cost
of 50 e/(MW.km.year) a loss of 1% of the overall economic welfare is incurred
when the investment cost increases to about 200 e/(MW.km.year). Hence, in
this example switching from overhead lines to undergound cables costs more than
1% of overall welfare. It is not the aim of the author to argue whether this is a
high or low cost as this result is also sensitive to the input data, such as assumed
elasticity of demand. The sole purpose of this section it to provide a sensitivity
analysis allowing to better capture to subtleties of the model rather than to give
an indication of realistic cost increases or savings by using different technologies.
In Fig. 5.7 the impact on overall welfare is illustrated. In the lower graph the
relation between overall welfare and the installed capacity on TAB is shown. Overall
welfare is scaled in such way that the overall welfare level of the situation without a
transmission link equals 1. An investment cost of 50 e/(MW.km.year) is assumed.
Two observations can be made for this example. Firstly, investing in transmission
capacity can create a welfare increase of more than 2% compared to the case
without a transmission link. Secondly, for the given cost, there is an optimum
of 945.2 MW. Installing more transmission capacity is detrimental to the overall
welfare level. For other cost values the optimum is found at different levels, as
indicated by Fig. 5.6.
5.4.3 Three-zone example: radial configuration
In this section a radial three-zone example is used to illustrate the supranational
planning model in a context with a possible transit zone. Each zone consists of a
single node. Additionally, in this example transmission investments are modelled
in a discrete manner, i.e. transmission capacity expansions are lumpy and come
per circuit.
Data
As displayed in Fig. 5.8 each zone has 7.5 GW of available generation capacity.
Low, medium and high cost generators are located in respectively zone A, B and C.
Their respective variable generation costs are 30, 43 and 70 e/MWh. In each zone
the same inverse demand function is assumed, namely price = 130−0.04×demand.
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Figure 5.7: Two-zone example: (below) impact of installed transmission capacity
(at a cost of for a cost of 50 e/(MW.km.year)) on overall welfare and (above)
impact of transmission investment costs on overall welfare
Zones A and B are fairly well interconnected by three lines with a rating of 1 GW.
Zone C is poorly connected to zone B by a single line with a rating of 450 MW. F1
and F2 indicate the frontiers between respectively zones A and B and zones B and
C.25
All transmission lines, including new ones, are assumed to have equal impedance
and a length of 100 km. Like the existing lines, new lines connecting zones A and B
have a rating of 1 GW. They have a yearly cost of 30000 e/km. For new connections
25F1 and F2 are given here for completeness, but are only used in the following chapters. In
the single-zone viewpoint adopted in this chapter borders between zones are neglected.
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Figure 5.8: Three-zone radial example: data
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Figure 5.9: Three-zone radial example: initial dispatch
between zones B and C, a rating of 450 MW and a yearly cost of 20000 e/km are
assumed, i.e. the same type of lines as in the initial situation. Transmission cost
data are again based on [104]. No direct lines between zones A and C can be built.
Results and welfare analysis
The initial situation, i.e. before any transmission investments, is shown in Fig. 5.9.
The low cost generator covers demand in zones A and B and partly in zone C. Due to
the limited interconnection capacity between zones B and C, the high cost generator
in zone C is dispatched to meet demand. The nodal price in zones A and B is
30 e/MWh, whereas in zone C the nodal price runs up to 70 e/MWh. This higher
price causes a lower demand in zone C compared to the other zones. 18000 e of
congestion revenues are collected on the line between zones B and C. They are
split between those zones.
The supranational planner (Fig. 5.10) expands the corridor between zones A and B
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Figure 5.10: Three-zone radial example: supranational planner’s solution
with 2 lines and adds 5 connections between zones B and C and thereby increases
total welfare to a value of 375000 e. The 62000 e welfare gain by far offsets the
required hourly investment cost of 1826 e(= (100×2×30000+100×5×20000)/8760).
This causes an altered market outcome and changed nodal prices. The price in
all zones becomes 30 e/MWh. Due to this lower price for zone C demand has
risen. The generator in zone A now produces at full capacity. Due to the increased
transmission capacity between zones B and C the high cost generator in zone C is
not dispatched anymore to cover demand.
The welfare effects are summarised in Table 5.4. Although overall welfare increases,
not all zones benefit. Zone A remains status quo. Whereas CS in zone C increased
significantly compensating decreased CR, zone B only looses the CR it earned
in the initial situation. Furthermore, note that in this three-zone example PS is
always zero as the price never exceeds the marginal costs of the generators. This is
due to the fact that in each zone there is sufficient generation capacity available.
This example serves very well in illustrating the assumption of possible welfare
transfers or compensation mechanisms underlying the supranational planning
collaboration concept. Firstly, with respect to the proposed transmission
investments, it should be noted that investments take place in the entire network
and not only in the zones benefiting from those investments. Therefore it is not
unreasonable to expect that zone C finances the investments. The cost of 1826 e
is largely compensated by zone C’s welfare gain of 71000 e. Otherwise, why would
zones A and B care about facilitating investments on their border? Secondly, as
zone B in its role of transit country is suffering a loss in the supranational planning
solution, zone C should also compensate zone B.
The discrete nature of the transmission investment variables is also visible in
the results. For instance, between zones B and C investments are available in
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Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 125 125 45 125 125 125
PS 0 0 0 0 0 0
CR 0 9 9 0 0 0
∆Welfare - - - 0 -9 +71
Table 5.4: Three-zone radial example: hourly welfare effects (in ke)
lumps of 450 MW. A total of six parallel lines each with a rating of 450 MW, is
installed between those zones resulting in a total transfer capacity of 2700 MW.
When investments are represented in a continuous way, the result would be that a
capacity of exactly 2500 MW (i.e. 6× 416.67 MW) is installed.
5.4.4 Three-zone example: meshed configuration
The two previous examples used a radial network structure. In this example a
meshed configuration is introduced. Again three zones are modelled. Hence, transit
flows can occur.
Data
A triangular grid with three zones A, B and C is depicted in figure 5.11(a). Each
zone consists of a single node. Each link has a length of 100 km and an equal
impedance. The cost for investment is 50 e/(MW.km.year). An initial transmission
capacity of 200 MW is already installed on each line. A continuous representation
of transmission investments is used.
For the next chapters it is important to note that it is assumed that each zone hosts
one link entirely. Links TAB , TBC and TAC are located in respectively zones A, B
and C.
In figures 5.11(b) and (c) linear demand and generation cost functions are given.
Zone A hosts the most elastic demand function, but also the most expensive
generators. The generator cost functions differ in the amount of power which can
be delivered at zero variable cost, ranging from 0 MW in zone A up to 1000 MW
in zone C. The slope of the generation cost function is equal for all zones.
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A: pA=130-0.030 x demandA
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Figure 5.11: Three-zone meshed example: (a) network, (b) demand functions and
(c) generation cost functions
Results and welfare analysis
The investments done by the supranational planner are shown in Table 5.5. The
capacity increases on each link, but to a different extent. The newly available
transmission capacity causes the generation and demand dispatch to change (Table
5.6). As the zones with the cheaper generation costs are now better connected
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TAB TBC TAC
∆Capacity [MW] +115.9 +75.4 +391.4
Table 5.5: Three-zone meshed example: transmission investments
Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
Generation [MW] 3014.5 3021.7 3028.8 2569.5 3031.5 3493.4
Demand [MW] 3328.5 2993.8 2742.8 3476.8 2991.0 2626.6
Price [e/MWh] 30.15 25.22 20.29 25.70 25.32 24.93
Table 5.6: Three-zone meshed example: dispatch and prices in the initial and
supranational planning case
to the other zones, they are able to increase their generation output. This is in
particular true for zone C, the cheapest zone. In zone A the generation level
drops. Globally, demand has risen slightly with 29.5 MW. The nodal prices also
changed significantly, especially in zones A and C. Due to the increased transmission
capacity, nodal prices almost converge to the initial price of zone B. Note that
zone B is the moderate zone with respect to demand elasticity and generation cost
levels.
The welfare effects are summarised in Table 5.7. Although considerable increases
of the available transmission capacity have taken place, welfare changes at the
zonal level appear to be modest. Unlike in the previous example, significant welfare
transfers between consumers and generators take place within a zone. The changed
nodal prices are at the root of this effect. Although small in absolute numbers, the
change in CR is noteworthy as its level is of the same order of magnitude as the
zonal welfare changes.
As in the previous example, there is a negatively affected zone. Zone B’s welfare
slightly decreases. The other zones profit from the supranational investment
decisions. Again, the assumption of zonal welfare transfers or a compensation
mechanism is to be relied on. Also the observation concerning the parties bearing
the transmission cost remains valid. Zone B is not likely to contribute voluntarily
in the costs. This should be part of the compensation mechanism.
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Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 166.1 156.8 150.5 181.3 156.6 138.0
PS 45.4 44.4 40.9 33.0 44.7 56.0
CR 1.266 0.493 1.198 0.285 0.113 0.277
∆Welfare - - - +1.735 -0.374 +1.758
Table 5.7: Three-zone meshed example: hourly welfare effects (in ke)
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Figure 5.12: 14 node example: transmission corridors, location of generators and
zone borders
5.4.5 14-node, three-zone example
Although in this example again a three-zone network is used, each zone now consists
of multiple nodes.26 On the one hand there are transmission links entirely located
within a single zone and on the other hand there are cross-border links with both
ends located in different zones. The zones themselves are positioned in a meshed
way, i.e. each zone has at least one link with the other two zones. A discrete
investment representation is used.
Data
Fig. 5.12 shows the network structure of the 14 node, three-zone example. Three
zones A, B and C are defined. All transmission corridors are indicated as well as the
26The network topology resembles the topology of the IEEE 14 bus network. However, only
the location of nodes and lines is maintained. Electrical properties, ratings, generation costs, etc.
are changed.
EXAMPLES AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 79
Node Zone Variable cost Initial Supra
generation generation
1 A 35 8849 10000
2 A 40 9200 10000
4 B 60 0 0
7 B 70 300 0
9 C 45 8755 9814
13 C 55 0 0
Table 5.8: 14 node example: Generation cost data (in e/MWh) and generation
output for the different planners’ solutions (in MW)
Corridor # circuits Corridor # circuits
From To Zone Initial Supra From To Zone Initial Supra
1 2 A 6 0 6 7 B 7 0
1 3 A 10 3 6 8 B 6 0
2 3 A 6 0 8 10 BC 3 0
2 4 AB 8 0 8 14 BC 3 0
2 5 AB 12 4 9 11 C 6 2
3 5 AB 6 0 9 12 C 6 0
3 9 AC 3 0 9 13 C 6 1
4 5 B 6 0 10 11 C 6 0
5 6 B 6 4 12 13 C 6 0
5 8 B 7 1 13 14 C 6 0
Table 5.9: 14 node example: initial situation and different planners’ investments
location of the generators. Each zone has two generators with an available capacity
of 10 GW. The variable generation costs are given in the third column of Table 5.8.
In each node the same linear demand function holds: price = 130− 0.04 ∗ demand.
The initial number of circuits, i.e. before any investment, on each corridor is
given by the fourth and nineth column of Table 5.9. New lines have a yearly cost
of 20000 e/km. They have equal impedance, a length of 100 km and a rating
of 450 MW. Additional lines with the same specifications can be added to each
corridor shown in Fig. 5.12 with a maximum of six extra circuits per corridor.
Results and welfare analysis
In Table 5.9 the initial number of circuits on each corridor and the extra circuits
decided by the supranational planner are given. In each zone transmission
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Node Zone Initial Supra
LMP D LMP D
1 A 35.00 2375 44.37 2141
2 A 40.00 2250 44.31 2143
3 A 44.99 2125 44.40 2140
4 A 42.13 2197 44.29 2143
5 B 44.97 2126 44.26 2144
6 B 70.00 1500 44.74 2131
7 B 70.00 1500 44.74 2131
8 B 58.85 1779 45.55 2111
9 C 45.00 2125 45.00 2125
10 C 62.02 1699 45.26 2119
11 C 63.61 1660 45.11 2122
12 C 49.54 2012 45.05 2124
13 C 54.08 1898 45.10 2123
14 C 55.67 1858 45.25 2119
Table 5.10: 14 node example: Nodal prices (LMP, in e/MWh) and demand (D, in
MW)
investments are proposed. Most circuits are added in zone A in order to allow the
generation units in nodes 1 and 2 to increase their output. Also the generator in
node 9 is better connected. Not surprisingly, the generators in nodes 1, 2 and 9
have the cheapest generation costs (Table 5.8).
For both the initial situation and the supranational planner’s outcome Table 5.10
provides the nodal price (LMP) and local demand (D) in each node. Generators’
output for both situations is given in Table 5.8. Due to the investments done by
the supranational planner overall demand has risen. In particular in zones B and
C demand increases. In zone A a slight reduction of demand is noticed. These
changes in demand are caused by altered nodal prices. Due to the investments,
the network is less congested and prices almost converge. The high prices initially
observed in several nodes of zones B and C drop significantly. Zone A undergoes a
slight price increase. These price drops are possible because the cheap generation
units in nodes 1, 2 and 9 are now dispatched as much as possible.
All zonal welfare effects are summarised in Table 5.11. Per zone an aggregation is
made by summing the effects for all nodes part of that zone. CR collected on a
link within a zone are entirely allocated to that zone, for cross-border lines a 50-50
split is applied between the two zones linked by the line.
Compared to the initial situation overall welfare increases. A total investment of
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Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 304.4 340.2 425.2 275.0 454.6 540.3
PS 0 0 0 136.8 0 0
CR 78.8 129.3 87.1 0 6.2 1.4
∆Welfare - - - +32.7 -8.7 +29.3
Table 5.11: 14-node example: hourly welfare effects (in ke)
3.42 ke creates a welfare increase of 53.3 ke (excl. investment cost). However,
the benefits only accrue to zones A and C. Zone B is negatively affected. Although
zone B enjoys lower nodal prices, increased demand and therefore also a higher
level of CS, the significant drop in CR is not sufficiently compensated to render the
supranational planner’s result positive for zone B. The drop in CR also affects the
other zones, but they are sufficiently compensated. In zone A a significant portion
of PS is created as the generation units are inframarginal and therefore able to
make profit. This largely compensates the drop in CR and the slight reduction
in CS. The story is different for zone C where the drop in nodal prices and the
according increase in demand and CS by large compensates the loss of CR. As in
the previous example, a welfare transfer from zones A and C to B is required to
compensate zone B for its loss. As the values in Table 5.11 do not yet take into
account the investment costs, it is not sufficient to only finance the investments in
zone B (i.e. an amount of 1.14 ke27).
5.4.6 From simple examples to reality
The four presented examples are obviously very simple and it can be doubted to
what extent the results, i.e. the decided investments and the resulting welfare
distribution, are not purely a result of the data. When making the link to the
research questions and the policy debate of chapter 2, it is important to verify
whether or not similar results would occur in real life. In particular, it is important
to get an idea whether it is likely or not to have both winners and losers.
Real transmission grids of course count thousands of nodes and cannot always be
simplified to a network of two or three nodes. Nevertheless, the presented examples
should not be neglected. With some imagination, a two-zone network as used in
section 5.4.1 can represent situations like the connection of the Iberian peninsula
to France and the main continent or of the British Isles to the continent. Of
course, this assumes that internally those countries are considered as copper plates.
27This value only takes into account the five circuits built within zone B and not the cost of
the four new cross-border circuits between zones A and B. Including the latter does not change
the conclusion.
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Similar geographic matches can be made for the other examples and especially
when, like in the 14-node, three-zone example, the national network is modelled as
well. A similar topology is of course not sufficient to suggest that the observations
with respect to welfare also hold in real situations. Calibration of cost functions
and demand elasticities is also required. As already indicated in section 5.4.2
asymmetry between countries exists, but asymmetry alone is not always sufficient
to have winners and losers (as illustrated by the two-zone example). It is difficult
to check for real situations the observations made in the simple examples, but two
recent contributions provide convincing indications.
Firstly, it is stated by [94] that for concrete investment projects in the Nordic
countries costs and benefits are not equally distributed. This observation is based
on a study of the Danish TSO. For instance, for the Great Belt project in Denmark
it is stated that the overall gain is positive. However, Norway and Finland would
loose welfare, whereas Sweden, Denmark and UCTE would win.
Secondly, the work presented in [113] discusses the welfare effects of an offshore
grid in the North and Baltic Seas. Although the examples used in this thesis do
not specifically address offshore networks, they could be applied in this context
as well. It is concluded by [113] that overall welfare effects of several projects are
positive, but that on a national level winners and losers can be identified. Also
within a country, winners and losers exist.
These two studies suggest that the results obtained in the simple examples can be
considered as realistic in terms of policy impact and they can be relied upon for a
policy-oriented analysis.
5.5 Assessment of design choices
The purpose of this section is to discuss the impact of the design choices made in
section 4.2. The underlying philosophy for the current choice is to keep the models
as simple as possible but as complex as required to address the research questions.
Although often requiring more complex modelling and solution methods, the
supranational planning model can be altered to accomodate other design choices.
As the supranational planning model is closely linked to existing models described
in the literature, the literature review of chapter 4 underlying the identification
of transmission planning model aspects already provides an overview on how
different aspects can be dealt with. Here, a limited number of specific elements are
highlighted:
 Treatment of the planning horizon: The presented supranational planning
model assumes a static treatment of the planning horizon. Adopting a
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dynamic planning model is possible, but would not alter the results with
respect to the research questions. As it does not alter the single-zone
viewpoint, the welfare distribution can sill be unequal and winners and
losers still exist. As a dynamic approach would introduce a time dimension,
the welfare distribution can change at each moment a decision is taken by
the model. The identification of winners and loosers becomes more complex.
However, it does not change the impact of the assumption of a perfect
cost/benefit allocation mechanism. Mathematically, the model would become
more complex and the time dimension requires more variables and often
requires a mixed integer approach.
 Uncertainty incorporation: Introducing uncertainty in the supranational
model would not alter the intuition of the model and how it contributes to
answering the research question. Nevertheless, the impact on the model itself
highly depends on the kind of uncertainty that is introduced. The current
model allows a rather easy incorporation of different scenarios, for instance
with respect to the installed generation portfolio. In fact, the provided model
already inherently has such a feature. The possibility to use different time
periods can be considered as scenarios. These scenarios are then weighted
by the number of hours they occur, but any other kind of weight could be
applied.
 Transmission planning objectives: The current model only considers economic
welfare. Expanding the model towards other objectives is possible. As long
as other objectives can be expressed in the same units (i.e. euros) the
incorporation is straightforward and objectives can be easily compared and
traded off. For instance, reliability can be expressed via a cost of non-supplied
energy. Of course, not only the objective function matters, other objectives
can also require extra constraints. Another apporach is to set up a multi-
objective framework. Although such approach does not require the same
measurement unit for each objective, the trade-off between different objectives
is not straightforward. Weighting factors per objective become a necessity.
Again the intuition of the supranational model does not alter by applying
mutliple objectives. Only the interpretation of the welfare distribution has
to be enlarged in order to capture all objectives. The same holds for the
assumption of a perfect cost-benefit allocation mechanism.
 Market incorporation: The supranational planner assumes a perfectly
competitive market modelled via a DCOPF. Assuming other market models,
e.g. an oligopolistic setup, would not change the intuition of the supranational
planner, but it would seriously affect the mathematical modelling. As
explained in section 5.2, by assuming a welfare maximizing DCOPF as
underlying market, the entire supranational planning model can be simplified
to a QP. Other market models would result in more complicated models and
require other solution methods. Additionally, the assumptions of the DCOPF
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hide to a certain extent the technical reality. A strong assumption is the flat
voltage profile, which elimates some stress in the system. Although an AC
network representation is possible, this overly complicates the model without
contributing to the research questions.
 Link with generation investment planning: A reactive approach is assumed
for the supranational planner. Adopting a proactive approach under the same
assumption is possible (see section 4.1.5), without changing the intuition. It,
however, adds another mathematical level to the problem, rendering the QP
simplification impossible.
Multi-area awareness is not discussed in the above list, as this design aspect is
varied throughout this thesis and direclty relates to the research question.
As can be observed from the above analysis, the supranational planning model
can be altered in various ways without truly changing the intuition of the model
with respect to the research question. Applying other or multiple objectives is the
most interesting way to expand the existing model while still contributing to the
research question. Taking into account different objectives results in a different
welfare distribution as welfare then comprises different aspects.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter the supranational planning concept introduced in section 3.1.2 is
further refined. A bilevel structure is proposed to model the investment problem
faced by a supranational planner. At the upper level the planner takes the
investment decision while taking into account its impact on the market outcome
which takes place at the lower level. The market outcome is dealt with as a separate
problem out of the planner’s control. In this work a perfectly competitive market
is opted for.
Translated to a mathematical model the bilevel structure can be represented by a
Stackelberg game where the supranational planner is the leader and the market
is the follower. Given the choice for a perfectly competitive market modelled
as a DCOPF, the bilevel mathematical formulation has been reformulated as a
single-level problem. This allows the use of less complex solution methods. Two
alternatives are discussed for modelling the transmission investments themselves:
a continuous and a discrete representation. Whereas the former results in models
which are easier to solve, the latter makes the model more realistic. Both approaches
are used throughout the examples.
By using a simple two-zone example, this chapter also provides an insight in the
sensitivities underlying the supranational planning concept. Although in monetary
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terms transmission investments can be small compared to the overall welfare level,
they can create a significant welfare effect. Of course, the size of the actual effects
depends on the specific case considered. As illustrated, the degree of asymmetry
between the different zones in the network and the cost of transmission itself are
important factors influencing the ultimate welfare gains.
The different examples illustrate how the supranational planning concept truly
works. By considering the entire network as a single zone abstraction is made of
the underlying multi-area context. As a consequence, the proposed investments
maximized overall welfare, but not all zones in the network necessarily benefit.
Apart from the two-node example, the examples have been chosen in such way
that they clearly show this effect.
Additionally, by referring to other studies it is indicated that this is not only an
academic curiosity, but it is very likely to run in situations with winners and losers
in real international transmission networks. Moreover, although the simplicity of
two-zone and three-zone networks masks the complexity of the real world to some
extent, at an international scale these simple topologies are relevant. Together, both
observations imply that the chosen examples can be used for further policy-oriented
analysis.
The important assumption of possible welfare transfers between zones plays a vital
role when negatively affected zones occur. It is also observed in the examples that
an allocation mechanism based on investment costs alone is insufficient to make the
supranational planner’s solution beneficial (or at least status quo) for all zones. The
welfare loss or benefit can be significantly larger than the transmission investment
costs. Hence, only reshuffling the costs does not always alters the incentives. In the
next chapter extra constraints are added to the planning problem allowing to relax
the assumption of the existence of mechanism arranging zonal welfare transfers.

6
Pareto-planner
In this chapter the second planning collaboration concept is profoundly analysed.
Firstly, in section 6.1 the intuition and structure behind the Pareto-planning
concept is discussed. Two variants of the Pareto-planner differing in the treatment
of investment costs are distinguished. Next, for each variant two different
mathematical formulations are given in section 6.2. A bilevel formulation and
a single-level mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) are
described. For each formulation, a solution method is described in section 6.3.
Genetic algorithms and mathematical optimisation methods are implemented.
Finally, both formulations are required to analyse the examples in section 6.4.
The examples clearly indicate the subtleties of the Pareto-planning collaboration
concept and the differences with the supranational planner. The four examples of
chapter 5 are also used here.
6.1 Model intuition and structure
The Pareto-planning collaboration concept is intuitively analysed. Two variants
are distinguished. Next, the structure of the model is given. The differences with
the supranational planning concept are emphasised.
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6.1.1 Intuition
As defined in chapter 3 the second planning collaboration concept describes a Pareto-
planner as a planner deciding on transmission investments with the objective of
maximizing overall welfare, but constrained by the initial zonal welfare distribution.
Whereas the supranational planner was built on the assumption of the existence
of an adequate mechanism arranging welfare transfers between different zones,
the Pareto-planner assumes that there is no such complete mechanism available.
However, in one variant of the Pareto-planner a partial mechanism limited to cost
allocation only is introduced. Hence, the Pareto-planner assumes less collaboration
between different zones.
As already indicated in section 3.1.4 two slightly different variants of the Pareto-
planner are possible:
 Pareto-planner without cost allocation (Pareto w/o CA),
 Pareto-planner with cost allocation (Pareto CA).
They differ in the definition of the welfare constraints with respect to the
incorporation of transmission investment costs. Whereas in the Pareto-planner
without cost allocation it is assumed that all zones have to bear the cost of
transmission investments done on their territory, the Pareto-planner with cost
allocation assumes that those costs can be allocated among the different zones
in the network. The latter interpretation is obviously less stringent, but assumes
more collaboration. Note that this collaboration is less intense than a full welfare
distribution mechanism. Here, only investment costs can be redistributed over the
different zones, other components determining welfare (i.e. CS, PS or CR) are not
transferred. The overview in Fig. 3.6 is further refined in Fig. 6.1. In section 6.2
the difference between both variants is further clarified by means of a mathematical
formulation.
Crucial for the welfare constraints is of course the definition of what constitutes
zonal welfare. In line with the definition provided in chapter 5, here the sum of
zonal PS, CS and CR is used. However, an alternative definition excluding PS
is possible when it is assumed that PS is not considered as being zonal. Capital
markets and the international scale of generation companies render that PS is not
zonal anymore and local decision makers could therefore be more focussed on CS
and CR. In general, by eliminating the possibility of internal welfare transfers (e.g.
changing zonal CS for zonal PS) the welfare constraints become more restricted.
Such an alternative definition is not used in this chapter, but appendix B provides a
brief illustration of the possible effects. Note that also other definitions are possible.
For instance, it could be argued to also exclude large industrial customers for the
same reason as excluding PS.
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Supranational planner
Pareto-planner 
with cost allocation
Non-cooperative 
planning game
Assumed 
collaboration
+
-
Pareto-planner 
without cost allocation
Fig. 6.1: Assumed collaboration in different models
It is important to realize that the Pareto-planning concept has two important
drawbacks. Firstly, apart from checking whether no zone is worse off, there are
no further constraints on the welfare distribution. As a consequence, the newly
created welfare can be unequally spread across all zones and can appear unfair.
Even stronger, it is possible that the burden of hosting new investments does not
match the welfare distribution. Zones barely remaining status quo can be required
to host significant new investments for the welfare gain in other zones. Also the
internal split in CS, PS and CR can be different before and after investments.
Secondly, it is perfectly possible that no Pareto-improvements are feasible. In such
case, the presented solution equals the initial situation, i.e. no investments are
done.
Despite the drawbacks, it is correct to state that in terms of multi-area awareness
the Pareto-planner scores better than the supranational planner as it explicitly
incorporates the welfare effects on different zones into its constraints. The objective
function, however, remains unchanged and adopts the same single-zone viewpoint.
It covers welfare and investments over the entire network and all zones at once.
6.1.2 Structure
The structure of the Pareto-planner is similar to the supranational planner. A
bilevel structure or Stackelberg setup again captures the problem. The structure
is presented in Fig. 6.2. The leader is the investment planner. Overall economic
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Transmission planner [LEADER]
Max { Welfare – Investment cost }
     s.t. Investment constraints
Pareto constraints
Market outcome [FOLLOWER]
Fig. 6.2: Bilevel structure of the Pareto-planning concept
welfare minus total transmission investment cost is maximised. Also the investment
constraints of the supranational planner remain unchanged. Different from the
supranational planner are the newly added Pareto-constraints acting at the leader’s
level. The following problem is again the underlying market problem, which is the
same as in the case of the supranational planner.
The extra Pareto-constraints are clearly the only difference from the supranational
planner. Due to these extra constraints, the Pareto-planner is never able to
outperform the supranational planner. When they are not binding, the Pareto-
planner’s outcome coincides with the supranational planner’s solution.
6.2 Mathematical formulation
In this section the structure presented in Fig. 6.2 is transformed into a mathematical
formulation. The Pareto-planner with cost allocation is first presented as it is
more closely linked to the supranational planner than the Pareto-planner without
cost allocation. The required changes to obtain the latter variant are presented in
section 6.2.3.
Two mathematical formulations are given. Firstly, a bilevel formulation is provided.
It clearly demonstrates the model structure and the link of the Pareto-constraints
with the following market problem. Next, this bilevel formulation is rewritten as a
single-level MPEC. In section 6.3 two solution methods are presented, each using
one of the two formulations presented here.
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6.2.1 Bilevel formulation of the Pareto-planner with cost alloca-
tion
The bilevel model of the Pareto-planner with cost allocation is given below. A
continuous representation of transmission investments is used.1
Maximize
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p
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n
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An,p dn,p − 1
2
Bn,p d
2
n,p
)
(6.1a)
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1Note, however, that the bilevel formulation is used to deal with discrete investments as
explained in section 6.3.1. Only minor changes are required when a genetic algorithm is used to
solve the problem (cfr. infra).
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where ∀p : dn,p, θn,p, θns,p, gn,t,p ∈ arg : Maximize∑
n
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subject to:
∀n, p
∑
t
gn,t,p − dn,p −
∑
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(INCl,nfl,p) = 0 [λn,p] (6.5a)
∀l, p −Fmaxl − xl ≤ fl,p
[
µal,p
]
(6.5b)
∀l, p fl,p ≤ Fmaxl + xl
[
µbl,p
]
(6.5c)
θns,p = 0 [ξp] (6.5d)
∀l, p fl,p = Hl
∑
n
(INCl,n θn,p) [ψl,p] (6.5e)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≤ Gmaxn,t,p [νn,t,p] (6.5f)
∀n, t, p gn,t,p ≥ 0 [ρn,t,p] (6.5g)
∀n, p dn,p ≥ 0 [κn,p] (6.5h)
The bilevel structure is clear. The leader’s objective function is (6.1) and consists
of three terms. They respectively represent gross CS, total generation costs and
transmission investment costs. Note that all terms are calculated for the entire
network, i.e. a single-zone perspective is used. The constraints directly applying at
the leader’s level are the investment constraints in (6.2) denoting that the invested
capacity on each line has to be positive and the Pareto-constraints in (6.3).
For each zone a Pareto-constraint is added to the problem. It states that the
obtained welfare level after investments has to be equal to or larger than WF initz ,
the initial welfare level. Zonal welfare is a weighted average of welfare created in
each period p weighted by Tp, the number of hours in period p. Whereas in the
leader’s objective function overall welfare is calculated on an aggregated basis, here
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zonal welfare is calculated on a net basis and summed for each node in the zone.2
Such a net welfare calculation for a single node consists of three terms:3
 Net CS in (6.3a) is given by the area below the demand function minus the
payments made by the loads in that node. These payments equal the level of
demand dn,p multiplied by the nodal price λn,p.
 Net PS in (6.3b) equals the revenue received by generators in that node minus
the generation costs in that node. The former equals the generation output
multiplied by the nodal price λn,p.
 CR accrueing to the considered node in (6.3c) are calculated as 50% of the
CR collected on all lines starting or leaving the particular node. When a line
is located entirely in a zone, all CR originating from that line are added to
this zone’s welfare. For cross-border lines, only 50% accrues to the zone. CR
on a line is a function of the flow fl,p through the line and the nodal price
difference between both terminals of the line.
Clearly, the zonal welfare calculation is not only a function of demand and generation
levels (as is the case for the overall welfare calculation), but also of the nodal
prices and the flows. Note that the nodal prices are the dual variables of the nodal
balance constraints in the following market problem. This is a significant difference
with the supranational planner, where at the leader’s level only primal variables
are required.
Similar to the supranational planner the follower’s problem again represents the
market and is modelled using a DCOPF. The objective function is given by (6.4)
and the constraints are modelled by (6.5). Their interpretation is the same as in
section 5.2.2.
It is important to fully understand the changed leader’s planning problem and
how investment costs are dealt with by the Pareto-planner with cost allocation.
Investment costs only appear in the leader’s objective function and are treated
in line with a single-zone viewpoint. It does not matter in which zone the costs
are made, because the Pareto-constraints in (6.3) do not address transmission
investment costs. Hence, implicitly this formulation assumes an investment cost
allocation mechanism. Such a mechanism assures that transmission investment
costs are shared in such way that all zones are willing to accept the Pareto-planner’s
solution. For instance, when for one zone the Pareto-constraint is binding, i.e. the
2Note that in constraints 6.3 the sum is made for all n ∈ ΩN(z) , i.e. only the nodes located in
zone z.
3It can be shown that when summed over all nodes in the network, the sum of welfare calculated
on a net basis for each node separately equals the level of welfare calculated on aggregated basis
for the entire network at once. However, it is not possible to use such an aggregation at the zonal
level, because it is not able to differentiate between the zones when CR have to be distributed.
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level of welfare remains status quo, and transmission investments are required in
that zone in order to obtain an overall higher level of welfare, the cost burden is
shared by the other zones. Otherwise, the considered zone would still be worse off.
It is important to realize that the Pareto-planner as modelled in this thesis does
not provide an answer on how such a cost allocation mechanism should look like.
It only assumes its existence and ability to allocate costs to zones.
6.2.2 Single-level MPEC formulation of the Pareto-planner with
cost allocation
In section 5.2.3 the bilevel supranational planning problem was recast as a single-
level problem. This was possible because the objective functions of both levels
were aligned. Although for the Pareto-planner the objectives remain aligned,
another difficulty arises when a single-level formulation is sought for. The leader’s
constraints are now not only a function of the primal variables of the following
problem, but also of the dual. As a consequence, it is no longer possible to drop
the follower’s objective function and add the follower’s constraints to the leader’s
problem and then solve the problem as a single-level one.
Another approach to reformulate the bilevel problem as a single-level one is relying
on an MPEC formulation. As already briefly mentioned in section 5.1 an MPEC
is a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints. Before entering into a
reformulation of the Pareto-planner, a brief introduction to MPECs is provided.
Introduction to MPECs
As described in [114], transportation planning problems are typical examples to be
modelled using MPECs. On the one hand the total system with its design costs
has to be optimised, on the other hand the behaviour of the users should be taken
into account. The leader-follower structure is clear.
MPECs are optimisation problems with special constraints, i.e. so-called equilibrium
constraints resulting from an underlying problem. The term equilibrium refers to
the underlying problem which has to be solved optimally. As explained in [114],
these constraints can be represented by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
In (6.6) a general formulation of a (potentially non-linear) optimisation problem
is given. The DCOPF of the follower’s problem, a QP, is an instance of this
more general formulation. Equations (6.6b) and (6.6c) represent the equality and
inequality constraints. λ and µ are their respective dual variables or Lagrange
multipliers [115].
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Maximize F (x) (6.6a)
subject to:
H(x) = 0 [λ] (6.6b)
G(x) ≥ 0 [µ] (6.6c)
For the above optimisation problem, it can be proven that x is an optimal solution
when x satifies the constraints in (6.6) and when there exist Lagrange multipliers
such that the following statements hold [115, 116]:
∇xF (x)−∇xG(x)Tµ+∇xH(x)Tλ = 0 (6.7a)
H(x) = 0 (6.7b)
0 ≤ G(x) ⊥ µ ≥ 0 (6.7c)
In (6.7c) the ⊥-operator is used to indicate complimentarity of the expressions at
both sides of the operator. It means that at least one of the expressions has to be
binding. Hence, G(x) and µ cannot be non-zero at the same time.
The above derivation of equilibrium conditions is valid when F (x) is a concave
function and when the constraints are convex functions [115]. For the DCOPF
modelled as a QP, this is guaranteed.
Given the above definition of equilibrium constraints resulting from an underlying
problem, an MPEC can be written as follows:
Maximize W (x, y) (6.8a)
subject to:
g(x, y) ≥ 0 (6.8b)
h(x, y) = 0 (6.8c)
∇xF (x, y)−∇xG(x, y)Tµ+∇xH(x, y)Tλ = 0 (6.8d)
H(x, y) = 0 (6.8e)
0 ≤ G(x, y) ⊥ µ ≥ 0 (6.8f)
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The single-level objective function (6.8a) is now a function of x and y. Whereas
x denotes the decision variables of the following problem, y is the leader’s set of
decision variables. The constraints directly applying to the leader’s level are (6.8b)
and (6.8c). The equilibrium conditions are given by (6.8d)-(6.8f).
The introduction of complementarity constraints significantly increases the
complexity of the problem as they act in a discrete way. The two constraints
linked in a complementarity constraint can be interpreted as disjunctive constraints
because either G(x, y) = 0 or µ = 0. Although the underlying problem is convex
and easy to solve, its reformulation renders the MPEC non-linear and non-convex.
Pareto-planner with cost allocation as MPEC
The MPEC structure of (6.8) is applicable to the Pareto-planning concept.
The Pareto-planner can be formulated according to (6.9)-(6.11). A continuous
representation of transmission investments is used.
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∀n, p An,p −Bn,pdn,p + λn,p + κn,p = 0 (6.11a)
∀n, t, p −Cn,t,p −Dn,t,pgn,t,p − λn,p − νn,t,p + ρn,t,p = 0 (6.11b)
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∀l, p 0 ≤ Fmaxl + xl + fl,p ⊥ µal,p ≥ 0 (6.11i)
∀l, p 0 ≤ Fmaxl + xl − fl,p ⊥ µbl,p ≥ 0 (6.11j)
∀n, t, p 0 ≤ Gmaxn,t,p − gn,t,p ⊥ νn,t,p ≥ 0 (6.11k)
∀n, p 0 ≤ dn,p ⊥ κn,p ≥ 0 (6.11l)
∀n, t, p 0 ≤ gn,t,p ⊥ ρn,t,p ≥ 0 (6.11m)
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The objective function is given by (6.9). The investment and Pareto-constraints
are enforced via (6.10). Equations (6.11) are the KKT conditions of the DCOPF.
They are the equivalent of the DCOPF formulation given by (6.4)-(6.5). The
bilevel structure is now replaced by a single-level notation, albeit by the use of
complementarity constraints.
6.2.3 Pareto-planner without cost allocation
The previous section discussed in detail the formulation of the Pareto-planner
with cost allocation. In this section the necessary changes for the Pareto-planner
without cost allocation are provided. As only the Pareto-constraints are altered,
no full model formulation is given. Both the bilevel and MPEC formulation remain
valid.
Under the assumption that no transmission investment cost allocation mechanism
is available, the investment costs have to be borne by the zone hosting the
new investment on its territory. In order to remain Pareto-improving under
this new assumption, the investment costs have to be included into each zone’s
Pareto-constraints. The Pareto-constraints in (6.3) and (6.10b)-(6.10e) have to be
reformulated:
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The zonal transmission investment costs are addressed by (6.12d). Note that only
lines within the zone are considered as indicated by l ∈ ΩL(z).4
4Cross-border lines are not specifically adressed in this notation. In the examples two situations
occur. Firstly, a cross-border line can be fully assigned to a zone, as if the cross-border line is
located entirely within that zone. Secondly, it is possible to introduce an extra artificial node
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Obviously, by adding an extra cost term to the Pareto-constraints in the case without
cost allocation, they are more stringent than in the case with cost allocation. As a
consequence, the solution found by the Pareto-planner with cost allocation always
outperforms the solution obtained by the Pareto-planner without.
6.3 Solution methods
In general two groups of solution methods exist for solving optimisation problems:
mathematical optimisation models and heuristics. This distinction can also be
observed in transmission planning literature [34, 117]. Whereas the former solution
methods try to find the optimum by directly solving the mathematical formulation
of the problem, the latter adopts techniques based on adaptation of a solution
environment driven by specific operators that change solutions with the purpose of
attaining a better performance [118]. The flexibility of heuristics regarding problem
formulation and mathematical properties (e.g. convexity) is a great advantage.
Examples of mathematical optimisation models are linear, non-linear, dynamic
and mixed-inter programming. Benders decomposition and branch-and-bound
techniques are often used. They can sometimes guarantee a global optimum.
Genetic algorithms (GA), tabu search, simulated annealing, etc. are commonly
used heuristics. If properly implemented, they guarantee a near-optimal solution.
A literature overview on the different solution methods in transmission planning is
given in [34].
As outlined in the previous section, the Pareto-planner can be formulated as a bilevel
problem which can also be recasted as a single-level MPEC. Both formulations
are used for the examples in this thesis. The bilevel formulation easily deals with
discrete transmission investments. The MPEC approach is applied for the examples
with a continuous representation. For both approaches, the solution methods are
presented in this section. The bilevel approach relies on GAs and the MPEC is
solved using mathematical optimisation methods.
6.3.1 Solving the bilevel problem using a genetic algorithm
In general, genetic algorithms (GA) provide a flexible methodology for solving
optimisation problems without limitations on the problem with respect to convexity,
continuity, linearity, etc. It can be easily tailored to the problem considered. It is
also a useful way to tackle the bilevel problem and to find near-optimal solutions.
indicating the frontier between the zones. The cross-border line is then split into two equal parts
and each zone pays 50% of the costs.
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A GA consists of an algorithm based on the natural principle of evolution. In
general, an initial population of individuals evolves towards a next generation
by undergoing selection, cross-over and mutation. The fittest solutions have the
highest probability to survive and generate offspring [118, 119]. GAs are widely
used for solving combinatorial problems in different fields of research, including
power systems [120]. A clear discussion on how GAs can be implemented and
fine-tuned in the context of transmission planning models is given by [77, 121].
There are several examples of (modified) GAs used for transmission planning
available in literature, e.g. [117, 122, 123].
GAs are particularly interesting for solving the bilevel structure when a discrete
investment representation is used. Although adaptations for continuous variables
exist, discrete variables are particularly suited to be handled by a GA. In the
bilevel structure of the Pareto-planning problem, all decisions concerning the
discrete investment variables are taken at the leader’s level. Those variables act
as parameters for the underlying market problem. Letting the GA decide on
the investment variables leaves the underlying market problem and the Pareto-
constraints to determine the fitness of a particular investment set, which serves as a
measure for the welfare level. Checking the investment and Pareto-constraints and
solving the market problem are very easy tasks. Although it is further explained
in the remaining part of this section, it should already be clear that the bilevel
structure is very well captured by a GA.
Firstly, the general GA structure and its implementation in this thesis are described.
Next, the calibration of several key parameters is discussed.
GA structure
The different steps of the GA’s setup are shown in Fig. 6.3 and illustrated by an
example. The main characteristics are:
 Representation: An individual represents a possible set of investments and
consists of alleles. Each allele corresponds to the number of circuits added
to a specific corridor. A decimal representation of the number of circuits is
opted for. Decimal representation is preferred above binary representation in
GA’s for transmission planning. This avoids Hamming cliffs5 when cross-over
and mutation are applied to this problem [77, 124]. Moreover the implicit
cardinality6 of the problem is lower when using decimal representation [77].
5Hamming cliffs occur when more than one bit has to be flipped in order to reach the nearest
neighbour. This can happen with a binary representation, but not with a decimal one.
6The cardinality refers to the number of elements in a set. For instance, when 20 elements are
required a binary code requires 5 digits. However, with five digits it is possible to represent 32
elements. Hence, the cardinality is higher than required.
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Figure 6.3: Genetic algorithm: schematic overview
A box constraint can be used in the population generation and mutation
stages to limit the number of new circuits in a corridor. By doing so, the
investment constraints at the leader’s level can be covered.
 Initial population: A good initial set of individuals can enhance the GA’s
performance. Sometimes solutions found for a relaxed problem or an easy
to solve approximation are used (e.g. [54, 124]). In this thesis, the initial
population is randomly generated. Additionally, both the initial situation
(i.e. no investments) and - when available - the supranational solution (found
using a MIQP formulation) are added to the initial population.
 Fitness function: There are different ways to assign a fitness value to
individuals, e.g. linear scaling, proportional scaling, ranking, etc. [125].
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In this thesis, a ranking method is applied. This is illustrated in step 3 of Fig.
6.3. Individuals are ranked according to their objective function value. For
instance, individuals resulting in a higher overal economic welfare are ranked
higher. The performance of an individual is determined by how it performs
compared to the other individuals in the population and is decoupled from
the welfare value itself.
For the Pareto-planner a fitness function including a penalty function
capturing the Pareto-constraints is used (cfr. infra).
 Selection: The selection mechanism selects individuals for creating offspring.
Fitter individuals are more likely to be selected. Different routines are
available, e.g. stochastic universal sampling or roulette wheel selection. In
this thesis, the former technique is applied.7
Apart from the selection mechanism it is also important to define how many
new individuals are created in each new generation and how many already
existing individuals survive to the next generation. In this thesis a generation
gap of 50% is applied implying a fifty-fifty split between already existing and
new individuals.
 Cross-over: The cross-over mechanism is used to create offspring from
recombining two parents. It provides for diversification in the search for the
optimum [127]. Crossing-over parts of individuals creates new individuals
which can be located in other parts of the solution space than the parents
were. Single and double point cross-over are often used techniques. Also
more complex techniques exist, e.g. based on matroid theory [128]. Whereas
in the former one allele is chosen at which cross-over takes place (see also
the example in step 5 of Fig. 6.3), the latter determines two alleles of the
individuals at which cross-over takes place. The algorithm decides on which
individuals cross-over is applied according to a pre-defined probability, i.e.
the cross-over rate. In this thesis a cross-over rate of 70% is used.
 Mutation: By mutation single alleles of an individual can be changed (see also
the example in step 6 in Fig. 6.3). By doing so, individuals can contain values
for alleles different from the initial population, something not possible by only
applying cross-over. In general, mutation introduces so-called intensification
in the algorithm [127]. It allows exploring a neighborhood of a particular
individual. Higher mutation rates change the GA towards a more random
search algorithm benefiting to a smaller extent from the information included
in the individuals at hand [120]. However, sometimes superior results with
high mutation rates are reported for transmission planning applications [124].
7Stochastic universal sampling is a technique developed by [126] and relies on the generation
of a single random number for selecting individuals. The probability of being selected is equal to
the individual’s fitness value divided by the sum of fitness values of all individuals.
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In this thesis mutation is applied on a random basis with a mutation rate of
15%, meaning that each allele has a probability of 15% for being mutated.
Alternatives based on simulated annealing (e.g. [77, 121]) or specific
algorithms improving local solutions (e.g. [54]) can also be used.
 Stopping criterion: A GA has no information on whether the optimal solution
is found or not. As a consequence, a stopping criterion has to be defined. In
this thesis a maximum number of generations of 1500 is used. This number
should be high enough in order to guarantee a near-optimal solution. An
alternative used in [124] is to stop the GA after a number of generations
without improvement and thereby indicating convergence.
The GAs have been implemented in Matlab using the Gatbx toolbox.8
GAs perform very well for unconstrained optimisation problems, but also
constrained problems can be dealt with, e.g. by using a penalty function. This is
an important feature when considering the Pareto-planner which is bound at the
leader’s level by the Pareto-constraints. It is important to emphasize the difference
with the follower’s problem.
The fitness value is obviously a function of the overall welfare obtained by a set
of investments. It is found by running a simple DCOPF given the investments
done in the individual considered. This is done using Cplex 12.1.0 in Tomlab9
and poses no problems. The Pareto-planner, however, also has to cope with the
Pareto-constraints guaranteeing initial zonal welfare levels. They play a crucial role
in the fitness of a particular individual. An individual is only feasible when none
of these constraints are violated. One possibility is to rule out all individuals not
meeting such a constraint. This strategy, however, throws out the baby with the
bathwater as such an individual can contain valuable information possibly leading
to a better and feasible offspring. A feasible solution can sometimes lay further
away from the optimum than an infeasible. Therefore, it is opted for to utilize a
penalty function [120, 124]. For each violated constraint the zonal welfare loss is
used as penalty in the objective function. This allows the GA to move to infeasible,
but strong individuals and at a later stage return to feasible solutions. The results
in this thesis are obtained using a linear penalty function.
The penalty is defined as the sum of the Pareto-constraint violations. The violation
is zero when the constraint is met and positive when the welfare in a particular
zone is lower than the initial welfare level. In such a case the violation equals the
lefthand minus the righthand side of (6.3) (or (6.12)). The penalty then equals the
8Gatbx is a matlab toolbox for genetic algorithms developed at the University of Sheffield
(UK) available from http://www.shef.ac.uk/acse/research/ecrg/gat.html [129].
9Tomlab is an optimisation platform and modelling language for solving applied optimisation
problems in Matlab. It integrates commercial solvers in the Matlab environment. http://tomopt.
com/tomlab/
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total sum of all violations and is multiplied by a constant. The constant determines
the weight of the penalty in the objective function.10
GA calibration
GA calibration is useful as each problem behaves differently and no single set of
parameters performs well for all problems considered. However, some attempts for
finding generally applicable parameters are undertaken [130].
According to [130] there are two forms of calibrating an evolutionary algorithm
like a GA: parameter tuning and parameter control. Parameter tuning determines
a static set of parameters ex ante, i.e. the set of parameters remains fixed once
the GA is started. The opposite is true for parameter control where the set of
parameters evolves in a dynamic way. Parameters can change during the GA
execution, e.g. the mutation rate can change with the number of generations.
Parameter tuning can rely on analogy with similar problems, theoretical analysis and
experimentation. Analogy with similar problems looks attractive, but it is unclear
what defines ’similar’ in the context of such complicated systems. Using a theoretical
analysis for determining parameters is difficult as often several assumptions are
required. Experimentation seems a feasible technique, but also struggles with
several drawbacks.
 The effect of parameters cannot always be isolated, they can interact.
 The tuning exercise can be very time consuming.
 There is no guarantee that the parameters found are optimal.
Parameter controlling techniques change the parameters during the run. In [130]
three categories on how they are altered are defined: deterministic, adaptive and
self-adaptive control. In deterministic parameter control an ex ante rule on how
the parameters change during the run is defined. For instance, the mutation
rate increases with the number of generations. There is no feedback during the
run. Adaptive and self-adaptive control base the parameter values on information
obtained during the run, e.g., the quality of the best solution found so far. The
latter technique even encodes the parameters into the chromosomes. The fittest
parameter set has a higher probability to survive.
In this work parameter calibration is limited to a parameter tuning approach
only. Tuning based on analogy with similar problems is possible to a limited
10In this thesis the constant is set equal to 10 as this resulted in the best solutions. This value is
obtained by intuitive trial-and-error on a test case. No guidance has been found in the literature
on this particular calibration issue.
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extent as literature concerning transmission planning using GA provides some
hints. Additionally, experimentation on the supranational planning problem is
done in order to have a higher degree of similarity. To calibrate the GA used for
the Pareto-planners, it is used to solve the supranational planning problem. As the
supranational planner can be solved with a guaranteed optimum using the MIQP
formulation, that optimum can be used as a benchmark for the GA’s solution. In
fact, it is assumed that the GA parameters obtained for the supranational planner
also perform well for the Pareto-planners. Unfortunately, similarity is not perfect
as the Pareto-planner also has the Pareto-constraints and the penalty function
to deal with. The three-zone, 14-node example of section 5.4.5 is used for this
purpose. The calibration results are discussed in Appendix A. Here, only a brief
overview of the outcome is given.
The calibration results revealed that the mutation rate is the most important
parameter impacting both the quality of the result and the required number of
generations before convergence. A mutation rate of 15% is selected. A further
analysis of different runs using only this mutation rate learned that the cross-over
rate is the second most important parameter. A cross-over rate of 70% is selected.
The other parameters do not render large differences in the quality of the result nor
in the convergence speed. Based on the average results the generation gap is set at
50%, the selection mechanism is stochastic universal sampling and the cross-over
mechanism is single point cross-over. Population size is set at 40 individuals and
the maximum number of generations at 1500.
6.3.2 Solving the MPEC using a mathematical optimisation
method
Solving MPECs is not straightforward due to the non-convex nature of the
complementarity constraints. The research on methods for solving MPECs is
still ongoing and so far no generally accepted superior methods are available.
Methods for solving an MPEC rely on reformulating the MPEC as another problem
and then solving it. One possibility is to further exploit the discrete nature of the
complimentarity constraints and rewrite the model as a Mixed Integer Program
(MIP). This technique is investigated in [131] and introduces an explicit set of
disjunctive constraints and an integer variable for each complimentary constraint.
Although global optima can sometimes be guaranteed, the integer approach can
significantly affect the calculation time. Another group of methods reformulates
an MPEC as a Non-Linear Program (NLP) [114, 132]. This second approach is
chosen in this thesis.
However, no own implementation of this method is performed. The GAMS software
package provides an interface for solving MPECs using NLP reformulations. The
NLPEC module only requires a model formulation as in section 6.2.2 which defines
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all necessary equations and the complimentarity conditions. The reformulation
as an NLP is done by the NLPEC module and is then solved using a typical
NLP-solver. For this thesis the Knitro-solver11 is used for this purpose. Although
NLPEC provides for a variety in NLP-reformulations [133], the default setting
based on an inner-product reformulation is used.12 A drawback of this technique
is that it is not possible to guarantee a globally optimal outcome. The NLP-solver
only guarantees local optimality.
This approach is tested using the supranational planning problem with continuous
investment representation where the DCOPF is modelled using its KKT conditions.
This is the same as the model in section 6.2.2 without the Pareto-constraints. The
example of sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.4 are used and the same (optimal) solution was
found.
6.4 Examples
The examples introduced in chapter 5 are now used to illustrate the Pareto-
planning concept. The data description is not repeated in this chapter. Both
variants concerning cost allocation are implemented. summarised results of the
initial situation and the supranational planning concept are shown for comparison.
6.4.1 Two-zone example
In Table 6.1 the results for the two-zone network are shown. As the supranational
planning solution does not violate the Pareto-constraints for both variants, this
solution is also the one of the Pareto-planners. Hence, this simple example illustrates
that the Pareto-constraints are not always binding.
This is also illustrated by means of Fig. 6.4, which should be interpreted like the
conceptual idea explained in section 3.1.3 and Fig. 3.3. For different values of TAB ,
the welfare for zones A and B are indicated. It can be seen that for all values of TAB
the welfare distribution lies in zone IV indicating a Pareto-improvement for both
zones. Hence, the supranational solution is also the solution of the Pareto-planners.
11Knitro is a non-linear optimisation solver developed by Ziena optimisation LCC which can
interface with the GAMS modelling framework. http://www.ziena.com/knitro.html
12The inner product consists of the non-negative terms in the complementarity constraints: a
slack variable and the difference between a variable and its bound. Either the slack variable or its
complement must be zero in order to have a solution. Hence, complementarity is forced by the
multiplication of both terms.
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No link Supranational
= Pareto CA
= Pareto w/o CA
Zone A Zone B Zone A Zone B
Generation [MW] 3250 2666.7 3958.9 2036.5
Demand [MW] 3250 2666.7 3013.7 2981.7
Price [e/MWh] 32.5 53.3 39.6 40.7
CS [e] 158437.5 142222.2 136235.7 177814.9
PS [e] 52812.5 71111.1 78364.6 41474.5
CR [e] 0 0 539.5 539.5
CS+PS+CR [e] 211250 213333.3 215139.8 219828.9
Transmission capacity [MW] 0 945.2
Investment cost [e] 0 1079
Total welfare [e] 424583.3 433889.7
Table 6.1: Two zone example: overview of results on an hourly basis
Although seemingly trivial, this result can have a significant implication for policy-
makers. It shows that in some cases it is possible to achieve the best outcome
without a very strong framework arranging the collaboration between different
zones as assumed by the supranational planner. No welfare distribution mechanism
is required, even not for distributing investment costs. Of course, this result is
case-dependent. The following examples illustrate that this strong result is not
always valid. As a consequence, policy-makers cannot use this result to claim that
the optimal solution is found without a strong framework without checking whether
the result holds for the network considered.
6.4.2 Three-zone example: radial configuration
The three-zone radial example illustrates very well the difference between both
Pareto-variants, i.e. the impact of assuming on the one hand no welfare transfer
mechanism at all and on the other a mechanism limited to investment cost allocation
only. As can be seen from Fig. 6.5, both variants have a different outcome.
Moreover, both Pareto-planning outcomes are different from the supranational
solution. Table 6.2 explains why differences occur.
In the supranational solution zone B clearly looses welfare, even when it does
not have to contribute in the investment cost. Hence, this solution violates the
Pareto-constraints and is not acceptable for the Pareto-planner. The solution found
by the Pareto-planner with cost allocation (indicated by Pareto CA) is acceptable
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Figure 6.5: Three-node radial example: Pareto-planners’ solutions
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to all zones. Note, however, that zone A is not gaining any welfare compared to
the initial situation and is therefore not willing to bear any investment cost. This
clearly indicates the importance of the cost allocation assumption. This solution is
only feasible when zones B and C bear all investment costs, even the costs made in
zone A. These findings are also supported by Fig. 6.6.
The outcome changes when no such mechanism is available. In case of the Pareto-
planner without cost allocation (denoted by Pareto w/o CA) the investments are
different. Zone A now benefits from a welfare increase enabling this zone to cover
the investment cost of infrastructure on its territory, i.e. 50% of the cost of an extra
connection between zones A and B. The extra welfare going to zone B is limited to
1.2 ke, but this amount is sufficient to cover its investment cost of 0.51 ke.
From the different results, it can also be learned that the Pareto-constraints do
not ensure an equal distribution of the acquired benefits. When cost allocation is
possible, zone C is the big winner, whereas zone A remains status quo and zone B
only wins a small amount of welfare. Without cost allocation, zones A and C both
win about the same amount of welfare, but zone B only benefits marginally. The
above findings are also supported by Fig. 6.6.
The differences between the solutions can also be observed via the price levels in
the different zones. Zone A always has a price of 30 e/MWh and except for the
Pareto w/o CA never receives CR. In zone C the welfare benefits mostly originate
from a decreased price level compared to the initial situation. The size of this price
drop, however, differs depending on the investments done. The situation is more
complicated in zone B. The price in zone B can increase, but in order to remain
Pareto-improving, the loss in CS due to the increased price has to be compensated
by extra CR.
Finally, the Pareto-constraints and the assumption concerning cost allocation
impact the total welfare gained in the entire network. Obviously, with an amount
of 373.17 ke, welfare is highest for the supranational planner. The Pareto-planners
with and without cost allocation obtain a welfare level of respectively 372.15 and
364.08 ke. As already mentioned in the previous example, the lack of a full welfare
transfer mechanism can in some cases cause a welfare loss. The cost can be smaller
when a limited mechanism dealing with investment costs only is available.
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Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 125 125 45 125 125 125
PS 0 0 0 0 0 0
CR 0 9 9 0 0 0
CS+PS+CR 125 134 54 125 125 125
∆Welfare - - - 0 -9 +71
Investment cost - - - -1.83
Pareto CA Pareto w/o CA
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 125 125 101.25 125 96.8 64.8
PS 0 0 0 0 0 0
CR 0 11.25 11.25 24 38.4 14.4
CS+PS+CR 125 136.25 112.5 149 136.9 79.2
∆Welfare 0 +2.25 +58.5 +24 +1.2 +25.2
Investment cost -1.60 -0.17 -0.51 -0.34
Table 6.2: Three-zone radial example: hourly welfare effects [ke]
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Figure 6.6: Three-zone radial example: Evolution of zonal welfare for different
feasible investments (up to 6 circuits per corridor)
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TAB TBC TAC
Supranational +115.9 +75.4 +391.4
Pareto CA +24.5 +0 +224.5
Pareto w/o CA +24.5 +0 +224.5
Table 6.3: Three-zone meshed example: invested capacity compared to the initial
situation [MW]
6.4.3 Three-zone example: meshed configuration
In the three-zone meshed example the Pareto-planners’ solutions differ from the
supranational result. However, unlike in the previous example, there is no difference
between both variants. It makes no difference whether there is a cost allocation
mechanism or not. This is possible because the welfare gains are sufficiently high for
each zone. They exceed the investment cost for each zone. Consider in particular
the situation of zone B. Zone B remains status quo and no costs are incurred on
the link TBC .
13 This is sufficient to meet the Pareto-constraints.
In Table 6.3 the invested capacities are shown for each link. Table 6.4 provides
the welfare calculation and the investment costs. It can be observed that in the
Pareto-solutions zonal prices diverge more than in the supranational case. The
resulting overall economic welfare is also lower due to the lower investment levels.
This is required to keep the welfare balance for zone B non-negative. Generation
dispatch, demand and prices are given in Table 6.5.
In Fig. 6.7 both the supranational and the Pareto-solutions are indicated in a cloud
of technically feasible outcomes. The Pareto-constraints visually confirm that the
supranational planning solution is not acceptable and that the Pareto-constraint is
binding for zone B.
13Note that in section 5.4.4 it is assumed that links TAB , TBC and TAC are located in
respectively zones A, B and C. Hence, investment costs on a single line do not have to be split
among the two adjacent lines.
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Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 166.1 156.8 150.5 181.3 156.6 138.0
PS 45.4 44.4 40.9 33.0 44.7 56.0
CR 1.266 0.493 1.198 0.285 0.113 0.277
CS+PS+CR 212.9 201.7 192.5 214.6 201.4 194.3
∆Welfare - - - +1.735 -0.374 +1.758
Investment cost 0 0 0 -0.333
Pareto CA Pareto w/o CA
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 174.7 156.9 143.1 174.7 156.9 143.1
PS 38.2 44.3 49.4 38.2 44.3 49.4
CR 1.258 0.494 1.203 1.258 0.494 1.203
CS+PS+CR 214.1 201.7 193.8 214.1 201.7 193.8
∆Welfare +1.201 0 +1.239 +1.201 0 +1.239
Investment cost -0.142 -0.014 0 -0.128
Table 6.4: Three-zone meshed example: hourly welfare effects [ke]
Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
Generation [MW] 3014.5 3021.7 3028.8 2569.5 3031.5 3493.4
Demand [MW] 3328.5 2993.8 2742.8 3476.8 2991.0 2626.6
Price [e/MWh] 30.15 25.22 20.29 25.70 25.32 24.93
Pareto CA Pareto w/o CA
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
Generation [MW] 2763.2 3019.1 3299.6 2763.2 3019.1 3299.6
Demand [MW] 3412.3 2994.6 2675.1 3412.3 2994.6 2675.1
Price [e/MWh] 27.63 25.19 23.00 27.63 25.19 23.00
Table 6.5: Three-zone meshed example: dispatch and prices for different solutions
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Figure 6.7: Three-zone meshed example: Evolution of zonal welfare for different
feasible investments (using steps of 10 MW for each line starting from 200 MW up
to 600 MW)
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Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 304.4 340.2 425.2 275.0 454.6 540.3
PS 0 0 0 136.8 0 0
CR 78.8 129.3 87.1 0 6.2 1.4
CS+PS+CR 383.2 469.5 512.3 411.8 460.8 541.7
∆Welfare - - - +32.7 -8.7 +29.3
Investment cost 0 0 0 -3.42
Pareto CA Pareto w/o CA
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 279.7 457.8 538.5 281.9 459.3 537.6
PS 122.1 0 0 115.1 0 0
CR 0.198 13.1 2.82 0.254 16.4 3.50
CS+PS+CR 401.9 471.0 541.3 397.3 475.8 541.1
∆Welfare +18.75 +1.47 +29.00 +14.05 +6.27 +28.80
Investment cost -1.26 -1.71 -0.685 -1.71 -1.94 -0.685
Table 6.6: 14-node example: hourly welfare effects [ke]
6.4.4 14-node, three-zone example
The 14-node, three-zone example provides a second illustration for the difference
between the two Pareto-variants. All welfare effects are summarised in Table 6.6.
The supranational solution is also in this case violating the Pareto-constraints
because zone B is worse off compared to the initial situation. For the Pareto-planner
with cost allocation, Table 6.6 shows the breakdown of the investment costs over
the different zones.14 Clearly a cost allocation mechanism is required as otherwise
zone B is unable to cover the investment costs (i.e. 1.71 ke) with the increased
welfare gains accrueing to its zone (i.e. 1.47 ke). In the solution without cost
allocation mechanism, this is no longer so. However, the overall welfare level is
lower.
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 give respectively the generation dispatch and the investments in
transmission circuits per corridor. Unlike in the previous examples, both variants
of the Pareto-planner invest more in transmission than the supranational planner.
Also the total generation output is higher than in the supranational case.15 This
suggests that in order to meet the Pareto-constraints and ensure an acceptable
14The investment costs for the Pareto-planner with cost allocation is printed in italic because
for this planner the costs are not split per zone and only considered for the entire network at
once (like for the supranational planner). Here, the breakdown is only shown in order to prove
the violation of the Pareto-constraint of zone B.
15Note that demand is flexible and determined by a linear demand function.
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welfare distribution, overinvestments are done. However, this result should be dealt
with with great caution. It is not proven that the presented Pareto-solutions are
optimal and that the optimum cannot have less investments than the supranational
case. The GA used is a heuristic only guaranteeing a near-optimal outcome.
Node Zone Variable Initial Supra. Par. CA Par. w/o CA
cost output output output output
1 A 35 8849 10000 10000 10000
2 A 40 9200 10000 10000 10000
4 B 60 0 0 0 0
7 B 70 300 0 0 0
9 C 45 8755 9814 9885 9917
13 C 55 0 0 0 0
Table 6.7: 14-node example: Generation cost data [e/MWh] and generation output
for the different solutions [MW]
Corridor # circuits
From To Zone Initial Supra. Par. CA Par. w/o CA
1 2 A 6 0 0 0
1 3 A 10 3 3 4
2 3 A 6 0 0 0
2 4 AB 8 0 0 1
2 5 AB 12 4 3 3
3 5 AB 6 0 2 3
3 9 AC 3 0 0 0
4 5 B 6 0 0 0
5 6 B 6 4 4 4
5 8 B 7 1 1 1
6 7 B 7 0 0 0
6 8 B 6 0 0 0
8 10 BC 3 0 0 0
8 14 BC 3 0 0 0
9 11 C 6 2 2 2
9 12 C 6 0 0 0
9 13 C 6 1 1 1
10 11 C 6 0 0 0
12 13 C 6 0 0 0
13 14 C 6 0 0 0
Table 6.8: 14-node example: initial situation and different planners’ investments
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6.5 Assessment of design choices
Whereas the assessment of design choices for the supranational planner (section
5.5) revealed that the supranational planner can be rather flexibly adapted for
different choices, in principle the same holds for the Pareto-planner. However, the
already complicated structure of the Pareto-planner should not be underestimated
as a complicating factor. This is relevant when considering a dynamic treatment of
the planning horizon and a proactive link with generation investments.
For incorporating uncertainty and altering the market modelling, the impact on
the Pareto-planner is the same as for the supranational planner and can be rather
limited. In particular with respect to the Pareto-planner, another market model
would not further complicate the model, as here no simplification towards a single-
level model is made in the first place. As long as the market model can be written
as a set of constraints, the structure remains unchanged.
The impact of changing the objective function or using multiple objectives is
stronger on the Pareto-planning than on the supranational planning model. The
interpretation of the initial welfare constraints is crucial. Two possibilities arise:
 When all different objectives are included within a single constraint, the initial
welfare constraint allows for an internal, i.e. within a zone, trade-off of the
different objectives. For instance, lower reliability can be compensated with
higher economic welfare. This approach allows for more flexibility. Of course,
whether or not the solution space increases, depends on the performance
of different countries for each objective in the initial situation (e.g. is one
country outporming the others on all objectives or is the initial situation
more differentiated?).
 When for each objective a separate constraint reflecting the initial situation
is used, the Pareto-planner becomes more constrained. A Pareto-improving
solution would now require that for each objective each country should
improve or at least remain status-quo. For instance, it is not possible to
accept a lower level of reliability, even if the economic welfare increases. The
solution space reduces in size and chances for finding a Pareto-improvement
decrease.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter the Pareto planning collaboration concept introduced in section 3.1.2
is further refined. This concept assumes less collaboration than the supranational
planning concept presented in chapter 5. Whereas the supranational planner
assumes a full welfare transfer mechanism able to compensate negatively affected
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zones, the Pareto-planning concept does not go that far. Firstly, the Pareto-planner
avoids any outcome that negatively affects a zone by adding Pareto-constraints to
the planning problem. Hence, this concept and the planning models score better
with respect to multi-area awareness. Although there still is a single objective
function maximizing overall economic welfare, the single-zone treatment is left
behind and makes place for explicit zonal welfare constraints, i.e. the Pareto-
constraints. Two drawbacks are inherent to this concept. It is not always possible
to find a Pareto-improving solution and the solution does not guarantee an equal
welfare distribution.
Secondly, two variants of the Pareto-planner varying in the treatment of the
transmission investment cost are identified. One assumes that investment cost
allocation between different zones is possible. The other does not allow this and
assumes that each zone bears the cost of new infrastructure hosted on its territory.
Clearly, the Pareto-planner with cost allocation assumes more collaboration than
the one without, but still less than the supranational planner. As a consequence,
the variant without cost allocation never outperforms the other case (or at best they
have the same solution). The Pareto-planning variants can also never outperform
the welfare level reached by the supranational planner. This is illustrated by both
the mathematical formulation of the planning models and the examples in this
chapter.
Modelling the Pareto-planning concept and solving those models prove to be more
complicated than the supranational planning concept. Again a bilevel structure is
considered to model the problem. However, no simple reformulation is possible.
On the one hand GAs are required to tackle the bilevel problem directly when a
discrete investment representation is used. On the other hand, for a continuous
investment representation the bilevel model is reformulated as a single-level MPEC
using the KKT conditions of the underlying DCOPF. Unfortunately, both solution
mechanisms provide no proven optimal solution.
Despite the drawbacks, the implementation of the Pareto-planning concept is
considered useful because it can provide a way-out when the supranational solution
is not acceptable for one or more zones or when the required level for collaboration
in the supranational concept is considered too high.
The examples reveal that various situations are possible. Firstly, it is possible that
the supranational solution is Pareto-improving for all zones (e.g. the two-zone
example). In such case it is not necessary to adopt a framework for a high level of
collaboration as assumed in the supranational concept. The lighter conditions of the
Pareto-concept are then sufficient to attain the maximal welfare level. Secondly, the
three-zone examples illustrated the possible impact of a cost allocation mechanism.
Whereas in the meshed example it does not matter, the radial example shows
that a higher welfare is possible when such a mechanism is available. Finally, the
14-node, three-zone example carefully suggests that the Pareto-planning solutions
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do not necessarily result in a lower level of investments than in the supranational
solution as is the case in the other examples.

7
Non-cooperative planning
game
In this chapter the third and final planning collaboration concept is dealt with: the
non-cooperative planning game. It is clearly different from the previous concepts
discussed with respect to the assumed level of collaboration and mathematical
complexity. Firstly, the non-cooperative planning game is described by intuitively
discussing several of its properties and by outlining its structure (section 7.1). Next,
a mathematical formulation is provided (section 7.2). After briefly highlighting
several issues related to solution methods (section 7.3), three examples are analysed
(section 7.4).
7.1 Model intuition and structure
Firstly, the intuition of the non-cooperative planning game is explained by
emphasizing three crucial differences with the supranational and Pareto-planning
concepts. Next, from this intuition a model structure is derived.
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7.1.1 Intuition and limitations
Compared to the supranational and Pareto-planning collaboration concepts, the
non-cooperative planning game is different in various ways. Intuitively, three major
differences can be identified. Next, several limitations of this concept are discussed.
Intuition
Firstly, it assumes no collaboration at all in developping transmission links. Despite
(possible) interconnections and a jointly operated market, this concept assumes
that all planning and investment decisions take place at the zonal level. This
differs substantially from the previous concepts where a single objective function
maximizing overall economic welfare throughout the entire network is assumed and
investments are thought to be decided at a higher level than zonal.1 Indeed, in the
non-cooperative planning game only zonal welfare is evaluated. The overall level is
never taken into account. Interestingly, as it is never accounted for, it is also not
possible to make ex ante statements on how the non-cooperative planning game
scores in terms of overall welfare compared to the other concepts. As illustrated by
the examples, it is not true to claim that concepts with a certain incorporation
of the supranational viewpoint always outperform the non-cooperative planning
game.
A second difference concerns the very high multi-area awareness of the non-
cooperative planning game. Whereas the supranational planner adopts a pure
single-zone viewpoint and the Pareto-planner incorporated a light form of awareness
via zonal welfare constraints, this concept goes one step further. By trading the
single-zone objective function for maximizing welfare at the zonal level, no single-
zone element remains at the investment level. The resulting network is a patchwork
of interconnected zonal networks. It is the result of zonal decision-making without
any involvement of a higher decision level. Note, however, that despite the strong
multi-area awareness and zonal focus on transmission investments, other aspects
remain unchanged. The network is assumed to remain interconnected2 and the
market still covers the entire network.
As already high-lighted in the literature study on design options for planning
models, existing models or concepts with a high multi-area awareness in investment
planning are scarce (section 4.1.6). The most valuable source for this thesis’ research
question is provided by [90] where also non-cooperative behaviour in transmission
1Another interpretation of investments being decided at a higher than zonal levels assumes
that investments are decided zonally but that a welfare transferring framework is in place giving
correct incentives to the zonal level such that they decide in line with the higher level.
2At least when zones are interconnected at the start. When initially energy islands are
considered, there is no guarantee that they will be connected in the result of the non-cooperative
planning game.
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investments is addressed. However, the analysis is limited to the intuition behind
competing merchant investors. This chapter goes beyond an intuitive analysis by
setting up and solving a mathematical model. Moreover, the presented approach
deals with regulated investments and does not consider merchant investors.3
A third change concerns the consequence of this increased multi-area awareness on
the planning process. Whereas in the previous concepts there always is a single
planner deciding upon investments for the entire network (with or without Pareto-
constraints), there are now many decision-makers. Investments are evaluated by
the zonal planners with zonal economic welfare levels in mind. Of course, these
planners all interact as the zonal networks are interconnected and interact via a
single market covering all zones. Each zonal planner is affected by the investment
decisions taken by other zones and vice versa. In fact, they play a game. As
now each player has its own decision variables, i.e. transmission investments, it is
important to clearly define property rights and indicate which player can invest in
which connections.
As the zonal planners now play a game, the result is no longer defined as an
optimum. It is better characterised as an equilibrium. By simultaneously solving
the different zonal optimisation problems and for each problem taking into account
the behaviour of other decision-makers, an outcome is sought for in which no
single zonal planner has an incentive to deviate from the result. In other words,
in an equilibrium no player can improve his own objective function given the
decisions of the other players. Translated to the non-cooperative planning game,
this means that in the equilibrium no zonal planner is able to improve zonal welfare
by changing its investment decisions given the decisions of the other zonal planners.
This equilibrium is of course the main result of the non-cooperative planning
game and can be compared with the results found for the other planning concepts.
However, zonal planners’ reaction curves are an interesting by-product of the
non-cooperative planning game. A reaction curve provides an insight in a zonal
planner’s best response given the decisions of the other players. It can also be used
to check whether the solutions found by the other concepts are stable, i.e. whether
they represent an equilibrium or not. When this is not the case, one or more zonal
planners have an incentive to alter their investment decisions.
Section 7.1.2 formalises several of the above findings by relating them to the
structure of the non-cooperative planning game. Firstly, several limitations of this
concept are discussed.
3Note that in a recent contribution, the analysis presented in this chapter is already broadened
by the incorporation of zonal cooperation on renewable objectives [134].
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Limitations
The non-cooperative planning game as intuitively described above and further
developed in the remainder of this chapter represents an extreme concept for
collaboration. In different ways it is very restricting. Nevertheless, the choice for
this concept can be justified by the research question. Additionally, solving the
limitations would require more complicated models. As explained in section 7.3,
the current concept represents already a harsh mathematical challenge.
The literature on game theory provides a broad variety of games that can be
played. With respect to the non-cooperative planning, repeated and sequential
games, games with imperfect information, bargaining theory and the relevance of
the threatpoint herein all present interesting routes to follow to render the game
among zonal planners more realistic. Textbooks on game theory provide useful
insights on how such games are organised [135, 136]. Nevertheless, for the purpose
of this thesis, the presented non-cooperative game already provides for sufficient
complexity.
One-stage game The non-cooperative planning game is conceived as a one-stage
game. This means that all decisions are taken in a single round, i.e. once and
forever. All zonal planners decide on their investments simultaneously. There is
no possibility to change the decision afterwards or to observe the actions of the
other players. Planners cannot react upon decisions of the other planners. In
reality, all planners do not have to decide on the same moment. They can observe
actions of others and then take their decision. This of course alters the rules of the
game. Repeated games or games with sequential moves can be used to relax this
assumption.
Similarly, the one-stage nature of this concept automatically rules out any form of
negotiation between different planners. This is an extreme assumption which allows
exploring the other end of the spectrum of collaboration (i.e. compared to the
supranational planner where full collaboration is assumed). In reality, however, it is
possible (and common practice) for countries to negotiate, for instance, cost-sharing
keys. Despite that in reality negotiations are possible for all investments, it is
likely that only for interconnector projects such negotiations take place and often
only in bilateral way. This implies that not always all affected parties have been
around the negotiation table. These subtleties can be captured by models based
on bargaining theory.
Perfect information In section 4.1 the incorporation of uncertainty into the
different concepts is discussed. A deterministic world without uncertainties is opted
for as this allows models to to be simpler, but at the same time to be sufficiently
complex to answer the research questions.
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For the non-cooperative planning game another kind of uncertainty emerges and
extra assumptions are required. How much information does one zonal planner has
about the other zones? Does he know the demand and generation cost functions?
Does he have knowledge on the existing network and the transmission investment
costs? For the non-cooperative planning game, it is assumed that all zonal planners
have perfect information. Although in reality this would obviously not be the case,
this simplification is acceptable keeping in mind the research questions. It is not
the purpose to model reality as perfectly as possible, rather the aim is to sketch
the impact of different forms of collaboration.
Threatpoint The non-cooperative planning game always starts from an initial
situation, in game theory sometimes called the threatpoint. This initial situation
of course determines the possible actions for each planner. In this thesis, this
situation is given and not further discussed. Nevertheless, slight changes to this
initial situation can result in a different equilibrium. It can also change the impact
one player can have on the others. Consequently, planners can have an incentive to
alter the initial situation, e.g. by investing in the own internal network and thereby
changing initial flow patterns, resulting in a stronger (bargaining) position in the
game itself. An example can be found in negotiations for natural gas contracts
[137].
7.1.2 Structure
Fig. 7.1 gives a clear overview of the structure of the non-cooperative planning
game. The zonal emphasis is found in the existence of multiple zonal planners
each maximizing the zonal welfare minus zonal investment costs. Each planner is
also bound by some investment constraints. As for the previous concepts, they
can include limits on new circuits added, corridors used, budget, etc. The zonal
planners are deciding on the investments and all act as leaders. Hence, the problem
at hand is a multi-leader problem.
A zonal planner can be described by a bilevel problem structure because also in
the non-cooperative planning game each zonal planner is subject to the underlying
market outcome. The mutual influence between planner and market remains
unchanged. Investments are still impacted by their market effects and the market
is bound by the transmission network, including the newly decided investments.
This is true for each zonal planner. Of course, as all planners act on the same
interconnected network, it is important to ensure that they all take into account
the same market conditions and outcome. For instance, the investment decisions
of planner 1 are reflected in all prices and the dispatch in the entire network.
Planner 2 has to take this into account for his decisions. Hence, a single common
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market has to be ensured. This is called a common follower. In Fig. 7.1 this
is indicated by a single box with the market outcome stretching over all leaders’
constraints.
The problem boils down to solving simultaneously several MPEC or Stackelberg
problems. Such a problem is a game with multiple players (i.e. the zonal planners)
and a common underlying problem (i.e. the market) and can be classified as a
Generalised Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) as defined in [138]. A GNEP is
characterised by the dependence of each player’s feasible set on the decisions of
the other players.
More specifically, the game played by the zonal planners is in fact a Nash game
played by multiple Stackelberg leaders with a common follower. References [139]
and [140] provide a thorough discussion of this type of games. In [140] the common
nature of the following market problem determining a single market outcome with
dispatch and prices is defined as ensuring price consistency. The non-cooperative
solution is then found by simultaneously solving the zonal planners’ MPECs while
ensuring price-consistency, i.e. while solving a single underlying DCOPF.
Mathematically, GNEPs or multi-leader common follower problems are often
formulated as Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). An
EPEC is an equilibrium found by simultaneously solving multiple MPECs. In fact
the equilibrium conditions of each MPEC have to be determined keeping in mind
that the MPEC itself partly consists of equilibrium conditions. Solving EPECs is
hard and subject of ongoing research. This is further discussed in section 7.3. First,
a mathematical formulation of the non-cooperative planning game is described in
the next section.
7.2 Mathematical formulation
This section explains how the non-cooperative planning game is mathematically
modelled as an EPEC. This is done in two steps. The first step describes the
problem faced by a single zonal planner. This problem is an MPEC. The second
step brings together several MPECs and shows how they are welded into a single
EPEC.
7.2.1 Single-level MPEC formulation of a zonal planner
The bilevel problem representing the zonal planner is directly formulated as a single-
level MPEC for two reasons. Firstly, the same reasoning as for the Pareto-planner
applies. The leader uses both primal and dual variables (in particular nodal prices)
in its objective function. Secondly, the objective functions of the leader and the
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follower are not aligned as the former maximizes only zonal welfare and the latter
considers overall welfare. Hence, it is not possible to drop the lower level objective
function and add the constraints of the DCOPF directly to the leader’s problem.
MPECs and their ability to model bilevel problems are already described in section
6.2.2. An analogous reasoning is applied on the non-cooperative planning game. It
is again the DCOPF which is rewritten by using its KKT conditions. The zonal
planner can be described by the following optimisation problem.
Maximize
∑
p
Tp
( ∑
n∈ΩN(z)
(
An,pdn,p − 1
2
Bn,pd
2
n,p − λn,pdn,p
)
(7.1a)
+
∑
n∈ΩN(z)
∑
t
(
λn,pgn,t,p − Cn,t,pgn,t,p − 1
2
Dn,t,pg
2
n,t,p
)
(7.1b)
+
∑
n∈ΩN(z)
∑
l
[
1
2
|INCl,n| fl,p
∑
b
(−INCl,bλb,p)
])
(7.1c)
+
∑
l∈ΩL(z)
(CLl LNl xl) (7.1d)
subject to:
∀l xl ≥ 0 (7.2a)
∀n, p An,p −Bn,pdn,p + λn,p + κn,p = 0 (7.2b)
∀n, t, p −Cn,t,p −Dn,t,pgn,t,p − λn,p − νn,t,p + ρn,t,p = 0 (7.2c)
∀n 6= ns, p
∑
l
INCl,nHlψl,p = 0 (7.2d)
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∀p
∑
l
INCl,nHlψl,p + ξp = 0 (7.2e)
∀l, p −
∑
n
INCl,nλn,p + µ
a
l − µbl + ψl,p = 0 (7.2f)
∀p θns,p = 0 (7.2g)
∀n, p
∑
t
gn,t,p − dn,p −
∑
l
(INCl,nfl,p) = 0 (7.2h)
∀l, p fl,p −Hl
∑
n
(INCl,nθn,p) = 0 (7.2i)
∀l, p 0 ≤ Fmaxl + xl + fl,p ⊥ µal,p ≥ 0 (7.2j)
∀l, p 0 ≤ Fmaxl + xl − fl,p ⊥ µbl,p ≥ 0 (7.2k)
∀n, t, p 0 ≤ Gmaxn,t,p − gn,t,p ⊥ νn,t,p ≥ 0 (7.2l)
∀n, p 0 ≤ dn,p ⊥ κn,p ≥ 0 (7.2m)
∀n, t, p 0 ≤ gn,t,p ⊥ ρn,t,p ≥ 0 (7.2n)
The zonal planner’s MPEC is composed as follows. The objective function is given
by (7.1) and consists of all terms determining zonal welfare: zonal CS and PS,
CR accrueing to the zone and the cost for transmission investments within the
zone. This is identical to the zonal welfare defined in the Pareto-constraints for
the variant without cost allocation (6.12). The constraints of the zonal planner
are the same as for the supranational planner (and the Pareto-planner except
for the Pareto-constraints). The investment constraint is given by (7.2a) and the
underlying DCOPF by its KKT conditions in (7.2b)-(7.2n). Their interpretation
remains unchanged.
7.2.2 EPEC formulation of the non-cooperative planning game
The solution of an EPEC is an equilibrium for all players, i.e. the zonal planners.
Hence, in order to ensure this property the equilibrium conditions of all players
have to be met. As already explained (see section 6.2.2), KKT conditions can be
used as equilibrium conditions.
Whereas in case of the Pareto-planner and the zonal planner only the underlying
DCOPF is reformulated using its KKT conditions, now the equilibrium conditions
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of the entire MPEC have to be determined. In order to achieve this, the MPEC is
first reformulated as an NLP. In particular the complementarity constraints need
an alternative formulation. Equation (6.8f) of section 6.2.2 can be rewritten as
in (7.3) [140, 141]. Equation (7.3c) now ensures that both elements cannot be
non-zero at the same time.
G(x, y) ≥ 0 (7.3a)
µ ≥ 0 (7.3b)
G(x, y) ∗ µ = 0 (7.3c)
Next, the KKT conditions of this NLP can be determined. In order to do so, first
the Lagrangian L of the NLP is defined:
L(x, y, λ, µ, γg, χh, η, γG, χH , ω, ζ)
= W + gT γg + hTχg +
(∇xF −∇xGTµ+∇xHTλ)T η
+µTω +HTχH +GT γG + (G(x, y) ∗ µ)T ζ (7.4)
The Greek symbols γg, χh, η, χH are the dual variables corresponding to constraints
(6.8b)-(6.8f). γG, ω, ζ are the duals of constraints (7.3a)-(7.3c). The KKT
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conditions of the reformulated MPEC then become:
∇xL = 0 (7.5a)
∇yL = 0 (7.5b)
∇λL = 0 (7.5c)
∇µL = 0 (7.5d)
0 ≤ g(x, y) ⊥ γg ≥ 0 (7.5e)
0 = h(x, y) (7.5f)
0 ≤ G(x, y) ⊥ γG ≥ 0 (7.5g)
0 ≤ µ ⊥ ω ≥ 0 (7.5h)
∇xF (x, y)−∇xG(x, y)Tµ+∇xH(x, y)Tλ = 0 (7.5i)
H(x, y) = 0 (7.5j)
G(x, y) ∗ µ = 0. (7.5k)
A zonal planner’s MPEC can be modelled with the above set of equilibrium
conditions. For the full EPEC representing the non-cooperative planning game for
each planner, such a set of equilibrium conditions is required. However, in order to
ensure price consistency and a common follower, i.e. a single underlying DCOPF,
the constraints related to the DCOPF should only be added once to the EPEC
problem. Moreover, each zonal planner should use the same set of dual and primal
variables relating to the market problem.
7.3 Solution methods
Like MPECs the mathematical properties of EPECs make them a hard challenge
to solve. The complementarity constraints, even when reformulated as non-linear
constraints, render them very difficult to solve. Moreover, it is not guaranteed that
a solution always exists, and if it exists whether it is unique or multiple equilibria
exist. The properties with respect to the existence of (multiple) solutions and
convergence of solution methods strongly vary with the specific problem adressed.
The difficulties with solving and interpreting EPEC results are outlined in [141].
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In [132, 139] the concept of a Nash equilibrium is extended towards a local Nash
equilibrium in case of an EPEC.
Based on [142] two categories of solution algorithms are identified in [132]. Like for
MPECs one group first reformulates each player’s MPEC to an NLP and then solves
for the KKT conditions of each NLP as set up in section 7.2. An alternative is
applied by [139, 143]. A diagonalisation method is used in which MPECs are solved
sequentially using the intermediate results of previous players until convergence for
all players is reached. This methodology does not require the full EPEC model
as discussed in the previous section. In [144] another method is proposed which
sequentially solves relaxed MPEC problems. The latter problems are written as
non-linear problems.
When solving an EPEC it may happen that multiple equilibria are found. Choosing
a single equilibrium is not straightforward and without extra assumptions often
not even possible. This problem is also discussed in [141].
As there are no clear-cut methods available (yet) to solve EPECs, in this thesis
the problem of solving the EPEC is circumvented by enumerating all possible
solutions and then ex post looking for equilibria. Obviously, enumeration is very
time consuming and therefore, only feasible for small problems. Nevertheless, this
approach has at least three advantages. Firstly, it is very easy to check whether
there are multiple equilibria or just one (if any at all). Secondly, convergence
problems are avoided. Finally, the reaction curves are also easily constructed.
Hence, for providing an insight in the non-cooperative planning game this is
sufficient and no more sophicaticated methods are required.
7.4 Examples
In this chapter the examples introduced in section 5.4 serve again to illustrate the
non-cooperative planning game and compare its result with the other concepts.
However, only the two-zone and both three-zone examples are used. The non-
cooperative planning game is not analysed for the 14-node, three-zone example.
Enumeration is no longer a workable solution method for an example of that size.
7.4.1 Two-zone example
In contrast to the two previous concepts with a single decision-maker, for the
non-cooperative planning game it is important to clearly identify who decides on
which transmission link. As already outlined in section 5.4.1 and indicated in
Fig. 5.2, the connection between zones A and B can be split in two equal segments
TAF and TBF where F denotes the frontier between both zones.
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No link Supra Non-coop
= Pareto CA
= Pareto w/o CA
Zone A Zone B Zone A Zone B Zone A Zone B
Gen. [MW] 3250 2667 3959 2037 3805 2173
Dem. [MW] 3250 2667 3014 2982 3065 2913
Price [e/MWh] 32.5 53.3 39.6 40.7 38.1 43.5
CS [e] 158438 142222 136236 177815 140913 16750
PS [e] 52813 71111 78365 41475 72390 47234
CR [e] 0 0 540 540 2004 2004
CS+PS+CR [e] 211250 213333 215140 219829 215308 218988
Inv. cost [e] 0 1079 422 422
Capacity [MW] 0 945.2 740
Overall welf. [e] 424583 433890 433451
Table 7.1: Two-zone example: overview of results on an hourly basis for all concepts
An important consequence of this split in two segments is that when the transmission
capacity on these segments is not equal, it is the segment with the lowest capacity
which determines the maximum flow between A and B. For instance, if on TAF
the capacity is 500 MW and on TBF only 300 MW, the flow between A and B can
never exceed 300 MW. Hence, 200 MW on TAF remains unused.
In the last column of Table 7.1 the results for the non-cooperative planning game
are displayed. A transmission capacity of 740 MW is installed on both segments.4
This is clearly less than in the cases of the supranational and Pareto-planners where
945.2 MW5 is installed. A larger price difference remains between both zones in
the non-cooperative outcome. From the welfare results it can be analysed that
zone A has most interest in keeping the capacity limited to 740 MW. Its welfare
(CS+PS+CR) is slightly higher than when 945.2 MW is installed. The overall
welfare level is obviously smaller than in the supranational case.
This result and zone A’s incentive to limit the capacity to 740 MW can also be
seen from Fig. 7.2 where zonal and overall welfare are depicted for a transmission
capacity varying from 0 to 1000 MW. The overall welfare function peaks at
4Note that this value is found using enumeration with a step size of 10 MW. This means that
all transmission capacities between 0 and 1000 MW are tested with a 10 MW interval. The upper
bound of 1000 MW is sufficient because price convergence is reached by then rendering higher
investments useless.
5This result is found using the QP and MPEC from chapters 5 and 6. When using enumeration
with a 10 MW step size, the result would be 950 MW.
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Fig. 7.2: Two-zone example: zonal and overall welfare for different levels of
transmission capacity
950 MW.6 For zone B a monotonically increasing curve is observed. It benefits
from higher transmission capacity until price convergence is reached. However, a
clear maximum for zone A is found at 740 MW after which zonal welfare drops.
The reaction curves shown in Fig. 7.3 provide a similar insight. In the upperright
corner of the figure a discrepancy between zone A’s and B’s reaction curves is
noted. Even if zone B decides upon a capacity higher than 740 MW, zone A would
still install a capacity of only 740 MW. Zone B, however, always follows zone A’s
decision by installing the same amount of capacity.
Additionally, from the same figure it can be observed that a multitude of equilibria
exists and that the 740 MW is just one (but extreme) outcome. All solutions on
the section from 0 to 740 MW where both reaction curves coincide, are equilibria of
the non-cooperative planning game. In general, it is very difficult to pick a single
6Cfr. previous footnote.
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Fig. 7.3: Two-zone example: reaction curves
outcome as there is no reason why under the given circumstances one equilibrium
should be favoured above the others. However, here the solution of 740 MW is put
forward as this is the equilibrium with the highest overall welfare and the highest
welfare for both zones separately.
The difference in total welfare for zone A between both outcomes is small enough to
be compensated by zone B’s welfare gains when going from 740 to 945.2 MW. This
illustrates that a welfare compensation mechanism can facilitate an overall welfare
maximizing solution whilst taking into account different zonal intrests. Note that
this observation is based on welfare figures before taking into account investment
cost, i.e. CS+PS+CR in Table 7.1. Even if zone B would bear the full cost of
moving from 740 to 950 MW, namely 239.7 e/h7, and not only the cost for its
own segment an extra compensation for zone A is still required to convince zone A
to host the infrastructure on its territory. This suggests that a mechanism based
on cost allocation alone is not sufficient to reach the supranational solution.
7239.7 e/h = (950 MW− 740 MW)× 200 km× 50 e/(km.MW.year)× (1/8760 h)
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Fig. 7.4: Three-zone radial example: overview of solutions
7.4.2 Three-zone example: radial configuration
As for the two-zone example, it is also for this case important to highlight which
zone can invest in which lines. In Fig. 5.8 four line segments have already been
defined. Zones A and C respectively decide on line segments TAF1 and TCF2 .
8
Zone B can invest in the remaining two segments adjacent to its zone, i.e. TBF1
and TBF2 .
The investments in the non-cooperative planning game are given in Fig. 7.4(b).
It turns out that the initial situation is the only equilibrium. Hence, no zone has
an incentive to deviate from the initial outcome. The welfare effects are given in
Table 7.2. Although large welfare gains are possible in the supranational case and
both Pareto-outcomes, this cannot be reached without any form of cooperation or
welfare compensation.
In particalur zone B, located centrally in the network, is crucial for this equilibrium.
As in the initial situation zone B already enjoys the lowest possible price, i.e.
30 e/MWh, it uses its decision power on the two links in its territory to keep the
8F1 and F2 respectively denote the frontier between zones A and B and zones B and C. They
are artificial nodes without generation nor demand.
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Initial Supranational
= Non-cooperative
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 125 125 45 125 125 125
PS 0 0 0 0 0 0
CR 0 9 9 0 0 0
CS+PS+CR 125 134 54 125 125 125
∆Welfare - - - 0 -9 +71
Investment cost - - - -1.83
Pareto CA Pareto w/o CA
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 125 125 101.25 125 96.8 64.8
PS 0 0 0 0 0 0
CR 0 11.25 11.25 24 38.4 14.4
CS+PS+CR 125 136.25 112.5 149 136.9 79.2
∆Welfare 0 +2.25 +58.5 +24 +1.2 +25.2
Investment cost -1.60 -0.17 -0.51 -0.34
Table 7.2: Three-zone radial example: hourly welfare effects [ke]
price at this level and avoid any price increase. Whatever the decisions of the other
zones are, zone B can always take appropriate action to ensure its welfare level. In
Fig. 7.5 zone B’s reaction curve is given. Zone C is clearly the victim of zone B’s
decision power. Its best response is to copy zone B’s reaction on segment TBF2 .
For zone A the situation is better because the cheapest generator is located in its
zone. Nevertheless, also for zone A better outcomes exist, like the Pareto-planner
without cost allocation.
Note that any case with price convergence (30 e/MWh in all three zones), like the
supranational result, is not an equilibrium. Although zone B profits from a price
of 30 e/MWh in this case, zone B has no incentive at all to pay for the necessary
investments on link TBF2 enabling zone C to also benefit from zone A’s cheaper
generation. Both Pareto-outcomes are also no equilibria. The Pareto-planner with
CA is not an equilibrium because zone A has an incentive to limit the number
of circuits on TAF1 to 4 instead of 5 because it is then able to retrieve a higher
amount of CR. Similarly, zone B has an incentive to keep the number of circuits
on TBF2 on 3 instead of 4 in the Pareto-case without cost allocation. By doing so,
it prevents a higher price of 42 e/MWh resulting in a lower zonal CS.
As in the two-zone example, moving away from the non-cooperative outcome to
the supranational case is possible when the benefitting party compensates the
negatively affected one. Hence, zone C should compensate zone B for the welfare
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Fig. 7.5: Three-zone radial example: reaction curve for zone B
loss. Note, again, that it is insufficient to only finance the transmission investment
costs. Zone B’s welfare loss exceeds the transmission costs. Additionally, zone C
should also finance the investments on zone A’s territory.
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TAB TBC TAC
Supranational +115.9 +75.4 +391.4
Pareto CA +24.5 +0 +224.5
Pareto w/o CA +24.5 +0 +224.5
Non-cooperative +150 +0 +350
Table 7.3: Three-zone meshed example: invested capacity compared to the initial
situation [MW]
7.4.3 Three-zone example: meshed configuration
In this example zones A, B and C respectively decide on links TAB , TBC and TAC
as outlined in section 5.4.4. There are no artificial nodes indicating frontiers.
The results for the non-cooperative planning game are again different from the
other concepts. Like in the Pareto-outcomes, no investments take place on link
TBC as indicated in Table 7.3. In contrast, a higher level of investments is noted
on the other links. However, it is important to acknowledge that a multitude of
equilibria exists and that the solution given by Tables 7.3 and 7.4 is the outcome
resulting in the highest overall welfare and the highest welfare for zones A and
C. Whereas for TBC the invested capacity is zero in all equilibria and the initial
capacity of 200 MW is maintained, for zones A and C, the invested capacity varies
between +40 and +150 MW on TAB and between +240 and +350 MW on TAC .
In Fig. 7.6 the zonal welfare evolution is shown for all equilibria.
In Table 7.4 the welfare effects are given and compared to the other concepts. The
non-cooperative equilibrium is not Pareto-improving because zone B is worse off.
Note, however, that this is not so severe for all equilibria as can be seen in Fig. 7.6.
The first equilibrium at the left-hand side of the graph with invested capacities +40,
+0 and + 240 MW on respectively TAB , TBC and TAC is nearly Pareto-improving.
It is also interesting to note that overall welfare is higher in the non-cooperative
planning equilibrium than in the Pareto-outcomes. Less collaboration creates more
welfare, albeit with a negative effect on zone B.
In Fig. 7.7 the reaction curves of each zone are given. Whereas in the horizontal
plane the decisions of the two other zones are given, the vertical axis is used
to indicate the reaction of the concerned zone. All axes depart from 200 MW,
which is the initially present transmission capacity on each link. For instance,
Fig. 7.7(a) shows the investment of zone A in TAB given the amount invested by
zones B and C in respectively TBC and TAC . The black dots represent the different
non-cooperative solutions.9
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Initial Supranational
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 166.2 156.8 150.5 181.1 156.6 138.0
PS 45.4 44.4 40.9 33.0 44.7 56.0
CR 1.266 0.493 1.198 0.285 0.113 0.277
CS+PS+CR 212.9 201.7 192.5 214.6 201.4 194.3
∆Welfare - - - +1.735 -0.374 +1.758
Investment cost 0 0 0 -0.333
Pareto w/o CA Non-coop
=Pareto CA
Zone A Zone B Zone C Zone A Zone B Zone C
CS 174.7 156.9 143.1 181.1 154.0 140.5
PS 38.2 44.3 49.4 33.2 47.3 52.8
CR 1.258 0.494 1.203 0.408 0.144 0.698
CS+PS+CR 214.1 201.7 193.8 214.7 201.5 194.0
∆Welfare +1.201 0 +1.239 +1.810 -0.265 +1.423
Investment cost -0.142 -0.086 0 -0.200
Table 7.4: Three-zone meshed example: hourly welfare effects [ke]
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Fig. 7.6: Three-zone meshed example: welfare evolution for different non-
cooperative equilibria
9Again a step size of 10 MW is used for enumeration of all solutions.
EXAMPLES 141
From Fig. 7.7 it can also be seen that the supranational solution is not an
equilibrium. In particular zone B is the spoilsport. When zones A and C invest
according to the cooperative solution, zone B has an incentive to keep the capacity
on TBC limited to the initial 200 MW. An opposite behaviour can be observed
for zone C. Given that zones A and B decide upon the supranational solution
for their transmission line, zone C invests up to a capacity of 590 MW, i.e. the
supranational solution. An almost similar situation occurs for zone A, assuming
the supranational output for zones B and C, zone A increases the capacity of TAB
to 320 MW, only 10 MW more than in the supranational solution.10
The observations in the previous examples concerning a compensation mechanism
remain valid for this case. Again the welfare loss for zone B in the cooperative
solution compared to the non-cooperative solution is smaller than the gains
accrueing to zones A and C together. A compensation mechanism incenting
zone B to act in line with the supranational solution is possible. Again it is,
however, insufficient to cover only the investment cost that zone B has to make
for attaining the supranational solution. Even without taking this hourly cost
of 347 e/h into account, zone B would suffer a loss of 265 e/h. Therefore, a
welfare compensation mechanism should ensure compensating zone B with an extra
amount of 82 e/h.
10Note, however, that the step size for enumarating all solutions is 10 MW and it can be
assumed that it coincides with the supranational solution.
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7.5 Assessment of design choices
The assessment of design choices for the non-cooperative planning game closely
follows the analysis made for the Pareto-planner (section 6.5). The mathematical
complexity limits the options to structurally extend the model. A dynamic
treatment of the planning horizon and a proactive link with generation investments
become very hard challenges. In particular, solving even more complicated EPEC
systems requires extensive research, especially if enumeration is not considered an
adequate solution method.
With respect to uncertainty and market incorporation, the non-cooperative planning
game can be adapted for other choices. As for the Pareto-planner, another market
does not create new modelling challenges. For uncertainty, it depends on the kind
of uncertainty introduced, but scenario-analysis should not significantly increase
the complexity.
Keeping in mind the research question, extending the objective function with other
objectives is the most interesting route to follow. As described in the supranational
planner’s design choice assessement, it is possible to have a single objective function
in which all objectives are measured in the same units. This should not introduce
too many difficulties. Also a multi-objective framework is possible, but is inherently
more complicated. The issue of interpretation of multiple objectives raised for the
Pareto-planner does not hold for the non-cooperative planning game, as no initial
welfare constraints are applied. It is difficult to assess how the results would change
when extra objectives are introduced, but is likely that more equilibria emerge
because zones have the possibility to internally trade-off different objectives.
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter the third and last planning collaboration concept is described,
mathematically formulated and illustrated by means of simple examples. The
analysis reveals that this concept is extreme with respect to its multi-area awareness.
Zones and their individual welfare are explicitly modelled. This is the strength of
this concept and makes it unique compared to the other concepts and the available
academic literature on multilateral investments.
Structurally and consequently also mathematically this concept is different from
the previous ones. A multi-leader common follower problem with multiple zones
modelled as Stackelberg leaders with a common (price-consistent) underlying
market is required to capture its complexity. In terms of operations research, the
model is an EPEC. Theory on EPECs is still under development and solution
methods are not readily available. Hence, enumeration of the solution space is used
to solve the examples.
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From the structure and its underlying intuition, it is clear that the overall welfare
is never taken into account and it is not possible to generally rank this concept in
terms of overall welfare compared to the previous planning collaboration concepts.
This is confirmed by the provided examples. For instance, in the three-zone meshed
example it is noted that the non-cooperative outcome scores better than the
Pareto-outcomes in terms of overall welfare. Hence, having an intermediate level of
collaboration like in the Pareto-planning concept is not always better than having
no collaboration at all. This is a rather strong conclusion and is obviously subject
to the assumptions made. It can definitely not be generalised to all situations as
shown by the other examples where the non-cooperative planning game results in
a lower level of overall economic welfare.
The reaction curves for different zones prove to be a useful tool to analyze zonal
investment behaviour and incentives. Depending on the topology and assumed
cost figures, it is possible that one zone is more dominant in determining the
non-cooperative outcome than others. This is illustrated by all three examples.
Finally, a similar conclusion as in chapter 5 can be made. In order to move from
the non-cooperative outcome to the supranational outcome it is in several cases
insufficient to limit compensation mechanisms between zones to investment costs
only. A broader welfare transfer is required to alter investment incentives.
8
Conclusions and
recommendations for further
research
This thesis started with an analysis of the challenges for European electricity
transmission investments and the surrounding framework for collaboration between
different countries. Two questions have been raised. These questions are answered
in this chapter by recapitulating the main results and conclusions from the previous
chapters. In addition, this chapter makes recommendations for further research.
8.1 Conclusions
From the analysis of European energy policy, it can be learned that there is huge
transmission investment challenge driven by the aim for a secure, sustainable
and competitive energy supply. Ensuring reliability on the short and long term
(including solidarity between different countries), creating a level playing field
for a single European electricity market and supporting climate change goals by
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accomodating substantial connection of renewable energy sources, are three policy
goals put forward by Europe. Each of them heavily relies on the transmission
grid as enabler. This challenge is widely recognized. However, the framework for
delivering on these investments is not (yet) adapted to the challenge. Correct
incentives should be given to all parties. Especially the finding that today the
national level is still the most important one and in the end drives investment
decisions, should not be neglected as its consequence can be that the European
goals are not adequately incorporated in the decision-making process and the
objective function of national decision-makers.
Given this call for an adequate framework and incentives, a more detailed analysis
of the current framework was done. It revealed that the Third Package clearly
introduced a European flavour in transmission investments. The creation of ENTSO-
E and ACER are important milestones. The TYNDPs have the potential to become
powerful tools for meeting the challenges. However, it should also be clear that
the Third Package does not go far enough to ensure that European goals will be
met. An area of tension between the national and the European level remains. The
national level of decision-making remains very strong and lacks incentives to truly
incorporate the European goals in its decisions. Planning, regulatory oversight and
financing are not fully adapted to the European investment challenge.
The upcoming EIP again takes some steps forward, but it is unlikely to fix all
remaining loopholes. Although extra Euopean money is made available, the core of
existing financing mechanims is not altered with respect to incentives. The national
level remains the most powerful and no true incentives to think in line with Europe
are created. An important element in the EIP is the creation of an investment cost
allocation mechanism. It is thought to align the European and national interests.
However, as argued throughout this thesis, the way the tool is created, i.e. by
limiting it to investment cost allocation only, it is not an adequate solution. These
findings are further discussed by answering the two research questions.
What outcome can be expected when the national level of decision-making
remains strong without incentives to really take into account the European
goals?
Three collaboration concepts A new formal framework based on basic welfare
economics is developed to clearly address this question. Three different collaboration
concepts are identified. In each concept a different assumption is made on the level
of collaboration between different countries. Stated otherwise, the collaboration
concepts differ in the assumed severity of the wedge driven between the European
and national levels.
A first concept is the supranational planner. Full collaboration is assumed and
the European objectives are put forward as the single objective function. In fact,
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national borders are neglected in this concept. It can be understood as a single
European planner taking all decisions without considering the welfare distribution
caused by these decisions. Obviously, this is an extreme situation compared to
reality. Nevertheless, it serves as an interesting benchmark as it determines an
upper bound for overall welfare. Moreover, it illustrates that a European solution
can result in winners and losers.
A second concept relaxes the level of collaboration and increases the importance
of the different countries in the decision-making process. A Pareto-planner is
proposed. Like in the supranational planning concept a single planner with a
European objective function is still in place. However, this Pareto-planner is
constrained by national welfare: there may be no losers compared to the initial
situation. Obviously, this situation is closer to today’s reality. With a national
flavour in investment decision-making, it is unlikely that countries can agree on
investments which result in lower welfare for their grid users. However, already from
the formal welfare economics’ framework, it could be derived that this can result
in a suboptimal situation. This is also clear from the mathematical formulation
and is confirmed by the examples presented.
A third concept presents another extreme, namely a situation without collaboration
on investment planning. A non-cooperative planning game with national planners
as players is developed. The European objectives are not pursued and only national
welfare is maximized by the different players. This situation represents a failing
framework in which adequate incentives are lacking to incorporate the European
goals in national investment decisions.
An important role in the different concepts is given to the underlying assumption
concerning the (non-)existence of a welfare compensation mechanism. This is
discussed in the next subsection dealing with this thesis’ second question.
Although the three concepts have a different degree of collaboration and European
spirit and it could be expected from the formal framework that the resulting
investment outcomes reflect this difference, the examples presented in this thesis
clearly indicated that conclusions have to be more subtle. In general it is true that
in terms of overall welfare the supranational planner always outperforms the other
concepts. In the examples, however, it is shown that the other concepts can result
in the same supranational outcome. Hence, the strong assumptions made for the
supranational planner are not always necessary and good outcomes can sometimes
be achieved with lighter forms of collaboration. This result should, however, not
be abused. It cannot serve as a reason to rely on a lighter form of collaboration
without verification.
A second subltety is found in the comparison of the results of the Pareto-planner
and the non-cooperative planning game. Although the latter inherently assumes
less collaboration than the Pareto-planner, it is possible that in terms of overall
economic welfare, the non-cooperative planning game scores better. This is a
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consequence of the fact that in that planning concept it is possible that countries
loose welfare, whereas this is strictly forbidden in the Pareto logic. Whether or
not this can happen in the European case is difficult to judge and depends on the
actual topology and, for instance, the ability of one country to block investments.
Positioning in academic literature and major contributions The comparison of
the different concepts in order to assess the impact of multiple planners on a single
interconnected network is unprecedented. The effects on planning arising from
such situation are not addressed in the literature. Hence, this is considered as an
important contribution of this thesis.
With respect to the mathematical modelling of the collaboration concepts
themselves, it was possible to partly rely on the existing literature. A thorough
literature review revealed that transmission planning models can be categorized
using a limited set of design building blocks: treatment of the planning horizon,
uncertainty incorporation, transmission planning objectives, market incorporation,
link with generation investment planning and multi-area awareness. The latter
option specifically addresses the research topic. For the other blocks choices are
made in order to keep a balance between simplicity and transparency of the models
and the required level of detail allowing to answer the research question. The
approach followed can be described as explicit market modelling in a static, reactive,
deterministic planning context, while maximizing economic welfare. The level of
multi-area awareness is different for each concept.
The mathematical model representing the supranational planner is not new and
builds on existing models. The Pareto-planner is a new approach created by adding
extra constraints to an existing model. The non-cooperative planning game is a
novel approach in the transmission planning literature. It introduces game theory
in transmission planning.
From an operations research point of view no new concepts or solution methods
are developed. Quadratic programs, mathematical programs with equilibrium
constraints and equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints are known
problem formulations. Also the solution methods (genetic algorithms, branch-and-
bound, enumeration) build on existing and widely known techniques.
Is investment cost allocation a sufficient tool to align European and national
goals?
This second question is again inspired by the ongoing debate on how incentives
between national and European levels can be aligned. It particularly addresses the
issue of new transmission investments causing welfare transfers. This can result in
winners and losers which obviously influences the decisions made by the different
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players. An investment cost allocation tool is sometimes put forward to resolve
this issue and bridge the gap between the European and national objectives.
Already from the formal framework and the general description of the three concepts
it is clear that a compensation mechanism plays a crucial role. An important
question is, however, what is really included in the compensation? Is it only the
transmission investment cost or is full economic welfare considered? Investment
costs are only a portion of the full welfare.
The different collaboration concepts drive on different assumptions concerning
such mechanism. A full welfare mechanism is assumed in the supranational
planning concept. Not only investment costs, but also changes in congestion
revenues, consumer and producer surplus are taken into account. When such a full
compensation mechanism is in place, it is always possible to compensate all losers
and align incentives with the European objective function.
For the Pareto-planner two variants are defined. Either no compensation at all
is assumed or a light form of compensation limited to investment costs only.
Obviously, the latter approach has more potential in achieving a higher overall
welfare level. Nevertheless, the limitation to costs only performs worse than a full
welfare compensation mechanism.
In the non-cooperative planning game, no compensation at all is assumed. Hence,
the outcome can include countries loosing welfare without being compensated. As
already highlighted above, from an overall welfare point of view, this is not always
worse.
The main lesson learned from this analysis is that a compensation mechanism based
on investment costs only is not guaranteeing an adequate alignment of European
and national goals. As illustrated by the examples, it can work in some cases, but
without any guarantee for the European case.
Lessons for Europe
Earlier studies providing an insight in the welfare distribution for large European
projects (e.g. an offshore grid) indicated that overall welfare gains are certainly
possible, but that those gains are not evenly distributed among all countries. Hence,
ending up with winners and losers is not a fiction. Such a distribution of the gains
from traded is of course linked to the initial asymmetry between the different
countries. Starting from this finding, this thesis’ results can be translated to the
European case.
As the supranational planner results in an outcome with winners and losers,
the assumption of a full welfare compensation mechanism is prerequisite for the
European context with several countries connected to a single network. With
150 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
winners and losers in the suprantional outcome, the Pareto-planning approach
without any form of cost allocation cannot result in a supranational outcome. Also
the Pareto-variant with the allocation of investment costs to the winners, is also
not resulting in the optimal European outcome. However, better results than
without cost allocation are certainly possible, especially for investments where the
investments cost occur on the territory of the winners or countries remaining status
quo. Whenever countries with an overall welfare loss going beyond investment
costs are to be relied upon for certain investment projects, the variant with cost
allocation is insufficient to bridge the gap between European and national interests.
The outcome of the non-cooperative planning game is not easily predicted for the
European situation. From this concept, a relevant lesson for Europe learned from
the examples, is the importance of the topology and the potential for one country
to become the most influential player (cfr. zone B in the radial 3-zone example).
Consequently, both the Third Package and the EIP are insufficient to fully align
European and national interests.
8.2 Recommendations for further research
The presented research calls for further steps on several fronts. Not only
recommendations concerning the methodology, but also new questions arising
from the results can be formulated.
 Three concepts are modelled in this thesis. These concepts represent, however,
different (extreme) points on a spectrum of possible collaboration. As
already discussed in chapter 7 more complicated models with more realistic
assumptions on negotiation can be defined. Such models have the potential to
more closely mimic the existing situation. Similarly, different CR allocation
keys can be looked at in the Pareto-planning concept.
 In this thesis all concepts are illustrated using small-scale examples. This was
a deliberate choice as it allows for a clear insight in the intuition underlying
each concept. Extreme examples have been selected making results more
tractable. Nevertheless, testing the concepts on larger networks and networks
explicitly representing the European topology could shed a brighter light on
how extreme the differences in results can be for real(istic) networks.
 In addition to the previous recommendation, it was highlighted in the
examples that a degree of asymmetry between different zones is required in
order to have gains from trade. It should be assessed how large this asymmetry
is for real cases and how it evolves in time. A more exact calibration of
generation cost and demand data is necessary. Also the returns to scale in
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transmission investments can be introduced in order to reach a more realistic
situation.
 In order to achieve the first suggestion it is required to enhance the solution
methods for the different mathematical models. A better fine-tuning of the
GA with cross-over and mutation strategies better adapted to the problem
addressed, are recommended. Another route to follow is to switch to dynamic
programming. Even more crucial is implementing a solution method for
solving the EPEC problem. Enumeration was sufficient for this thesis’ research
goals, but is not acceptable as solution method for larger networks.
 Given the triangular European energy policy challenge, it is useful to
investigate what happens when the objective function is extended with
measures for sustainability and reliability. In this thesis only competitiveness
by means of economic welfare is dealt with. In the chapters discussing the
three concepts it is already indicated that the models should be up to this
challenge, but that new assumptions will be necessary, e.g. with respect to
the welfare constraints in the Pareto-planning concept.
 It is concluded that a full welfare mechanism is beneficial for aligning national
and European goals. In this thesis no statement is made on how such
mechanism should look like. Remembering the experiences with the ITC
mechanism, a careful design is important.
 In European market design and legislation congestion revenues are explicitly
present. This is not the case for consumer and producer surplus, the other
parts of economic welfare. Given this rather ’tangible’ presence of congestion
revenues, it could be investigated how they can be used in a compensation
logic. One route to follow is to change the assumed 50-50 distribution key.
 Going further than only addressing congestion revenues, a more fundamental
approach would entail a complete rethinking of transmission tariffs. Instead
of keeping its design national and adding a compensation mechanism on top
of it, a harmonization or a complete new European standard tariff design can
open opportunities in streamlining European and national incentives. It can
even render an explicit compensation mechanism obsolete.
 This thesis assumed that all investments are done by welfare (either national or
European) maximizing planners. In reality, TSOs are often profit-maximizing
rather than welfare-maximizing players. This can alter the game played
by investors. Secondly, in Europe and other parts of the world merchant
investors are also investing in transmission assets. They have a different
objective function and invest for profit. How can they contribute to the
investment challenge?
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A
Calibration GA
This appendix outlines the experimentation used to calibrate several parameters of
the genetic algorithm used in chapter 6. The supranational planning problem is
used to calibrate the Pareto-planning problem. The three-zone, 14-node example of
section 5.4.5 is used. The optimum is calculated using the model and techniques of
chapter 5 and is used here as reference for evaluating the performance of different
parameter settings. The tested parameters and their ranges are given in Table A.1.
The initial population can impact the quality of the solution found. Therefore,
each possible parameter combination is tested twice. Moreover, each parameter is
tested numerous times in different settings for the other parameters. A total of
512 runs of the GA is used to calibrate. 256 runs per possible parameter value are
run for the selection and cross-over mechanisms. For instance, half of all runs use
single-point cross-over and the other half uses double-point cross-over. 128 runs
are performed for each possible value for the generation gap, cross-over rate and
mutation rate. The number of generations is set at 2000 as convergence is reached
by then in most cases. The number of individuals per generation is set at 40.
In Tables A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5 and A.6 the average number of runs required to obtain
the best solution found and the average final value of that solution is given for each
parameter tested. The former is a measure for speed, the latter for quality. The
average final value is expressed relative to the known optimum. When this value
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equals 1 the optimum is found by the GA. Hence, the higher the value in the third
column of these tables, the better the parameter scores. The lower the number in
the second column, the lower the number of generations required to obtain that
score. From Tables A.2-A.6 it can be learned that in particular the mutation rate
has a significant impact on both the convergence speed and the actual solution
found. A value of 0.15 is preferred.
For a mutation rate of 0.15, Tables A.7, A.8, A.9 and A.10 show the impact of the
remaining parameters. The cross-over rate is the most relevant parameter further
impacting the quality and the convergence speed. A cross-over rate of 0.7 is selected.
The other parameters exhibit only minor differences. For those parameters, the
setting with the highest average final value is selected. A generation gap of 0.5,
stochastic universal sampling and single-point cross-over are chosen. In Fig. A.1 it
is illustrated that using a mutation rate of 0.15 and a cross-over rate of 0.7 results
in good GA performance.
Parameter Parameter values used for experimentation
Generation gap 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8
Selection rws, sus
Cross-over Single-point (xovsp), Double-point (xovdp)
Cross-over rate 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8
Mutation rate 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3
Table A.1: GA calibration: tested parameters and values
Mutation rate Average #generations Average final value
0.15 699 0.99996887
0.20 1050 0.99994699
0.25 1542 0.99990521
0.30 1587 0.99965099
Table A.2: Impact of mutation rate
Generation gap Average #generations Average final value
0.5 1204 0.99988341
0.6 1207 0.99987051
0.7 1209 0.99987463
0.8 1255 0.99984560
Table A.3: Initial impact of generation gap
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Cross-over rate Average #generations Average final value
0.5 1208 0.99988184
0.6 1168 0.99987673
0.7 1205 0.99987566
0.8 1194 0.99986137
Table A.4: Initial impact of cross-over rate
Selection mechanism Average #generations Average final value
rws 1231 0.99986877
sus 1208 0.99987585
Table A.5: Initial impact of selection mechanism
Cross-over mechanism Average #generations Average final value
Single point 1231 0.99986725
Double point 1209 0.99986878
Table A.6: Initial impact of cross-over mechanism
Generation gap Average #generations Average final value
0.5 1074 0.99996315
0.6 1006 0.99991949
0.7 1113 0.99993138
0.8 1210 0.99992813
Table A.7: Impact of generation gap with mutation rate=0.15
Cross-over rate Average #generations Average final value
0.5 1569 0.99978771
0.6 587 0.99996576
0.7 842 0.99997671
0.8 1487 0.99990306
Table A.8: Impact of cross-over rate with mutation rate=0.15
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Selection mechanism Average #generations Average final value
rws 1111 0.99993140
sus 1087 0.99994329
Table A.9: Impact of selection mechanism with mutation rate=0.15
Cross-over mechanism Average #generations Average final value
Single point 1081 0.99993940
Double point 1117 0.99994329
Table A.10: Impact of cross-over mechanism with mutation rate=0.15
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Figure A.1: GA calibration: runs with mutation rate =0.15 and cross-over rate=0.7
(in black) and all other runs (in grey)
B
Alternative welfare
definition
In chapter 5 welfare was defined as the sum of PS, CS and CR. Due to the existence
of international capital markets it could be argued that PS should not be accounted
for in the same way as for CS. In particular, when zonal welfare is addressed, this
can turn out to be more realistic. Should, for instance, a country try to maximimise
zonal welfare including zonal PS when it knows that the generation companies
holding this PS are in fact owned by other another country? This appendix briefly
illustrates on the two-zone example what happens when PS is neglected and only
the sum of CS and CR is used as definition for welfare.
By not allowing welfare transfers within a zone (e.g. CS is replaced by PS), the
problem becomes more restricted. This illustrated in Fig. B.1. For zones A
and B now only the sum of CS and CR are shown on the different axes. The
Pareto-constraints are positioned at the initial level of CS and PS. It can be seen
that no Pareto-improvements are feasible. Zone A looses CS whenever the capacity
between zones A and B is different from zero. In this case the loss in CS cannot be
compensated by increased CR. Given this situation, the only equilibrium in the
non-cooperative game is also the initial situation, i.e. 0 MW installed on TAB .
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Figure B.1: Two-zone example: outcomes for different concepts and an alternative
welfare definition
Note that when for the supranational planner the planner’s objective function also
excludes PS and only maximizes overall CS+CR minus transmission investment
costs, the supranational outcome also differs from the results in chapter 5. Now
only 880 MW would be installed and not 945.2 MW. When a higher transmission
capacity is installed, the investment costs are not covered by the increase in CS+CR.
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